Abstract
India witnesses some of the world's largest public gatherings, including religious festivals (Kumbh Mela, Tirupati), sporting events (IPL), and cultural celebrations (film launches, political rallies - Karur). These assemblies often result in tragic stampedes, revealing glaring failures in crowd control, public safety management, and legal accountability.
Despite the constitutional guarantee of the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, existing laws under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) / The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023 and the Disaster Management Act, 2005, enforcement and prosecutorial mechanisms have largely failed to prevent repeated occurrences or ensure justice to victims.
This paper examines recent stampede incidents in 2024-2025, the legal and constitutional framework governing public safety in India, and the degree of state accountability-criminal, civil, administrative-for tragedies that could have been prevented. It analyses legislative proposals (for example, the Karnataka Crowd Control Bill, 2025), judicial decisions, and inquiries to assess gaps in law, policy, and practice.
The paper argues that though the legal doctrines (negligence, duty of care, constitutional rights) are well-recognised, in practice acute deficiencies in enforcement, clarity of roles, infrastructure, standards of crowd safety, and political will undermine effective accountability.
Keywords
Public Safety, State Accountability, Negligence & Duty of Care, Crowd Management Legislation, Constitutional Right to Life (Article 21)
Introduction
Stampedes-also described as crowd crushes or crowd disasters-have long afflicted India across its states. These events often lead to large-scale loss of life and injury, generate public outrage, and raise deep questions about governance, legal responsibility, and social justice. In recent years, particularly 2024-2025, several high-profile stampedes have renewed debate about whether Indian law and institutions sufficiently ensure public safety in mass gatherings.
The objective of this paper is to
Survey and analyse recent cases of stampedes and identify recurring patterns of failures (organizational, infrastructural, administrative).
Review the legal and constitutional obligations on the State and other actors (organisers, police, municipal authorities) regarding public safety, especially crowd safety.
Evaluate state accountability in terms of criminal, civil, and administrative liability in Indian law, examining successes and failures.
Analyse recent legislative developments (especially in states) aimed at crowd control, and their promise and limitations.
Propose legal and policy reforms to strengthen prevention and accountability.
Recent Stampede Incidents in India: Cases and Causal Patterns
To understand weaknesses in public safety and legal accountability, first we must examine key incidents from recent years, noting what went wrong.
Key Recent Incidents
Here are several of the notable stampede (crowd crush) events in India in 2024-2025:
Bengaluru, Chinnaswamy Stadium - June 4, 2025: During RCB's IPL victory celebrations outside the stadium, a stampede resulted in 11 deaths and many injuries.
Tirupati, Subramanya Ekadashi/token distribution - January 8, 2025: A stampede during Vaikunta Ekadashi token distribution resulted in 6 deaths and over 50 injuries.
Maha Kumbh, Prayagraj - January 29, 2025 (Mauni Amavasya ritual): A stampede caused by overcrowding and broken barricades claimed ~30 lives, with many injured.
Karur, Tamil Nadu - Political Rally (led by actor-politician Vijay / TVK) - September 27, 2025: A political rally exceeded permitted crowd capacity, and a stampede resulted in 41 deaths (including children) and dozens of injuries. Investigations into permission, crowd control, delayed arrival, and lack of amenities are underway.
These incidents typify recurring legal and administrative patterns: overcrowding, poor planning and crowd control, unclear or missing permissions, delayed emergency response, lack of coordination between event organizers and State authorities.
Recurring Causal Patterns
From these and other incidents, several recurring failure patterns emerge:
Overcrowding and Exceeding Permitted Capacity: Events exceeding crowd limits without sufficient planning. In Karur, the gathering far exceeded permitted numbers.
Insufficient Crowd Management and Infrastructure: Poor design and layout, narrow access routes, broken or inadequate barricades, lack of emergency exits. Examples: in the Kumbh incident, broken barricades; in Bengaluru, mismanagement of entry gates.
Delay or Lateness and Poor Communication: In Karur, extreme heat and delayed arrival of the speaker contributed to panic. Lack of communication to control or direct crowds.
Lack of Medical / Emergency Preparedness: Insufficient ambulances, medical staff; delays in emergency services. Tirupati inquiry noted ambulances not used effectively.
