Code of Civil Procedure 1908 MCQs for Judiciary

Correct answer: D. A dismissal in default of appearance

Section 2(2) CPC defines 'decree' as the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of parties with regard to matters in controversy. A dismissal in default (Order IX) is specifically excluded from the definition of 'decree' as it does not conclusively determine rights on merits. Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 and orders on preliminary issues are included as decrees. The distinction matters because decrees are appealable under Section 96 CPC whereas mere orders have limited appeal rights under Order XLIII.

Source note: Section 2(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908

Correct answer: B. The statement of grounds of a decree or order

Section 2(9) defines 'judgment' as the statement of the grounds of a decree or order. A judgment is thus the reasoning behind the ultimate decision, distinct from the decree which is the formal expression of adjudication. Every decree must be preceded by a judgment, but a judgment itself is not the decree. The distinction is critical because the period of limitation for appeal runs from the date of the decree, not the judgment, under the Limitation Act, 1963.

Source note: Section 2(9), Code of Civil Procedure 1908

Correct answer: B. Profits the person in wrongful possession actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received, together with interest on such profits, excluding profits due to improvements

Section 2(12) defines mesne profits as those profits which a person in wrongful possession actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received, together with interest on such profits. The definition expressly excludes profits arising from improvements made by the person in wrongful possession. This principle prevents unjust enrichment of the trespasser while ensuring fair compensation to the owner for the deprivation of use and enjoyment of the property.

Source note: Section 2(12), Code of Civil Procedure 1908

Correct answer: B. A formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree

Section 2(14) defines 'order' as the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree. The fundamental distinction is that decrees conclusively determine rights on the merits of the suit, while orders deal with procedural and interlocutory matters. Only certain specified orders are appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1, whereas all decrees (unless explicitly excluded) are appealable under Section 96 CPC. This distinction between decree and order is one of the most frequently tested concepts in civil procedure examinations.

Source note: Section 2(14), Code of Civil Procedure 1908

Correct answer: B. Determines rights with regard to some matters in controversy but does not finally dispose of the suit

A preliminary decree determines the rights of parties with regard to some or one of the matters in controversy in the suit, but does not finally dispose of the suit. After the preliminary decree, further proceedings are required before a final decree is passed. Suits for partition, mortgage foreclosure, administration, and dissolution of partnership are common contexts for preliminary decrees. Crucially, a preliminary decree is independently appealable under Section 97 CPC, and failure to appeal a preliminary decree bars challenge in appeal against the final decree.

Source note: Section 2(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908; Section 97 CPC

Correct answer: C. Either expressly or impliedly barred

Section 9 CPC confers wide jurisdiction on civil courts to try all suits of a civil nature except where cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. An express bar arises where a statute specifically ousts civil court jurisdiction, while an implied bar arises where a special statute creates an adequate remedy and forum in a manner indicating legislative intent to exclude the civil court. The Supreme Court in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1969) laid down the principles for determining when civil court jurisdiction is impliedly excluded, establishing that courts lean strongly in favour of their own jurisdiction.

Source note: Section 9, CPC 1908; Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1969)

Correct answer: C. The defendant resides or carries on business, or where the cause of action wholly or partly arises

Section 20 CPC provides that a suit may be instituted where the defendant (or any of several defendants) resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, OR where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. This gives the plaintiff a choice of forum when multiple options exist. The 'partly arises' limb of cause of action is generously interpreted, as even a small part of the transaction occurring within the territorial jurisdiction satisfies the test. Section 20 is subject to the overriding provisions of Sections 15-19 which govern specific categories of suits.

Source note: Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure 1908

Correct answer: C. Where the immovable property is situated

Section 16 CPC mandates that suits concerning immovable property, including suits for recovery, partition, foreclosure, redemption, determination of any right in immovable property, or recovery of movables distrained for rent, must be filed where the property is situated. This is a mandatory rule of territorial jurisdiction and not subject to the parties' choice under Section 20. The rationale is that the court where property is located has the most effective jurisdiction for enforcement of its orders through possession, attachment, or sale of that property.

Source note: Section 16, Code of Civil Procedure 1908

Correct answer: D. The first suit must have been decided on merits before the second suit is filed

Section 10 CPC applies when a matter is 'pending' in a previously instituted suit, not when it has already been decided. If the first suit has been finally decided, Section 11 (res judicata) becomes applicable rather than Section 10. The conditions for Section 10 are: identical matter directly and substantially in issue, same parties or those claiming under them, competent court in the first suit, and pendency of the first suit. The stay under Section 10 is mandatory once conditions are met, not discretionary, as held in Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Federation (AIR 1998 SC 1952).

