Intellectual Property Rights MCQs for CLAT PG

Correct answer: D. It means that even if a synthetic voice model is trained on recordings that are in the public domain (where copyright has expired) or on recordings that were used with copyright permission, the artist may still have a personality right claim if their voice is reproduced without consent; personality rights protect the ongoing commercial identity of the person regardless of the copyright status of the source material

The passage's statement that the personality right claim is 'independent of any copyright in the underlying recordings' is crucial because it extends protection beyond the copyright framework. Copyright in a sound recording expires after sixty years from publication. If an AI company trains a synthetic voice model on historical recordings of an artist made more than sixty years ago, there may be no copyright infringement (the recordings are public domain). Similarly, an AI company might obtain copyright licences for the recordings used in training. In either scenario, the artist's personality right in their distinctive voice could still be infringed by the creation of synthetic content that mimics their voice without consent, because the personality right is not tied to the copyright in specific recordings - it is a separate, ongoing right in the commercial persona. This independence is precisely the gap-filling function of personality rights: it protects aspects of identity that escape traditional copyright because they are not fixed in a specific copyrightable work.

Source note: Personality rights; AI-generated content

Correct answer: C. Article 21 of the Constitution of India (right to life and personal liberty), progressively interpreted to encompass privacy and the right to protect one's commercial persona, supplemented by common law principles rather than dedicated legislation

The passage is explicit on the source of personality rights: they have 'historically been developed through a combination of constitutional guarantees and common law principles rather than dedicated legislation.' The constitutional foundation is 'Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which protects the right to life and personal liberty,' which courts have 'progressively interpreted to encompass a right to privacy and, increasingly, a right to protect one's commercial persona.' India does not have a Right to Privacy Act as a standalone statute. While Section 57 protects moral rights and Section 38A protects performers' economic rights in their performances, neither is specifically identified in the passage as the primary source of personality rights. The passage describes personality rights as being broader than copyright - they protect the commercial persona independently of any copyright-protected creative output.

Source note: Personality rights; Article 21, Constitution; Bombay HC and Delhi HC 2024 rulings

Correct answer: B. The distinctive voice of a performer is the product of professional training and artistic development; it creates commercial value others seek to exploit.

The passage synthesises the Bombay High Court's reasoning in three steps: (1) the distinctive voice 'is the product of years of professional training and artistic development' - it represents significant personal investment; (2) it 'creates commercial value that others seek to exploit' - it has economic worth; and (3) it is 'uniquely associated with the performer in the public consciousness in the same way as a face or a name' - it has the identifying function characteristic of protectable persona elements. This three-part reasoning - investment, commercial value, and public identification - mirrors the classic justification for right of publicity protection in other common law jurisdictions (US, UK, Australia). The court's extension to voice is significant because it moves beyond the visual domain traditionally covered by personality rights (photographs, likenesses) to include auditory identity. Option D is factually incorrect and not the court's reasoning - the concern is precisely that AI can now reproduce voices artificially.

Source note: Bombay HC 2024 ruling on voice as personality right

Correct answer: D. Compulsory licensing under Section 84 focuses on access to the patented technology by the public (whether the public's reasonable requirements are being met) and is granted for specific remedial purposes on economic or public health grounds; competition law under Section 4 focuses on market structure and competitive harm - whether the IP holder is abusing a dominant position to foreclose competition - and remedies may include behavioural orders, penalties, and structural measures, not just licence grants

The two frameworks operate with different analytical frameworks and objectives. Compulsory licensing under Section 84 of the Patents Act is a specifically patent-law remedy focused on three grounds: whether reasonable public requirements are being satisfied, whether the invention is available at a reasonable price, and whether the patent is being worked in India. It is a public interest measure designed to ensure adequate supply of patented goods, particularly medicines and agricultural products. Competition law under Section 4 of the Competition Act addresses a broader set of competitive harms: the abuse of a dominant position in any relevant market, which may include exploitative pricing, refusals to deal, discriminatory conditions, tying, and other anti-competitive practices. Competition law remedies are broader (penalties, cease and desist orders, structural remedies) and focus on restoring competitive market conditions, not just ensuring access to specific patented goods. The two frameworks are therefore complementary tools addressing different aspects of the same underlying problem of unchecked IP market power.

