Constitutional Law MCQs for CLAT PG

The anti-defection law was introduced into the Constitution by the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, which inserted the Tenth Schedule. The law was enacted in response to rampant floor-crossing by legislators - the phenomenon of elected representatives switching political allegiances, often for personal gain - which had destabilised governments and undermined the mandate of voters. The Tenth Schedule provides for the disqualification of a member of Parliament or a State Legislature on the ground of defection from the political party which set up the member's candidature. A member is deemed to have defected if he voluntarily gives up his membership of a political party or votes or abstains from voting in the legislature contrary to the direction issued by his party. The power to decide questions of disqualification on the ground of defection is vested in the Speaker or Chairman of the respective House, whose decision shall be final. The constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule was challenged in Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu (1993). A five-judge bench upheld the anti-defection law by a majority of 3:2, holding that it furthers the constitutional objectives of stable government and faithful implementation of voters' mandates. However, the Court struck down Paragraph 7 of the Schedule, which had barred courts from reviewing the Speaker's decision, as it was in the nature of an amendment to Articles 136, 226 and 227 and had not been ratified by States as required. The Court held that the Speaker's decisions are subject to judicial review on limited grounds including jurisdictional error, mala fides, violation of natural justice and perversity.

Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to every person equality before the law and equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The expression 'equality before the law' is a negative concept importing the absence of any special privilege in favour of any individual, while 'equal protection of the laws' is a positive concept requiring the State to give equal treatment to persons in equal circumstances. The traditional understanding of Article 14 permitted reasonable classification by the State for legislative purposes, subject to the twin tests: first, that the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together from those left out; and second, that this differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974), the Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope of Article 14. Justice Bhagwati, speaking for a majority, enunciated the new dimension of equality, holding that equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and facets and cannot be imprisoned within traditional limits. The Court held that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. From a positivist point of view, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other belongs to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14. This anti-arbitrariness doctrine has since been applied by the Supreme Court to strike down State actions that, though formally classified, are in substance arbitrary and unreasonable.

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. This right is available only to citizens, not to corporations or foreigners. The right is not absolute; Article 19(2) permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on this freedom in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence. Any restriction must satisfy the test of reasonableness - both in content and in procedure. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that the press, as the vehicle of expression, is directly protected. A restriction on the circulation of a newspaper would directly amount to a restriction on freedom of speech. The Court struck down the law as it did not fall within any of the grounds in Article 19(2). The scope of freedom of speech has been progressively expanded. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1962), the Court held that the freedom of a citizen to publish his thoughts through newspapers is directly protected by Article 19(1)(a). The right to know, the right to receive information, and the right to communicate information and ideas without interference have been read into Article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act as unconstitutional for imposing vague and overbroad restrictions on online speech that fell outside the eight grounds enumerated under Article 19(2), and for failing to satisfy the test of reasonableness.

Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. For many years following A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court interpreted Article 21 narrowly, holding that the Articles dealing with different fundamental rights operated in distinct fields and were mutually exclusive. This meant that as long as a law prescribed some procedure for deprivation of life or liberty, it was valid even if the procedure was arbitrary or unreasonable. The landmark transformation came in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), where a seven-judge bench overruled the Gopalan approach. The Court held that the various fundamental rights are not mutually exclusive watertight compartments; they overlap, and it is not correct to hold that a law affecting one right is to be tested with reference to that right alone. The Court further held that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his life or personal liberty must be reasonable, fair and just - and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Justice Bhagwati observed that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are not to be read in isolation but must be read together to form a golden triangle of fundamental rights. In consequence, any law that deprives a person of life or liberty must now pass three tests simultaneously: it must be a valid law (Article 13), the procedure it prescribes must be fair and reasonable (Article 21), and it must not violate the guarantees in Articles 14 and 19. The right to life has subsequently been interpreted expansively to include the right to live with dignity, the right to livelihood, the right to health, the right to education, and the right to a clean environment.

The Constitution of India is not merely a legal document conferring powers; it is a social document embodying principles that govern the exercise of those powers. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), a thirteen-judge bench of the Supreme Court by a majority of 7:6 held that while Parliament possesses the widest power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, this power does not extend to altering or destroying the basic structure or essential framework of the Constitution. The majority identified certain features as forming part of this basic structure - these include the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, the secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, and the federal character of the Constitution. The doctrine was further affirmed and applied in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980), where the Supreme Court struck down certain clauses of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1976 on the ground that they damaged the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court in Minerva Mills specifically held that harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy is itself an essential element of the basic structure. Parliament cannot, under the garb of amendment, vest in itself unlimited and unchecked power, for a limited government operating under a Constitution is itself a component of the basic structure.