Regulatory and Permission Failures: Organisers sometimes proceed without required permissions; police and local authorities not enforcing conditions. For example, the Bengaluru stampede case raised issues that RCB and KSCA conducted event despite denial of permissions.
Inadequate Oversight and Institutional Response: Inquiry commissions often point to field-level lapses; higher level accountability (political or administrative) often muted. Clean chits given, or delays and dilution of responsibility.
Legal and Constitutional Framework Governing Public Safety in India
To evaluate accountability, we need clarity as to what the law imposes on State and other actors on public safety, especially in crowd management.
Constitutional Rights and State's Duty
Article 21 - Right to Life: The Supreme Court has interpreted this as inclusive of the right to live with dignity, which includes safety, physical safety, including in public gatherings. The state has an obligation to act to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life.
Article 14 - Equality before Law / Non-discrimination: State must ensure equal protection and safety for all; failure of safety measures disproportionately harming marginalized groups (poor, women, children, pilgrims) can also be seen through this lens.
Article 19(1)(d) - Freedom of Movement: Safety risks or poor infrastructure hindering safe movement during mass gatherings may violate this.
Judicial precedents affirm that state authorities cannot remain passive in face of known risks: there is a duty of preventive action.
Statutory Laws & Penal Provisions
Indian Penal Code (IPC), now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS):
Negligence / rash or negligent acts causing death or injury: Sections such as 304A (old), now in BNS Section 106(1) - causing death by negligence.
Hurt or grievous hurt by negligent or dangerous acts: Sections 337/338 (old), now section 125 BNS etc.
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) powers (or its replacement / modifications) for preventive orders: e. g. powers to issue orders under Section 144 (old) to prevent assembly likely to cause danger. In new schemes, similar preventive jurisdiction is expected to exist.
Municipal / Local Laws: Building codes, public safety licences, permissions for public gatherings, fire safety norms under relevant State Fire Safety Acts, local municipal regulation of traffic, roads, crowd flow etc.
Compensation law and tort liability: Victims or families may sue for negligence in civil courts; courts have in past awarded compensation (e. g. Uphaar Cinema fire).
Administrative / Disciplinary provisions: Government servant misconduct can result in administrative action under service rules if they fail to discharge duty. Inquiries / judicial commissions sometimes recommend such.
Legislative Proposals & Recent Bills
The Karnataka Crowd Control (Managing Crowd at Events and Venues of Mass Gathering) Bill, 2025 is a prominent recent legislative effort. Its key features include:
Requirement that organisers seek prior permission from the police for public events that may draw large crowds.
Penal sanctions: imprisonment up to 3 years, fines up to Rs 5 lakh for commercial event organisers violating safety norms. For non-commercial organisers, penalties may be smaller or fines.
Provision for indemnity bonds, safety clearances, and possibly cancelling or changing venues by authorities if risk is identified.
In more recent drafting, proposals of stronger punishments if fatalities occur: possibly life imprisonment.
There are also proposals in different states for similar crowd safety / mass gathering regulation following major incidents.
Accountability: Criminal, Civil, Administrative
To hold parties accountable when tragedies occur, different forms of liability exist. This section analyses how they apply (or fail) in the recent cases.
Criminal Liability
Negligence / Culpable Negligence: If organisers or state actors act carelessly - failing to foresee or guard against risk that they reasonably ought to have foreseen - criminal charges for negligence (or in more serious cases, culpable homicide not amounting to murder) can be invoked. For example, in the Bengaluru stampede, police FIRs have been filed against RCB management, KSCA, and event management firms for "culpable homicide and other serious charges" along with acts endangering life under BNS.
Failure of Policing / Authorization: Obstructing safe crowd flow, failure to equip event with enough security or regulatory oversight may attract charges under various sections that penalise acts endangering public safety.
Liability of Officials: If government officials (police, municipal authorities, fire department, etc.) fail to enforce regulations or permit unsafe events, they may be subject to investigation, suspension, or charges. Whether these lead to conviction is another matter.
Civil Liability and Compensation
Victims/families can bring claims in civil courts for negligence and seek compensation. In some past disasters (e. g. Uphaar Cinema fire, other major public disasters), courts have awarded damages.
State compensation under disaster relief statutes, or special compensation by state governments (ex gratia payments) is common, though that may not equate legal liability.