Source note: Section 84, Patents Act 1970; Competition Act 2002

Correct answer: A. When an IP right constitutes an 'essential facility' for downstream products or services - meaning that access to the IP is necessary for competitors to compete in a downstream market, and the IP holder's refusal to license (or insistence on anti-competitive terms) effectively forecloses competition in that downstream market

The passage explains the essential facilities doctrine's application to IP: 'exercise of an IP right in a manner that forecloses competition in a downstream market - particularly where the IP constitutes an 'essential facility' for downstream products or services - may cross the line from legitimate IP enforcement into actionable abuse of dominant position.' The essential facilities doctrine, developed in EU competition law (from RTE v. Commission and IMS Health), holds that a firm with dominance in one market (the essential facility) cannot refuse to provide access to that facility on reasonable terms to competitors in a downstream market, where such access is necessary for competition. Applied to IP: if a copyright or patent is the only viable way to produce a certain downstream product (and not merely one of many possible approaches), refusing to license it - or licensing only on terms that exclude competitors - may constitute abuse. The doctrine is applied narrowly and requires both dominance and the elimination of downstream competition.

Source note: Essential facilities doctrine; RTE v. Commission; IMS Health; Ericsson v. CCI

Correct answer: C. Both IP law and competition law ultimately serve the common goal of promoting innovation and consumer welfare; IP law grants narrow, specific monopolies as incentives for creativity and invention, while competition law polices the exercise of those rights to prevent broader market domination - the two systems are complementary when each operates within its proper domain

The passage argues that both bodies of law share common ultimate goals: 'Both bodies of law aim, in their different ways, to promote innovation and consumer welfare.' The conflict is framed as 'apparent rather than real' because IP law and competition law operate in different domains and with different tools: 'intellectual property law deliberately grants limited monopolies as incentives for innovation, while competition law polices the exercise of these rights to prevent their weaponisation as a tool for broader market domination.' When IP law is used as intended - rewarding specific creative and inventive acts through narrowly circumscribed monopolies - it is consistent with competition law's goals. The conflict only becomes real when IP rights are exercised to achieve market domination beyond the scope of the underlying IP, which is precisely where competition law intervenes.

Source note: Competition Act 2002, Section 3

Correct answer: D. The safe harbour allows IP holders to enforce their rights and impose reasonable conditions necessary for protecting their IP, but does not protect conditions that go beyond what is reasonable and necessary for IP protection; conditions that extend the IP monopoly into broader market domination may fall outside Section 3(5) and constitute anti-competitive conduct

The passage explains the safe harbour and its limits precisely: 'Section 3(5) of the Competition Act provides that the Act does not apply to the right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights.' The two qualifying elements - 'reasonable' and 'necessary for protecting' - define the boundaries. A condition that is unreasonable (e.g., tying the licence to purchasing other products) or that goes beyond what is necessary to protect the IP right (e.g., a blanket refusal to license a technology essential to competition in a downstream market) falls outside the safe harbour. The passage confirms that 'conditions imposed by IP holders that go beyond what is reasonable or necessary for protecting the IP right may fall outside Section 3(5) and constitute anti-competitive agreements under Section 3 or abuse of dominant position under Section 4.'

Source note: Competition Act 2002, Section 3(5); Ericsson v. CCI

Correct answer: B. Yes; the Delhi High Court confirmed that the Patents Act and Competition Act are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

The passage confirms that the Delhi High Court in Ericsson v. CCI established that the two regimes operate concurrently: 'the principle in India has evolved' to recognise that anti-competitive exercise of IP rights can be reviewed by the CCI under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. The court rejected the argument that the Patents Act creates an exclusive jurisdiction that displaces the CCI. Both enforcement mechanisms - patent law (for infringement and validity) and competition law (for anti-competitive conduct) - can apply to the same conduct from different analytical perspectives. This concurrent jurisdiction is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement, which explicitly preserves the right of WTO members to take measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights, including through competition policy.