Source note: Section 10, CPC 1908; Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Federation AIR 1998 SC 1952

Correct answer: B. A matter which might and ought to have been raised as a ground of attack or defence in the former suit was not raised

Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC embodies constructive res judicata: any matter which might and ought to have been raised as a ground of attack or defence in the former suit is deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue and thus barred in any subsequent suit. The Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain (1977) applied this doctrine where a police officer who had not raised the plea of lack of competent authority to dismiss him in his writ petition was barred from raising it in a subsequent civil suit. The doctrine prevents piece-meal litigation by requiring parties to bring their entire case at one time.

Source note: Explanation IV, Section 11, CPC 1908; State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain (1977) 2 SCC 806

Correct answer: A. Where the former court lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter

Res judicata does not apply when the former court lacked inherent jurisdiction to decide the matter in question. The Supreme Court in Raju Ram Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC) recognised three exceptions to res judicata: (1) judgment by a court without jurisdiction, (2) pure questions of law where changed circumstances may allow reconsideration as clarified in Mathura Prasad v. Dossibhai (1970), and (3) judgments obtained by fraud. A void judgment passed without jurisdiction cannot create any estoppel because jurisdiction is foundational; without it, the entire proceeding is a nullity.

Source note: Section 11 CPC; Raju Ram Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC

Correct answer: B. The plaintiff is barred from subsequently suing in respect of the omitted part

Order II Rule 2(3) provides that if a plaintiff omits to sue for any portion of his claim without leave of the court, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of such omitted portion. This rule prevents multiplicity of suits from the same cause of action and forces a plaintiff to litigate the entire claim at once. The rule complements res judicata: even where res judicata does not technically apply (because the matter was not decided), Order II Rule 2 prevents the fresh suit. The Madras High Court in C.A. Balakrishnan v. Commissioner, Corporation of Madras (AIR 2003 Mad 170) applied this principle even to writ proceedings.

Source note: Order II Rule 2, CPC 1908; C.A. Balakrishnan v. Commissioner, Corporation of Madras AIR 2003 Mad 170

Correct answer: B. Add a party at any stage of the proceedings if that person ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence is necessary for effective adjudication

Order I Rule 10(2) CPC empowers the court to add or strike out parties at any stage of the proceedings if they are necessary or proper parties for complete adjudication. A 'necessary party' is one without whom no effective order can be made. A 'proper party' is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence would enable the court to adjudicate all disputes. The power can be exercised suo motu or on application. Limitation does not run against amendments by which new parties are added under Order I Rule 10 in the same manner as independent suits.

Source note: Order I Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908

Correct answer: B. The suit appears to be barred by any law, or does not disclose a cause of action, or is undervalued and not corrected

Order VII Rule 11 provides for rejection of a plaint on specific grounds: (a) it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected; (c) the plaint is on paper insufficiently stamped and not corrected; (d) the suit appears barred by any law; (e) it is not filed in duplicate; (f) failure to comply with Section 9A. The test for rejection on ground (a) is whether the plaint taken at face value discloses any cause of action. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2003 SC 759), the Supreme Court held that for rejection purposes, only the plaint and averments therein are to be considered, and defence cannot be taken into account.

Source note: Order VII Rule 11, CPC 1908; Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2003 SC 759

Correct answer: B. Determining the real questions in controversy between the parties

Order VI Rule 17 permits amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings as the court thinks just and necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The guiding principle is that courts should lean in favour of allowing amendments so that the real dispute is adjudicated rather than technical defects defeating justice. However, the proviso (added in 2002) prohibits amendments after commencement of trial unless the court is satisfied that despite due diligence, the need for amendment could not have been foreseen earlier. In B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai (2000), the Supreme Court held that amendment should be allowed if it does not change the nature of the suit.

Source note: Order VI Rule 17, CPC 1908; B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai (2000) 1 SCC 712

Correct answer: B. That the summons was not duly served on him, or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing on the day fixed for hearing

Order IX Rule 13 provides two independent grounds for setting aside an ex parte decree: (1) that the summons was not duly served, or (2) that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing. Either ground, if proved, entitles the defendant to have the ex parte decree set aside. The provision does not require the defendant to prove a strong case on merits merely to set aside the decree. However, the Supreme Court in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (AIR 2005 SC 626) held that once Order IX Rule 13 proceedings (including appeal) conclude against the defendant, issue estoppel bars re-agitation of the same grounds in a Section 96(2) first appeal.