Administrative Accountability
Inquiries and commissions: After many incidents, judicial or administrative inquiry committees are formed. These can identify failures, recommend disciplinary action. For example, the commission after the Tirupati stampede gave clean chits to certain high officials but blamed field level persons.
Disciplinary action: Government servant service rules allow for departmental proceedings if an official is found negligent. However, such proceedings are often slow or inconclusive.
Enforcement Realities & Gaps
While the legal framework allows for liability, often gaps in practice include:
Delayed or weak investigations, lack of evidence or culpability hard to prove.
Politicisation or influence leading to partial accountability.
Courts often limited to awarding compensation or ordering investigations but struggle to ensure structural reform.
Many events (religious, traditional) are exempted in legislative proposals or practice, even though many serious stampedes happen in religious gatherings.
Recent Legislative and Policy Developments
Because stampedes continue to produce heavy casualties, there are emerging legal / policy responses worth studying.
The Karnataka Crowd Control Bill, 2025
As discussed, Karnataka's bill is pivotal. Its promising features include:
Clear definition of mass gatherings, requiring permit systems, safety clearances.
Stronger penal sanctions for organisers who violate norms.
Powers to local authorities (police, district magistrates) to cancel or relocate events if risk identified.
Financial penalties and indemnity bonds, compensation to victims.
Limitations / Concerns
Exemptions for religious/traditional gatherings in early drafts may severely limit reach. Many disasters are religious/traditional.
Enforcement mechanism and capacity: Will local authorities have enough training, infrastructure, manpower?
Ambiguity in some definitions: what constitutes "mass gathering", what safety standards are binding, who sets them.
Judicial Responses and Inquiries
After Bengaluru stampede: the John Michael D'Cunha Commission looked into causes and put responsibility with RCB and police for poor crowd control at entry gates.
Tirupati inquiry: assigned responsibility to field officials, noting lapses in safety protocols and emergency response.
In Karur, High Court has demanded SOPs, and a SIT has been constituted. Judicial activism is playing a role in imposing accountability demands.
State Practices & Compensation
State governments have in many cases announced ex gratia compensation for victims immediately after incidents. While necessary, such payments do not substitute for legal liability or structural reforms.
Suspensions or transfers of officials are sometimes ordered immediately (e. g, suspending police or government functionaries). But investigations often drag, and consequences are inconsistent.
Gaps, Challenges, and Barriers
In spite of legal provisions, serious obstacles prevent prevention of stampedes and effective accountability when they occur. Key challenges are:
Legal Ambiguity & Patchwork Regulation
No comprehensive national law governing mass gatherings or crowd safety. Regulatory oversight is fragmented across states, municipalities, police, fire services.
Existing laws may not clearly define standards (crowd density thresholds, gate widths, emergency exits, medical services).
Exemptions and Cultural Considerations
Religious, traditional gatherings often exempt or loosely regulated. Given that many fatal stampedes occur in such settings, exemptions limit preventive capability.
Capacity Constraints (Infrastructure, Training, Resources)
Marginal physical infrastructure: limited ingress/egress, poor ventilation, narrow paths, deficient barricading.
Inadequate emergency and medical infrastructure in many locales.
Limited training for officials in crowd science, risk assessment, disaster response.
Enforcement and Institutional Fragmentation
Multiple authorities (organisers, police, municipal bodies, fire department) each bear part of responsibility; coordination often weak.
Insufficient oversight and monitoring; permission regimes sometimes formalities rather than substantive checks.
Political, Social, and Practical Pressures
Pressure to hold political, electoral, religious events with massive crowds; delays or postponements are politically unpopular.
Cost pressures: event organisers may avoid expensive safety measures.
Public expectations sometimes low; crowd behaviour hard to control once large gathering begins.
Weak Accountability in Practice
Investigations sometimes slow, incomplete, or do not lead to prosecutions.
Civil compensation may be modest; departmental disciplinary action often stalls.
Judicial directions or recommendations are often not followed up with systemic change.
Recommended Legal & Policy Reforms
To address the above gaps and improve both prevention and accountability, the following reforms are proposed:
Legislative Reform
National Mass Gathering / Crowd Safety Act: Create a central framework law that sets minimum safety standards for mass gatherings (infrastructure, medical facilities, emergency services, crowd flow design). States may build upon but not below the central baseline.