Source note: Ericsson v. CCI (Delhi HC, 2016/2023)

Correct answer: B. It would allow copyright to 'engulf facts, data, and ordinary language, ' effectively privatising information that the public and other creators need to access freely, thereby undermining the public domain and creating unwarranted monopolies over commonplace material

The passage explicitly states that 'a standard set too low would allow copyright to engulf facts, data, and ordinary language.' This captures the concern that if any effort - however minimal or mechanical - sufficed for copyright, then the protection would extend to factual compilations, databases, standard forms, and ordinary language, creating intellectual property monopolies over material that should be freely usable by all. The telephone directory example illustrates this: if sweat of the brow sufficed, a publisher could own copyright in a list of telephone numbers sorted alphabetically - a purely factual compilation. This would enable the copyright owner to prevent competitors from publishing their own directory using the same publicly available phone numbers, effectively monopolising information. The public domain would shrink dramatically, harming education, research, journalism, and further creative work. Option A describes a problem with a standard that is too high, not too low.

Source note: Copyright Act 1957, Section 13

Correct answer: A. Neither the facts reported in a judgment nor the legal principles (ratio decidendi) announced therein can be owned as copyright, regardless of the effort expended in researching them; only the specific creative expression in which those facts and principles are articulated may be protected

The passage explains the idea-expression dichotomy as a principle that separates unprotectable elements (ideas, facts, legal principles) from potentially protectable elements (specific creative expression). It states: 'neither the facts in a judgment nor the legal principles announced therein could be owned as copyright, regardless of the effort expended in researching them.' The ratio decidendi of a case - the legal principle decided by the court - is an idea (a statement of law), not the protected expression of that idea. Anyone is free to state the same legal principle in their own words. However, the specific creative framing of a headnote, the precise language chosen to capture the proposition, and the editorial selection of which passages to include are forms of expression that can attract copyright protection as original editorial work, subject to the modicum of creativity standard.

Source note: Copyright Act 1957; TRIPS Agreement, Article 9(2)

Correct answer: D. The headnotes and editorial comments reflecting genuine creative choices - such as the selection of legally significant passages, framing of legal propositions, and identification of ratio decidendi

The passage draws a careful distinction between two types of EBC's work. Headnotes and editorial comments that involved 'genuine creative choices - the selection of legally significant passages for headnotes, the framing of legal propositions in precise language, the identification of ratio decidendi' were held to attract copyright as original editorial work. By contrast, 'mere typesetting, formatting, or copy-editing of the public-domain judicial text, involving no creative choice' did not attract copyright. The determinative question was whether the work involved a minimum degree of creative intellectual effort or was purely mechanical. Options A and D describe mechanical work (formatting, typesetting, pagination) that the passage specifically says does not attract copyright. Option C involves the bare judicial text, which the passage notes is government work in the public domain.

Source note: Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1

Correct answer: B. Under the sweat of the brow doctrine, mere expenditure of labour and effort sufficed for copyright even without any creative input; this would impermissibly allow copyright to vest in factual compilations such as telephone directories, thereby privatising factual information that belongs to the public domain

The passage explains the Supreme Court's rejection of the sweat of the brow doctrine in clear terms: under that doctrine, even 'a telephone directory - which involves considerable effort in compilation but no creative selection - would attract copyright.' The court found that this outcome would 'impermissibly privatise factual information in the public interest.' The doctrine was rejected not because it was foreign law or because it set the bar too high, but because it set the bar too low - it allowed intellectual property protection for mechanical or functional work that involved no creative expression, thereby allowing facts and data to be monopolised. Option D describes the opposite of the doctrine's effect: the sweat of the brow doctrine was actually too permissive (too low a standard), not too restrictive.

