Abstract
The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 established the Lok Adalat as a consensual, non-adversarial mechanism to promote affordable and expeditious access to justice through voluntary settlement. However, the introduction of Permanent Lok Adalats (PLAs) under the Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002 fundamentally altered this framework by conferring adjudicatory powers upon a forum historically rooted in conciliation. This paper examines the resulting jurisprudential contradiction between the traditional Lok Adalat's consent-based ethos and the coercive adjudicatory authority exercised by PLAs under Chapter VI-A of the Act.
Drawing upon statutory analysis and judicial precedents, including P. T. Thomas v. Thomas Job, State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, Canara Bank v. G. S. Jayarama, and recent High Court decisions, the paper demonstrates that while traditional Lok Adalats derive their legitimacy exclusively from voluntary compromise, Permanent Lok Adalats may render binding and final decisions even in the absence of party consent. This transformation challenges the foundational principles of party autonomy and consensual dispute resolution that have historically defined the institution of the Lok Adalat.
The paper argues that retaining both institutions under a common nomenclature obscures their fundamentally different legal character, creates misleading expectations for litigants, and raises concerns regarding procedural fairness, particularly in light of the absence of a statutory right of appeal and the relaxation of procedural and evidentiary rules. Rather than advocating the abolition of PLAs, the paper proposes targeted reforms, including renaming the institution to reflect its adjudicatory nature, introducing a limited appellate mechanism, mandating reasoned decisions, and issuing procedural guidelines through the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA).
It concludes that while Permanent Lok Adalats serve an important role in resolving public utility disputes efficiently, conceptual clarity and enhanced procedural safeguards are essential to preserve the integrity of India's consensual alternative dispute resolution framework. Keywords: Lok Adalat; Permanent Lok Adalat; Consensual Dispute Resolution;
Adjudication; Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; Alternative Dispute Resolution; Party Autonomy.
The Traditional Lok Adalat: Consent as the Sole Foundation
The traditional Lok Adalat operates on a clear institutional premise: no award without party consent. Constituted under Section 19 of the Act, its authority to pass awards derives exclusively from Section 21, which requires a compromise or settlement voluntarily arrived at between parties. The Supreme Court in P. T. Thomas v. Thomas Job (2005) 6 SCC 4871 characterised the Lok Adalat as an ancient Indian mechanism based on Gandhian principles, where proceedings are founded on compromise, producing no winners or losers. The Court observed that this system provides a speedy, cost-effective, and simple method of justice. Indian courts have consistently affirmed that consent is non-negotiable.
In State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh (2008) 2 SCC 6602, the Supreme Court held that a Lok Adalat award derives validity solely from party consent, emphasising that the signature of parties, not merely their counsel, is essential. The Karnataka High Court in Shaila v. Managing Director, ICICI Lombard GIC Ltd (Karnataka High Court, March 25, 2026), set aside an award where counsel had agreed to a settlement without client instructions. Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed that "a wrong concession, statement, admission, compromise, and settlement made by a counsel without obtaining instructions or authority from the clients will not bind the clients."
Similarly, the Gauhati High Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. Hakim Uddin, held that a company cannot be bound by counsel's settlement made without written authority, stating that "the objective of the Act is to bring disputes to a final settlement for which the presence of the parties and their free consent is mandatory." The legal position is therefore settled. The traditional Lok Adalat embodies a clear proposition: consent precedes award. Where parties fail to reach agreement, the forum lacks authority to impose a resolution.
The Permanent Lok Adalat: Adjudication Without Consent
Chapter VI-A (Sections 22A to 22E) was inserted into the Act by the 2002 Amendment to establish specialised forums for disputes relating to public utility services, including transport, postal services, insurance, power supply, hospitals, and educational institutions. The critical departure lies in Section 22-C(8), which provides:"Where the parties fail to reach an agreement under sub-section (7), the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, if the dispute does not relate to any offence, decide the dispute." This provision marks a radical departure from the traditional model. The Permanent Lok Adalat is not required to return unresolved disputes to court. Instead, it assumes adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Section 22-D further provides that the Permanent Lok Adalat "shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity, and other principles of justice." The Supreme Court confirmed this interpretation in Canara Bank v. G. S. Jayarama. A bench of Justices D. Y. Chandrachud and P. S. Narasimha observed that the Permanent Lok Adalat's role "mutates from that of a conciliatory body to an adjudicatory body" when conciliation fails. Section 22-E(4) provides that every award "shall be final and shall not be called in question in any suit, application, or execution proceeding."
