Criminal Law (BNS 2023) MCQs for Judiciary

Correct answer: B. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 replaced the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, which was the substantive criminal law of India since British colonial rule. Along with the BNS, two companion statutes also came into force on 1st July 2024: the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) 2023 replacing the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (CrPC), and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) 2023 replacing the Indian Evidence Act 1872. The BNS consists of 358 Sections across 20 Chapters as compared to the IPC's 511 Sections across 23 Chapters. The BNS retains most IPC offences, adds new ones (organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching), removes decriminalised offences (adultery, Section 377), and introduces community service as a new form of punishment.

Source note: BNS 2023 / BNS Chapter 1 Introduction

Correct answer: B. Six punishments; community service has been newly added as a sixth form of punishment alongside death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment, forfeiture of property, and fine

Section 53 of the IPC 1860 provided five types of punishments: (1) death, (2) imprisonment for life, (3) imprisonment (rigorous or simple), (4) forfeiture of property, and (5) fine. Section 4 of the BNS 2023 retains these five and adds a SIXTH: COMMUNITY SERVICE. Community service was introduced to reflect the reformative and rehabilitative aspect of criminal justice, aligned with the concept of 'Nyaya' in the statute's name. However, 'community service' is not defined in the BNS itself; it is defined in the Explanation to Section 23 of the BNSS as 'work which the court may order a convict to perform as a form of punishment that benefits the community, for which he shall not be entitled to any remuneration.' If a person defaults in community service, he may be imprisoned under Section 8(5) BNS.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 4

Correct answer: B. Section 152 BNS: 'Acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India' which criminalises acts of secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities, separatist activities, or actions that endanger the sovereignty or unity of India, or encourage such activities

The IPC Section 124A (Sedition) was struck down in terms of usage by the Supreme Court in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India (2022) and was expressly deleted in the BNS. In its place, Section 152 BNS creates the new offence of 'Acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.' Section 152 penalises with imprisonment which may extend to 7 years or life imprisonment whoever commits or attempts to commit or abets or encourages secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encourages feelings of separatist activities or endangers the sovereignty or unity and integrity of India; or indulges in or commits any such act. Unlike sedition (which was broad and had been misused), Section 152 requires more specific conduct. However, critics argue it is equally broad. Section 197(1)(d) BNS additionally criminalises making false or misleading information that jeopardises the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 152

Correct answer: B. Specific petty offences including: public servant unlawfully engaging in trade (Section 202), non-appearance in response to proclamation (Section 209), attempt to commit suicide to compel a public servant (Section 226), theft where value is less than Rs. 5,000 (Section 303), misconduct by a drunken person (Section 355), and defamation (Section 356)

Section 4 BNS 2023 lists community service as one of the punishments. However, community service is specifically prescribed for only six petty or minor offences: (1) Section 202 BNS: public servant unlawfully engaging in trade; (2) Section 209 BNS: non-appearance in response to proclamation under Section 84 BNSS; (3) Section 226 BNS: attempt to commit suicide to compel or restrain exercise of lawful power by a public servant; (4) Section 303(2) BNS: theft where value of stolen property is less than Rs. 5,000; (5) Section 355 BNS: misconduct or annoyance in public by a drunken person; (6) Section 356 BNS: defamation. Community service is reserved for minor, non-violent, and first-time offences. Judges have discretion to impose it based on the nature of the offence, the circumstances, and the offender's background. Default in community service can result in imprisonment under Section 8(5) BNS.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 4 / Sections 202, 209, 226, 303, 355, 356

Correct answer: B. The definition now includes 'transgender' in addition to male and female; the pronoun 'he' and its derivatives are used for any person whether male, female or transgender, and 'transgender' has the meaning under Section 2(k) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019