Source note: Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1; Copyright Act 1957, Section 13

Correct answer: C. The combination of the originality requirement (which denies copyright to works lacking creative expression) and the idea-expression dichotomy (which denies copyright to the factual content and ideas within any work), ensuring that facts and data remain freely usable by all even when they appear within an otherwise copyrighted work

The passage identifies two complementary principles that protect the public domain of knowledge. First, the originality requirement - which demands a minimum of creative intellectual effort - prevents copyright from vesting in purely mechanical or factual compilations, thus keeping non-creative factual work in the public domain. Second, the idea-expression dichotomy - which prevents copyright from extending to ideas, facts, or principles regardless of how creatively they are expressed - ensures that even within a copyrighted work, the underlying information, data, and ideas remain freely available to all. Together, these two principles create a framework in which copyright protects only the specific creative choices made by the author, while leaving the vast pool of human knowledge, factual data, and intellectual concepts free for all to use. The fair dealing exception in option A operates differently: it allows copying of copyrighted material in certain circumstances but does not prevent copyright from arising in the first place.

Source note: Copyright Act 1957, Section 52

Correct answer: A. By the time a conventional static domain-blocking order is obtained, pirate website operators typically migrate to new domain names or servers, rendering the original order ineffective; a static order covers only the named domain and does not automatically extend to mirror or redirect sites

The passage provides a precise explanation of the enforcement challenge: a pirate website can 'spring up, accumulate millions of users... and be hosted anonymously in a foreign jurisdiction... By the time a conventional court order blocking the site is obtained, the website's operators may have already migrated to new domain names or servers, rendering the order ineffective.' The static blocking order's limitation is its specificity: it names the particular domain or URL being blocked, and the moment the pirate migrates to a new domain, the order has no application to the new site. Dynamic injunctions address this by covering not just the named site but also future mirror and redirect sites through a mechanism that allows the rights holder to report new infringing URLs to ISPs under the court's authority, without requiring fresh court applications.

Source note: UTV Software Communication v. 1337X.to (Delhi HC, 2019); Warner Bros. v. Moviesmod.bet (Delhi HC, 2024)

Correct answer: C. A Dynamic+ injunction covers not only mirror sites (sites that replicate the content of the blocked site) and redirect sites (sites that forward users to the blocked site) but also any new site that substantially hosts or indexes the same infringing content, including sites that emerge after the date of the injunction order, providing broader prospective protection

The passage explains the Dynamic+ injunction's enhancement: it covers 'not only mirror sites but also any site that substantially hosts or indexes the same infringing content, including sites that emerge after the date of the order.' A standard dynamic injunction primarily targets mirror and redirect sites (essentially variations of the original pirate site). The Dynamic+ variant goes further, extending to any new sites that substantially serve the same piracy function, even if they are not strictly mirrors or redirects of the specifically identified original site. This broader scope is designed to address the evolving landscape of digital piracy, where new pirate services constantly emerge. The passage notes that courts have balanced this broader power with safeguards, including the requirement that rights holders certify that reported sites are infringing and a mechanism for affected parties to seek review.

Source note: Warner Bros. v. Moviesmod.bet (Delhi HC, 2024)

Correct answer: D. Courts have inherent jurisdiction to direct third parties who are 'innocent facilitators' or 'enmeshed in the wrongdoing' to take measures within their power to address ongoing infringement; the isp, while not itself infringing, provides the technical infrastructure through which users access infringing content; courts may direct ISPs to block access under their general equitable jurisdiction, supplemented by Section 51(b) of the Copyright Act and the it Act's provisions on content blocking (Section 69A)

The legal basis for directing ISPs (who are typically non-parties) to implement blocking orders in private copyright litigation is grounded in the court's inherent jurisdiction to grant effective remedies for ongoing wrongs, supplemented by specific statutory provisions. Courts have applied Norwich Pharmacal principles and general equitable jurisdiction to order non-party intermediaries who are innocently involved in or facilitating infringement to take reasonable blocking measures within their technical capability. Section 51(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957 makes harbouring or facilitating infringement a form of secondary infringement, potentially drawing ISPs into liability if they ignore court-ordered blocking. Section 69A of the IT Act empowers the government to direct blocking of websites for reasons including national security and public order, but courts in private copyright litigation have found parallel jurisdiction under the Copyright Act read with the CPC and their general powers to grant injunctions. The development of dynamic injunctions has operationalised this jurisdiction.

