Criminal Law (BNS 2023) MCQs for CLAT PG

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 came into force on 1st July 2024, replacing the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, which had governed criminal law in India for over 163 years. The BNS represents the most comprehensive reform of India's substantive criminal law since independence. The IPC was drafted during British colonial rule and carried provisions that reflected colonial administrative priorities and Victorian-era social norms. The BNS retains the structure and most offences of the IPC while making several significant changes. The number of sections has been reduced from 511 to 358, achieving rationalisation without loss of substantive content. Several archaic expressions have been modernised: 'lunatic,' 'insane,' and 'idiot' have been replaced by 'person of unsound mind.' Sedition under Section 124A IPC has been deleted and replaced by Section 152 BNS which criminalises acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, with a focus on specific acts of subversion rather than broadly defined 'disaffection.' The BNS introduces community service as a new form of punishment for minor offences, reflecting a shift towards reformative justice. It also adds new offences that were absent from the IPC: organised crime, petty organised crime, terrorist acts, mob lynching (murder by a group of five or more persons on identity-based grounds), snatching as a specific form of theft, and sexual intercourse by deceitful means. Certain IPC provisions have been deleted: Section 309 (attempt to commit suicide), Section 377 (unnatural offences following Navtej Johar), Section 497 (adultery following Joseph Shine), and Section 124A (sedition following Kedar Nath concerns).

The requirement of a guilty mind, expressed through the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, is a foundational principle of criminal liability. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, as under the Indian Penal Code it replaced, most offences specify the required mental state using terms such as 'intentionally,' 'knowingly,' 'fraudulently,' 'dishonestly,' or 'voluntarily.' These words embody varying degrees of culpability, with intention generally denoting the highest level of mental fault and negligence the lowest. The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (AIR 1965 SC 722) addressed the question of when a statute may exclude the requirement of mens rea. In that case, the accused had carried undeclared gold into Indian territory in violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. He contended that he had no knowledge of the notification restricting gold imports. The Court held that the object of the regulatory statute would be defeated if the prosecution were required to prove knowledge of the notification in every case. The test the Court enunciated was contextual: courts must examine the language, subject matter, and purpose of the statutory provision to determine whether mens rea is excluded by necessary implication. Where a provision deals with regulatory or public welfare matters and proof of mental fault would frustrate its purpose, the statute may be treated as imposing strict liability. The corollary is that the general requirement of mens rea remains the rule, and strict liability is the exception, to be established by a careful analysis of legislative intent.

Section 22 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, provides a complete defence to a person who, at the time of the offence, was incapable of understanding the nature of the act or of knowing that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law, by reason of unsoundness of mind. This provision is derived from the McNaghten Rules formulated by the English House of Lords in 1843, which established the cognitive test for legal insanity in criminal law. The defence does not depend on the existence of a diagnosed mental illness at any point in time; it requires proof of a specific state of mental incapacity at the precise moment when the act was committed. In Srikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 7 SCC 748, the Supreme Court held that the accused, who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, was entitled to the benefit of the defence because medical evidence established that his illness at the time of the offence had rendered him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. The Court emphasised that a mere diagnosis of mental illness does not automatically entitle the accused to the defence; the court must evaluate whether the illness, at the time of the offence, rose to the level of incapacity specified in Section 84 IPC. The legal presumption is one of sanity; the accused bears the burden of establishing the defence of insanity on the balance of probabilities. Critically, the provision covers only those cases of unsoundness of mind where the accused could not understand the nature of the act at all, or could not appreciate its wrongfulness.

The distinction between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and murder is one of the most intricate areas of criminal law under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Section 100 BNS defines murder as a form of culpable homicide that falls within one of four specified clauses based on the degree of intent and knowledge. Section 101 BNS defines culpable homicide not amounting to murder as the residual category. The Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. R. Punnayya (AIR 1977 SC 45) offered a comprehensive exposition, describing culpable homicide as the genus and murder as the species; every murder is culpable homicide but not every culpable homicide is murder. The gradation turns on the degree of mental culpability with which the killing is effected. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465), Justice Vivian Bose enunciated the four-part test for murder under Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC, now Clause 3 of Section 100 BNS: the injury must have been intentionally inflicted; the accused must have intended to cause that specific injury, not merely some injury; it must be established objectively that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; and whether the injury is so sufficient is a question of medical fact to be proved by expert evidence, not a question of what the accused knew or believed. This test is particularly significant because it allows for a murder conviction even where the accused did not specifically intend death, provided the injury intentionally inflicted was, as a medical matter, sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

The right of private defence under Sections 34 to 44 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Sections 96 to 106 of the Indian Penal Code) is a codified right permitting individuals to protect themselves, their family members, and their property from unlawful aggression without recourse to public authorities, where such recourse is not possible. The right arises when there is a reasonable apprehension of an attack; it does not require an actual attack to have occurred, but the apprehension must be reasonable and objectively grounded, not merely a subjective fear or suspicion. Section 36 BNS places important limitations on the right: it is not available where there is time to seek the protection of public authorities, and it cannot be exercised against acts of public servants acting in good faith under colour of their office, even if those acts are not strictly legal. The right is defensive and not retributive; as the Supreme Court observed in James Martin v. State of Kerala (2004) 2 SCC 203, the right of private defence is not a licence to kill or to inflict punishment. In Deo Narain v. State of UP (AIR 1973 SC 473), the Court held that the force used in exercising the right must be proportionate to the threat apprehended and no more than is necessary for the purpose of defence. The right ceases when the danger has passed; force continued after the danger has ended is retaliation, not private defence. Section 37 BNS extends the right to causing death only in the specific circumstances listed therein, including reasonable apprehension of death, grievous hurt, rape, kidnapping, or acid attack.