Source note: Order IX Rule 13, CPC 1908; Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar AIR 2005 SC 626

Correct answer: B. The defendant has an absolute right to participate from the stage of his appearance, even if he cannot reopen what has already been done

In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal (AIR 1955 SC 425), the Supreme Court established the foundational principle that civil procedure exists to facilitate justice, not to obstruct it. A defendant who appears at an adjourned hearing after an ex parte order has an undoubted right to participate in proceedings from that stage forward, even without formally setting aside the ex parte order. He cannot reopen evidence already recorded without good cause, but he cannot be shut out from future hearings. The Court held that the Tribunal violated principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) by refusing to allow the defendant's counsel to appear on March 20.

Source note: Order IX Rule 6-7, CPC 1908; Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal AIR 1955 SC 425

Correct answer: B. Every decree passed by any court exercising original civil jurisdiction, except a decree passed by consent of parties or where no appeal lies as per the Code

Section 96(1) CPC provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any court exercising original civil jurisdiction. Section 96(3) specifically bars an appeal from a consent decree. Section 97 provides that when a preliminary decree has been passed, an appeal from a final decree does not affect issues determined by the preliminary decree if no appeal was taken from the preliminary decree. A first appeal is a complete rehearing on facts and law, and the first appellate court must apply its own mind to the evidence independently, as held in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179.

Source note: Section 96, 97, CPC 1908

Correct answer: B. A substantial question of law

Section 100 CPC as amended in 1976 restricts second appeal to cases involving a 'substantial question of law.' The High Court must formulate the substantial question of law at the time of admission. The Supreme Court in Chunilal V. Mehta v. Century Spinning (AIR 1962 SC 1314) defined a 'substantial question of law' as one of general public importance, or one on which courts have taken divergent views, or one that materially affects the rights of parties and has not been finally settled. The second appeal cannot be used as a third fact-finding exercise; the factual findings of the first appellate court are final.

Source note: Section 100, CPC 1908; Chunilal V. Mehta v. Century Spinning AIR 1962 SC 1314

Correct answer: B. The lower court wrongly refused to admit evidence, or despite due diligence it could not be produced, or the appellate court requires it to pronounce judgment

Order XLI Rule 27 provides three grounds for admission of additional evidence at appellate stage: (a) the lower court improperly refused to admit it; (aa) despite due diligence it could not be produced at trial; (b) the appellate court requires it to pronounce judgment or for other substantial cause. The Supreme Court in Gill & Co. v. Bimla Kumari (1986 RLR 370) held that the requirement must be felt by the court to fill an inherent lacuna, not by the party to patch up a weak case. Additional evidence is the exception, not the rule, and the court must record reasons for admitting it under Rule 27(2).

Source note: Order XLI Rule 27, CPC 1908; Gill & Co. v. Bimla Kumari 1986 RLR 370

Correct answer: B. Prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience in favour of the applicant

The three essential conditions for grant of temporary injunction are: (1) Prima facie case: the plaintiff must show a serious question to be tried, not necessarily probability of success; (2) Irreparable injury: harm that cannot be adequately compensated in damages; (3) Balance of convenience: comparative hardship, whether refusal would cause greater harm than grant. The Supreme Court in Dalpat Kaur v. Prahlad Singh (AIR 1993 SC 276) held that all three conditions must concurrently exist; absence of any one is fatal to the application. These conditions are cumulative, not alternative, and courts have no power to grant injunctions as a matter of course merely on the filing of a suit.

Source note: Order XXXIX Rules 1-2, CPC 1908; Dalpat Kaur v. Prahlad Singh AIR 1993 SC 276

Correct answer: B. Courts can exercise inherent powers under Section 151 to grant interim injunctions even in cases not covered by Order XXXIX

In Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal (AIR 1962 SC 527), the majority held that courts can grant injunctions under their inherent powers under Section 151 CPC even to prevent abuse of process where Order XXXIX does not apply. However, Justice Shah's minority opinion held that civil courts other than Chartered High Courts have no inherent power to grant injunctions in cases not covered by Order XXXIX, treating Order XXXIX as exhaustive. The majority view prevailed. Section 151 saves the inherent power of courts to make such orders as are necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

Source note: Section 151, CPC 1908; Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal AIR 1962 SC 527