Source note: IT Act 2000; Copyright Act 1957

Correct answer: A. The commercial nature of the infringement affects the availability and quantum of remedies: Section 55(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 allows courts to award additional (enhanced) damages where infringement is flagrant, and commercial piracy that generates advertising revenue is precisely the type of flagrant, profit-driven infringement that justifies enhanced remedies; it also affects the criminal liability threshold, since Section 63 requires infringement to be wilful and for profit to attract criminal prosecution

The commercial dimension of online piracy - specifically the generation of advertising revenue from hosting infringing content - is legally significant in several ways. First, it defeats any argument that the infringement is casual or unintentional: a website that monetises through advertising has made a deliberate, sustained commercial choice to build a piracy business model. Second, for the purposes of civil remedies, the deliberate commercial exploitation of infringing content constitutes 'flagrant infringement' within the meaning of Section 55(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, which allows courts to award additional damages having regard to the flagrant nature of the infringement and the benefit accruing to the defendant. Third, for criminal liability under Section 63 and 63A of the Copyright Act, the requirement of wilful infringement for profit is clearly satisfied by a commercially operated piracy website. The advertising revenue model also provides an identifiable damages basis: courts can assess what the piracy website earned and use that to calculate damages and account of profits.

Source note: Copyright enforcement; OTT industry

Correct answer: B. The rule of law principle that judicial power (including the power to determine what constitutes an infringing act and to impose blocking remedies) should remain within judicial supervision; delegating to private rights holders the unchecked authority to determine which websites are infringing and to order ISPs to block them without contemporaneous judicial review shifts coercive power from an accountable judicial officer to a private party with a commercial interest in broad enforcement

The critics' concern identified in the passage is fundamentally about the allocation of judicial power. Dynamic injunctions, particularly the Dynamic+ variant, grant rights holders significant enforcement authority: they can identify new sites as infringing and report them for ISP blocking under the court's standing order, without returning to court for each new blocking decision. The concern is that this quasi-judicial power - determining that a specific site is infringing and should be blocked - is being exercised by a private party with a commercial interest in broad enforcement. Without contemporaneous judicial review of each individual blocking decision, there is a risk of over-blocking (accidentally or deliberately blocking legitimate content or websites). The courts have addressed this by requiring rights holders to certify that blocked sites are infringing and preserving a mechanism for affected parties to challenge blocking, maintaining a degree of judicial oversight while enabling practical enforcement. This balancing is the central challenge in designing effective digital copyright enforcement systems.

Source note: Digital copyright enforcement

Correct answer: D. The economic rights reforms ensure creators receive ongoing financial compensation from commercial exploitation of their works even after assignment; the moral rights reforms protect the creative integrity and reputation of authors regardless of economic rights transfer - the two reforms address different harms and operate independently

The passage describes two 'distinct categories of rights' addressed by the 2012 amendments: economic rights (Section 19(8) and Section 38A, which ensure ongoing royalty payments) and moral rights (Section 57, which protects creative integrity). The economic rights reforms address financial harm - creators being cut out of commercial revenues. The moral rights reforms address different harm - the distortion or manipulation of a work in a way that harms the creator's artistic reputation. The two reforms operate independently: an author can receive full royalties and still have their work distorted (violating moral rights), or an author can have their work reproduced faithfully but without any payment (violating economic rights). The passage establishes the distinctness of these two categories clearly, making option B correct. Option D incorrectly creates a hierarchy between the two categories.