Mandatory Permit / Safety Clearance Regime: All large public gatherings (religious, political, cultural, commercial) must be cleared in advance by competent authorities, following risk assessment, capacity evaluation, and emergency readiness.
Defined Standards for Venue Safety: Specific guidelines (or regulations) for ingress / egress, gate widths, number of exit gates, crowd density thresholds, structural load limits, signage, medical and water facilities.
Penalties that Deter: Clear criminal and civil liability for organisers and responsible officials: graded punishments depending on severity (injury, death), including possible life imprisonment in the worst cases. Also, mandatory compensation and powers to recover damages from assets of organisers if not paid.
Statutory Emergency Preparedness & Response Plans: Every event must submit an emergency action plan (medical aid, evacuation routes, communication protocols) as part of permission.
Institutional and Administrative Measures
Capacity Building: Training for police, municipal authorities, fire services in crowd risk management, disaster response; use of technology (e. g, CCTV, crowd-density monitoring, AI tools) to anticipate danger.
Design and Infrastructure Investment: Ensuring that public spaces, religious sites, pilgrimage paths, festival areas etc. are developed with safe ingress/egress, barricades, shelters, water and shade, medical help.
Coordination Mechanisms: Clear division of roles between organisers, state and local government, police, emergency services; prior joint emergency drills.
Transparent Inquiry and Accountability Platforms: Mandated judicial or administrative inquiries with public reporting; follow-up on recommendations; well-defined responsibility for action.
Legal and Judicial Measures
Proactive Judicial Oversight: Courts should be willing to take suo motu cognizance in major stampedes, order reports, ensure compliance of past judgments.
Strengthening Evidence Framework: Better documentation, preservation of video/CCTV, design plans, permission documents, logs of communication-all to facilitate clearer proving of negligence or culpability.
Victim Rights and Compensation: Streamline processes for compensation; victim/family legal aid; ensure state compensation not just symbolic but adequate.
Analysis of 2025 Through these Lenses
Applying the framework above to recent incidents (Bengaluru, Karur, Prayagraj, Tirupati) highlights:
The Karnataka Bill is promising, but as noted, exempts religious events which are a major category of risk. Without covering religious gatherings, large portions of stampede risk remain outside regulation.
In Karur, although there was police permission, the event far exceeded permitted capacity; local authorities seemed unprepared for the swelling crowd. Despite existing laws, enforcement was inadequate; preliminary FIRs show criminal liability being considered. But whether this leads to effective criminal responsibility remains to be seen.
In the Maha Kumbh, notwithstanding advanced monitoring (CCTV etc.), infrastructure or crowd bottlenecks (broken barricades etc.) remained weak spots. Judicial responses post facto exist but prevention seems hampered.
The Tirupati case shows how even when arrangements exist, lapses at field level (e. g. gate operations, medical emergency handling) can turn small issues into deadly ones. Also, inquiries often focus on officials lower down rather than systemic responsibility.
Comparative International Perspectives
Looking briefly at how other jurisdictions address mass gathering safety offers insight:
Many countries (e. g. UK, Australia, EU nations) require detailed safety management plans for large events, with enforceable standards for crowd flow, exit routes, emergency medical services.
Some jurisdictions impose strict criminal liability for organisers if safety negligence results in death or injury, and require insurances / bonds.
Use of technology (crowd density sensors, simulation modelling) is more developed in some countries; also, preventive policing and event-licensing frameworks better resourced.
India could learn from these in shaping its laws and practices.
Conclusion
Stampede incidents in India in 2024-2025 underscore a persistent gap between what legal norms require and what is delivered in practice. Constitutional duties, statutory provisions, and draft laws offer a framework, but enforcement, institutional capacity, clarity of responsibility, and inclusion (especially in religious/traditional spaces) are often weak. For state accountability to be meaningful, legal reforms must be coupled with administrative will, resources, and societal pressure.
In sum, preventing stampedes is as much a matter of law as of governance, design, infrastructure, and culture. The State must move from reactive inquiry to proactive prevention, from ex gratia payments to binding enforcement, and from vague standards to concrete, enforceable safety norms. Only then can the tragic loss of life become not just a matter for headlines, but a preventable shame.
Primary materials
Key primary materials: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Supreme Court of India judgments.