Section 2(10) BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 8 IPC) expands the definition of gender to include 'transgender' alongside male and female. The IPC had only recognised male and female, which led to gaps in application of criminal law provisions to transgender persons. The BNS now provides that the pronoun 'he' and its derivatives are used for any person whether male, female, or transgender. The term 'transgender' carries the meaning assigned to it in Section 2(k) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. This change reflects the Supreme Court's recognition of transgender persons as a 'third gender' in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (NALSA) (2014) 5 SCC 438, and aligns the criminal law with constitutional equality principles.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 2(10)

Correct answer: B. Under IPC Section 22, movable property included only 'corporeal property' (tangible); BNS Section 2(21) expands this to include 'property of any description' whether corporeal (tangible) or incorporeal (intangible such as copyright and trademarks), thereby allowing prosecutions for theft and related offences covering intellectual property

Section 22 IPC defined 'movable property' as 'corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.' This was limited to CORPOREAL (tangible, physical) property only. Section 2(21) BNS 2023 expands the definition: 'Movable property includes property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.' The critical addition: the BNS removes the word 'corporeal' and substitutes 'property of any description,' thereby including INCORPOREAL (intangible) property such as intellectual property rights (copyright, trademarks, patents). This expansion allows theft of intangible digital assets and intellectual property to be prosecuted under the BNS. Section 2(8) BNS also expands 'document' to include electronic and digital records.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 2(21)

Correct answer: B. Adultery (Section 497 IPC), Section 377 IPC (unnatural offences/sexual intercourse against order of nature), Section 309 IPC (attempt to commit suicide), and Section 124A IPC (sedition)

The BNS 2023 deleted several IPC provisions: (1) Section 124A IPC (Sedition) replaced by Section 152 BNS; (2) Section 309 IPC (Attempt to commit suicide) deleted entirely since Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) affirmed it as constitutional but courts have effectively decriminalised it through the Mental Healthcare Act 2017 Section 115; (3) Section 377 IPC (Unnatural offences) deleted following Navtej Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 decriminalising consensual same-sex relations; (4) Section 497 IPC (Adultery) deleted following Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 which held it unconstitutional. Additionally deleted: Section 310 IPC (Thuggee), Section 311 (Punishment for Thuggee), and several obsolete provisions regarding false weights, counterfeiting colonial-era coins, and transportation as punishment (Section 53A).

Source note: BNS 2023 / IPC Sections 124A, 309, 377, 497

Correct answer: B. Organised crime (Section 111 BNS), petty organised crime (Section 112 BNS), and terrorist act (Section 113 BNS); additionally mob lynching (Section 103(2) BNS) and 'snatching' as a specific form of theft (Section 304 BNS) are new additions

The BNS 2023 introduces several new offences responding to contemporary criminal challenges: (1) ORGANISED CRIME (Section 111 BNS): crimes such as kidnapping, extortion, contract killing, land grabbing, financial scams, cyber-crimes, trafficking committed on behalf of a 'crime syndicate'; punishable with death or life imprisonment if death results, otherwise rigorous imprisonment for 5 to life; (2) PETTY ORGANISED CRIME (Section 112 BNS): organised crime of a lesser scale like pick-pocketing, card fraud, etc.; (3) TERRORIST ACT (Section 113 BNS): intent to threaten unity, integrity, security of India or to strike terror in the people; (4) MOB LYNCHING (Section 103(2) BNS): murder committed by a group of five or more persons on the basis of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief; mandatory minimum 7 years to death; (5) SNATCHING (Section 304 BNS): snatching defined as committing theft by suddenly grabbing or snatching any movable property from a person.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 111, 112, 113, 103(2), 304

Correct answer: B. Section 22 BNS: nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that the act is wrong or contrary to law

The maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea ('the act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty') is the cornerstone of criminal liability. The BNS 2023, like the IPC, embeds the mens rea requirement within individual offence definitions (using words like 'intentionally,' 'knowingly,' 'fraudulently,' 'dishonestly,' and 'voluntarily'). Section 22 BNS (corresponding to Section 84 IPC) provides the general exception for unsoundness of mind: the accused must be incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that the act is wrong or contrary to law at the time of the act. In State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (AIR 1965 SC 722), the Supreme Court discussed when a statute may exclude mens rea by necessary implication.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 22 / State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (AIR 1965 SC)