In the traditional Lok Adalat, finality without appeal is justified by party consent. The Permanent Lok Adalat imposes finality without consent.
https://indiankanoon. org/doc/1587800/https://thebarbulletin. com/lok-adalat-award-unsigned-joint-memo/: https://indiankanoon. org/docfragment/1923398 The Jharkhand High Court in State Bank of India v. State of Jharkhand, recognised this tension. Justice D. N. Patel observed that "predominantly the role of Permanent Lok Adalat is like a conciliator and not like an adjudicating authority." Yet the statutory framework expressly confers adjudicatory powers. The divergence between the two institutions is striking. In a traditional Lok Adalat, the basis of any award is the mutual consent of the parties, and party autonomy remains complete, parties may reject any proposal without consequence.
When conciliation fails, the case simply returns to the referring court. The procedure, while informal, remains fundamentally consent-based. The absence of a right of appeal is justified precisely because the parties have voluntarily agreed to the outcome. The Permanent Lok Adalat operates on an entirely different footing. Its awards are based not on consent but on adjudication when conciliation fails. Party autonomy is severely limited, as the forum may decide the dispute even without party agreement. When conciliation fails, the forum does not return the case to court but assumes adjudicatory jurisdiction itself. The procedure is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Evidence Act.
And critically, while there is no right of appeal, this absence cannot be justified by consent, because no consent was ever given. The Telangana High Court in K. Kalyani v. Mandal Legal Services Committee (2025 SCC OnLine TS 3428) emphasised that parties must be personally present and their signatures obtained before any Lok Adalat award. However, this procedural safeguard offers limited protection when the forum possesses independent adjudicatory authority. The issue is compounded by shared nomenclature. Litigants approaching a Permanent Lok Adalat may reasonably expect the same consensual process that characterises traditional Lok Adalats.
This expectation is actively encouraged by shared terminology, creating confusion with real consequences for parties who unknowingly subject themselves to binding adjudication without consent.
Practical Implications for Litigants
Consider a litigant advised to approach a Permanent Lok Adalat for resolution of an insurance dispute. The litigant, familiar with traditional Lok Adalats, expects a voluntary process where disagreement leads to return to court. Only when conciliation fails does the litigant discover that the forum possesses adjudicatory powers. At that stage, withdrawal is no longer an option. While writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 remains theoretically available against Permanent Lok Adalat awards, this remedy offers limited practical relief. Filing a writ petition requires demonstrating jurisdictional error or violation of fundamental rights, a significantly higher threshold than a statutory appeal.
For disputes involving modest sums, the cost and complexity of writ proceedings render this remedy inaccessible. The Supreme Court in Canara Bank clarified that Permanent Lok Adalats lack jurisdiction over disputes exceeding Rs. 10 lakhs in value and over non-compoundable offences. However, within these limits, their adjudicatory power remains unqualified by consent requirements.
The Appropriate Response
The challenge is not one of dismantling the Permanent Lok Adalat framework. These forums serve a legitimate function in expediting public utility disputes. The issue is one of clarification and reform. First, rename the institution. The term "Lok Adalat" carries specific connotations of voluntariness and consent in Indian legal culture. Renaming Permanent Lok Adalats as "Public Utility Disputes Tribunals" would accurately reflect their adjudicatory character and prevent litigant confusion. Second, provide a statutory appeal. Section 22-E(4) should be amended to provide a limited right of appeal to the High Court on questions of law.
Where a forum imposes binding awards without party consent, affected parties require meaningful appellate review. Third, require reasoned orders. Even if not bound by the Evidence Act, Permanent Lok Adalats should be required to issue reasoned orders explaining the factual and legal basis for their decisions. Transparency in adjudication is essential regardless of procedural informality. A formal statutory amendment may be pursued, but a calibrated soft law approach could also suffice.
The National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) may issue principles-based guidance clarifying that the adjudicatory powers of Permanent Lok Adalats require enhanced procedural safeguards, including mandatory recording of reasons and disclosure of jurisdiction to litigants before proceedings commence.
Conclusion
The traditional Lok Adalat represents a significant contribution to alternative dispute resolution. It embodies the principles of party autonomy, voluntary settlement, and consensual justice. The Permanent Lok Adalat serves a legitimate function in expediting public utility disputes. However, its adjudicatory powers mark a fundamental departure from the consensual ethos that defines the Lok Adalat concept. Classifying both institutions under the same nomenclature creates conceptual confusion, generates false expectations among litigants, and risks unfair outcomes. Justice delayed is justice denied.
Justice imposed without consent, ordinary evidentiary safeguards or a right of appeal is no longer purely conciliatory. As the use of Permanent Lok Adalats expands, legislation and judicial doctrine must define the forum honestly and provide procedure proportionate to its adjudicatory power.
Primary materials
Key primary materials: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; National Legal Services Authority.