Correct answer: B. The exclusion of mens rea in a statutory offence depends on the language, subject matter, and purpose of the statute; where the statutory objective would be defeated by requiring proof of mens rea and the statute deals with public welfare or regulatory matters, mens rea may be excluded by necessary implication

State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (AIR 1965 SC 722) is the leading authority on strict liability in Indian criminal law. George was a foreign national who brought undeclared gold into India in transit, violating the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA). He claimed no knowledge of the notification restricting gold import. The Supreme Court held that FERA was a regulatory/welfare statute designed to protect India's foreign exchange reserves; the object of the statute would be wholly frustrated if every accused could escape by pleading ignorance of the notification. The test: look at the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object it seeks to achieve, and the consequences of holding mens rea required. Where the statute is regulatory, deals with public welfare, and insistence on mens rea would defeat its purpose, the court will infer exclusion of mens rea by necessary implication. This applies to customs, excise, food adulteration, and similar regulatory offences.

Source note: State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (AIR 1965 SC 722)

Correct answer: B. The accused can be convicted for an offence without proof of guilty mind (mens rea); the prosecution need only prove the prohibited act (actus reus) was committed

Strict liability offences are statutory creations where the legislature, for reasons of public policy and welfare regulation, dispenses with the requirement to prove mens rea. The prosecution need only prove the prohibited act (actus reus). Classical criminal offences under BNS (murder, theft, cheating) require proof of both actus reus AND mens rea. Strict liability is typically found in: (1) Regulatory/welfare statutes (Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Drugs and Cosmetics Act); (2) Revenue statutes (Customs Act, FERA/FEMA); (3) Environmental protection legislation. The Supreme Court in State of MP v. Narayan Singh (1989) 3 SCC 596 applied strict liability to drug possession offences under the NDPS Act. The 47th Report of the Law Commission of India (1972) endorsed strict liability for socio-economic offences, recognising that proof of intent is often impractical for corporate and regulatory violations. Strict liability does NOT mean absolute liability; defences like impossibility of compliance, reasonable mistake of fact, or due diligence may still be available depending on the statute.

Source note: IPC/BNS / State of MP v. Narayan Singh (1989) SC

Correct answer: B. Section 2(16) BNS: injury means any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation, or property

Section 2(16) BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 44 IPC) defines 'injury': 'Injury means any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation, or property.' Four types of injury are recognised: (1) BODILY injury: physical harm to the person; (2) MENTAL injury: psychological harm (relevant for offences like criminal intimidation); (3) INJURY TO REPUTATION: harm to a person's standing in society (relevant for defamation); (4) PROPERTY injury: damage to property. This broad definition is important because many BNS offences use the word 'injury' as an element. The word 'illegally' in the definition is significant: harm caused by a lawful act (e.g., surgery by a doctor with consent) is not 'injury' within this definition even though it causes physical harm. The harm must be caused without legal justification.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 2(16)

Correct answer: B. Causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person; Section 2(14) defines wrongful gain as gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled; wrongful loss is loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled

Section 2(6) BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 24 IPC): 'A person is said to do a thing dishonestly who does that thing with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person.' This is read alongside: Section 2(14) BNS: 'Wrongful gain is gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled'; and Section 2(22) BNS (corresponding to Section 23 IPC): 'Wrongful loss is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled.' Key principle from Mahadev Prasad Kalikhanwal v. State (1960 Allahabad): it is not necessary that BOTH wrongful gain AND wrongful loss occur; either one suffices. Dishonesty is an essential element of theft (Section 303 BNS), criminal misappropriation (Section 314 BNS), criminal breach of trust (Section 316 BNS), and cheating (Section 318 BNS).

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 2(6), 2(14), 2(22)

Correct answer: B. 'Dishonestly' (Section 2(6)) requires intent to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss; 'fraudulently' (Section 2(11)) requires intent to defraud and includes both dishonest intent and something more, namely a deceptive element; a person may act dishonestly without deceiving anyone, but acting fraudulently always involves an element of deceit or misrepresentation

Section 2(11) BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 25 IPC): 'A person is said to do a thing fraudulently who does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise.' The distinction between dishonestly and fraudulently: DISHONESTLY (Section 2(6)) focuses on wrongful gain or wrongful loss through any means; it is the mental element of property offences. FRAUDULENTLY requires intent to defraud, which inherently includes a deceptive element. Cheating under Section 318 BNS uses both elements: the cheater must dishonestly (or fraudulently) induce another to deliver property by deceiving that person. Forgery under Section 336 BNS uses 'fraudulently' specifically. In R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration (1962), the Supreme Court discussed the overlap between dishonesty and fraud, noting that fraudulent acts are often also dishonest but dishonest acts are not always fraudulent.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 2(6) and 2(11)

Correct answer: B. Intention involves a desired outcome (the accused wanted the result to happen); knowledge involves awareness that the result is substantially certain to follow from the act (the accused did not necessarily desire the result but knew it would occur); both are higher mental states than negligence

Under BNS 2023 (as under IPC), offences are graded by the mental state required: (1) INTENTION: the accused desired the particular result as the purpose of the act; the highest form of mens rea (e.g., Section 100(1) BNS murder with intention to kill); (2) KNOWLEDGE: the accused knew that the result was the natural and probable consequence of his act even if he did not specifically desire it (e.g., Section 101 BNS culpable homicide 'done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death'); (3) NEGLIGENCE/RECKLESSNESS: failure to exercise the care of a reasonable person (e.g., Section 106 BNS causing death by negligence). This gradation is crucial for distinguishing murder (Section 100 BNS) from culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 101 BNS) from causing death by negligence (Section 106 BNS). Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465) established that for murder under the 'knowledge' clause, the accused must know that the particular injury inflicted is likely to cause death.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 100, 101, 106

Correct answer: B. Death penalty is constitutionally valid but must be imposed only in the 'rarest of rare' cases where the community's collective conscience is so shocked that it will expect nothing less than death; the court must consider the manner of commission, motive, anti-social nature, magnitude, and personality of the victim

Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1983 SC 957) is the seminal case on the death penalty in India, following Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980 SC) which upheld its constitutional validity. The Supreme Court in Machhi Singh laid down the 'rarest of rare' doctrine by identifying categories of cases where death may be appropriate: (1) Manner of commission: extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner shocking the moral sensibilities; (2) Motive: commission with extreme depravity and meanness such as for gaining money or other advantage; (3) Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature: multiple murders of members of a family or community; (4) Magnitude: the crime is enormous, affecting a large number of persons; (5) Personality of the victim: victim is an innocent child, helpless woman, public figure, etc. Section 6 BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 54 IPC) allows commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. BNS Section 4 retains death as a punishment.

Source note: Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1983 SC 957)

Correct answer: B. Apprehension based on what a reasonable person in the accused's position would have believed given the circumstances; the test is objective: what would a prudent person reasonably have apprehended under the same circumstances

The concept of 'reasonable apprehension' is used in several BNS provisions, particularly in the law of private defence (Sections 34-44 BNS, corresponding to Sections 96-106 IPC). For example, Section 34 BNS protects acts done in private defence when there is 'reasonable apprehension' of an attack. The test for reasonable apprehension is OBJECTIVE: what would a reasonable, prudent person in the accused's position have apprehended in those circumstances? It is NOT purely subjective (what the accused himself feared). The distinction is important: if an accused had an unreasonably exaggerated fear, the right of private defence does not extend as far as his unreasonable apprehension might suggest. In James Martin v. State of Kerala (2004) 2 SCC 203, the Supreme Court held that the right of private defence is available only when there is reasonable apprehension and the force used must be proportionate to the threat apprehended.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 34-44 / James Martin v. State of Kerala (2004)

Correct answer: B. He intended the effect or knew it was likely from the means used.

Section 2(28) BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 39 IPC) defines 'voluntarily': 'A person is said to cause an effect voluntarily when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe were likely to cause it.' This is a critical definition because many BNS offences are defined as 'voluntarily causing' a particular result: Section 117 BNS 'voluntarily causing grievous hurt,' Section 132 BNS 'voluntarily causing hurt,' etc. The definition encompasses three mental states: (1) INTENTION: the person intended the effect through the means used; (2) KNOWLEDGE: he knew the means were likely to cause the effect; (3) REASONABLE BELIEF: he had reason to believe the means were likely to cause it. All three mental states satisfy 'voluntarily.' This is broader than mere intention, covering cases where the accused did not specifically desire the result but knew it was likely.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 2(28)

Correct answer: B. By reason of unsoundness of mind he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or incapable of knowing that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law

Section 22 BNS 2023 (Section 84 IPC): 'Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law.' The McNaghten Rules (McNaghten's Case, 1843 HL) underlie this provision. Two alternative tests: (1) Incapable of knowing the NATURE of the act (cognitive incapacity as to what he is doing physically); OR (2) Incapable of knowing that what he is doing is WRONG or contrary to law (normative incapacity as to the legal/moral character of the act). Critical points: (a) The unsoundness must exist AT THE TIME of the act; (b) The mere existence of a mental illness does not create the defence; (c) The presumption is sanity; the accused bears the burden of proving insanity on the balance of probabilities; (d) In Srikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 7 SCC 748, the Supreme Court held that a schizophrenic accused who could not distinguish right from wrong was entitled to the defence.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 22 / McNaghten's Case / Srikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra (2003)

Correct answer: B. The Supreme Court found that the accused's paranoid schizophrenia was of such a nature and severity that at the time of the offence he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was wrong; the medical evidence established that the disease prevented him from distinguishing right from wrong

Srikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 7 SCC 748 is the key Supreme Court case on paranoid schizophrenia and the insanity defence. The accused had killed his wife during a psychotic episode. The Supreme Court applied the test in Section 84 IPC (now Section 22 BNS): for the defence to succeed, the unsoundness of mind must have been of such a nature that the accused was incapable of knowing: (1) the nature of the act; OR (2) that the act was wrong or contrary to law. The Court reviewed the medical evidence carefully and found the accused's condition met this standard. However, the Court also emphasised that: (1) the defence is not established merely by the existence of a mental illness diagnosis; (2) the court must assess whether the illness of that degree existed AT THE TIME of the offence; (3) the burden of proof is on the accused (balance of probabilities). This case is contrasted with Basdev v. State of PEPSU (AIR 1956 SC 488) where voluntary intoxication was not a defence.

Source note: Srikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 7 SCC 748

Correct answer: B. Voluntary intoxication is generally not a defence to criminal liability; however, if the intoxication was so severe that the accused was incapable of forming the specific intent required for the offence (a crime requiring specific intent), the intoxication may negate that specific intent, but does not excuse acts if a reasonable person would not have committed them regardless of intoxication

Sections 23-24 BNS 2023 (corresponding to Sections 85-86 IPC) deal with intoxication as a defence. Section 23 BNS: where an act is done in a state of intoxication, the fact that the intoxication was caused against the will of the person is taken into account. Section 24 BNS: intoxication voluntarily consumed provides a limited defence only if it renders the accused incapable of forming the SPECIFIC INTENT required for the offence. The general rule (from Basdev v. State of PEPSU, AIR 1956 SC 488): voluntary drunkenness is not an excuse; a man who gets drunk and commits an offence is guilty. EXCEPTION: where the offence requires a specific intent (e.g., murder requires intent to kill), and the accused was so drunk he could not form that specific intent, he may be convicted of a lesser offence not requiring that specific intent. The court must assess: (1) whether the accused was intoxicated to the required degree; (2) whether the offence in question requires specific intent; (3) whether the intoxication prevented formation of that specific intent.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 23-24 / Basdev v. State of PEPSU (AIR 1956 SC 488)

Correct answer: B. The right extends to causing death in defence of the body only when there is reasonable apprehension of: death, grievous hurt, an assault with the intention of committing rape or unnatural offences, kidnapping or abduction, wrongful confinement with no escape, or acid attack

Section 37 BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 100 IPC) lists the circumstances when the right of private defence of the BODY extends to causing death: When the assault reasonably causes the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence; When it reasonably causes apprehension of grievous hurt; When the assault is with the intention of committing rape; When the assault is with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust; When the assault is with the intention of kidnapping or abducting; When the assault is with the intention of wrongfully confining a person where there is no reasonable escape; When the assault is by throwing or administering acid or an attempt to do so. Section 38 BNS (corresponding to Section 101 IPC): in all other cases, the right of private defence of body extends only to the extent of causing any harm OTHER THAN death. Key case: Deo Narain v. State of UP (AIR 1973 SC 473) held that the right of private defence cannot be used as a pretext for aggression; force used must be proportionate.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 37, 38 / Deo Narain v. State of UP (AIR 1973 SC 473)

Correct answer: B. The force must be proportionate, defensive, and no more than necessary.

Deo Narain v. State of UP (AIR 1973 SC 473) is the foundational case on proportionality in private defence. The Supreme Court held: (1) The right of private defence is a RIGHT OF DEFENCE, not of retribution or offence; (2) The force used must be PROPORTIONATE to the apprehended harm; (3) The right is NOT available if there is TIME to have recourse to the protection of public authorities; (4) The right ceases as soon as the threat has passed; (5) If the attack has already occurred and the threat has ended, further force is retaliation, not private defence. In James Martin v. State of Kerala (2004) 2 SCC 203, the Supreme Court further elaborated: the right of private defence is 'not a licence to kill' and must be 'defensive, not retributive.' The accused must genuinely apprehend danger; a mere suspicion or post-hoc justification is insufficient. These principles apply under Sections 34-44 BNS 2023.

Source note: Deo Narain v. State of UP (AIR 1973 SC 473)

Correct answer: B. Involuntary intoxication excuses only where it destroys the required judgment.

Section 24 BNS 2023 (Section 85 IPC): the defence of involuntary intoxication is a complete defence when: (1) The intoxication was caused against the person's will or without his knowledge (involuntary intoxication); AND (2) At the time of the act, the person was INCAPABLE of knowing the nature of the act OR that it was wrong or contrary to law (same test as Section 22 BNS on unsoundness of mind). This is a much stronger defence than voluntary intoxication (Section 23 BNS). With involuntary intoxication, if the accused meets the incapacity test, he is completely excused. The mental element test is the same as for insanity under Section 22 BNS, because the involuntary intoxication has produced a state equivalent to temporary insanity. Key distinction: VOLUNTARY intoxication provides at most a partial defence (negating specific intent only); INVOLUNTARY intoxication may provide a complete defence if the incapacity tests are met.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 23-24

Correct answer: B. The belief must be bona fide, based on mistake of fact, not mistake of law.

Section 28 BNS 2023 (Section 76 IPC): 'Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.' Key elements: (1) MISTAKE OF FACT (not law): the classic maxim ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of law is no excuse) applies here; a mistake about facts (not law) can excuse; (2) BOUND BY LAW: the person believed he was legally obligated to perform the act; (3) GOOD FAITH: the belief must be honest and reasonable; (4) The act would have been lawful if the facts had been as believed. Example: a police officer who arrests someone genuinely believing in good faith there is a valid warrant, when in fact there is none, acts under Section 28. This is distinct from Section 29 BNS (act done under judicial order) and Section 30 BNS (act of public servant or person aiding).

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 28