Source note: Copyright Act 1957, Sections 19(8), 57

Correct answer: C. Despite having the full economic copyright in the composition, the producer cannot alter the lyrics, change the music, or modify the artistic integrity of the composition in a way that is prejudicial to the composer's honour or reputation, because moral rights cannot be transferred through contractual assignment

The passage explains inalienability in specific, practical terms: 'a film producer who has acquired all economic rights in a song cannot alter the lyrics, change the music, or substantially modify the artistic integrity of the composition without the composer's consent.' This is the consequence of moral rights being inalienable - they cannot be transferred by contract. Even a complete assignment of copyright does not include the moral rights. The distinction is between economic rights (which are transferable) and moral rights (which are personal to the author and non-transferable). The passage notes this makes the moral rights 'crucial' as a protection for creative integrity even after all commercial rights have been sold. Options A, C, and D all misstate the consequence of inalienability.

Source note: Copyright Act 1957, Section 57

Correct answer: A. A performer's consent to the inclusion of their performance in a film or sound recording could no longer be treated as an assignment of all future rights; performers retained the right to receive royalties from all commercial exploitation of their performance beyond the initial consent

The passage states that Section 38A 'extended a parallel protection to performers: a performer who had given consent to the inclusion of their performance in a film or sound recording could no longer be taken to have assigned all their future rights; they retained the right to receive royalties from all commercial exploitation of their performance.' This mirrors the protection given to composers under Section 19(8): the consent does not extinguish all future rights. Before the 2012 Amendment, a one-time consent to use a performance in a film was often treated as transferring all rights to the producer indefinitely. Section 38A corrects this by preserving the performer's ongoing royalty rights. Option A describes a different right (consent requirement). Option C confuses moral rights with economic rights. Option D introduces a mechanism not mentioned.

Source note: Copyright Act 1957, Section 38A

Correct answer: B. Standard-form agreements had systematically transferred all rights from creators (composers, lyricists, performers) to commercial intermediaries (producers) for one-time, often nominal payments, leaving creators without any share of the ongoing revenues generated by their works' commercial success

The passage describes the historical imbalance explicitly: 'standard-form agreements had systematically transferred all rights from creators to commercial intermediaries for a one-time, often nominal payment.' The problem was a structural power asymmetry: individual composers, lyricists, and performers, negotiating with large, well-resourced production companies, were presented with take-it-or-leave-it agreements that required assignment of all rights for a fixed sum with no ongoing royalty rights. Once the work became commercially successful (through repeated broadcasting, streaming, and theatrical exhibition), all subsequent revenues flowed to the producer, with nothing to the creator. The 2012 amendments used specific statutory provisions to override these contractual outcomes and ensure creators share in ongoing commercial success, regardless of what the assignment agreement says.

Source note: Copyright (Amendment) Act 2012

Correct answer: D. It ensures that the assignment of copyright in a literary or musical work to a film producer does not deprive the author of the right to receive royalties from the commercial exploitation of the work in the film, across all modes of exploitation including cinema, television, digital streaming, and broadcasting

The passage states Section 19(8) 'introduced a rule that the assignment of copyright in a literary or musical work to a film producer shall not deprive the author of the right to receive a share of royalties from the commercial exploitation of the work in the film - including revenues from cinema exhibition, television broadcasting, digital streaming, and other modes.' The key feature is that the assignment is not invalidated - the producer retains the right to exploit the work - but the composer retains the right to receive royalties from that exploitation. This addresses the historical practice of one-time buyout agreements that deprived authors of any ongoing share in a work's success. Option A goes too far (the provision does not prohibit assignment). Options C and D are separate rights not described in the passage.

Source note: Copyright Act 1957, Sections 19(8), 38A, 57; Copyright (Amendment) Act 2012

Correct answer: D. Design protection lasts up to fifteen years (ten years initial plus five years extension), while copyright in a literary or artistic work lasts for the author's life plus sixty years - a potentially much longer period

The passage specifically contrasts the two terms: it refers to copyright as 'the long-term copyright (life of the author plus sixty years)' and to design protection as 'a maximum of fifteen years under Section 11 of the Designs Act.' The contrast between these two durations - potentially decades of copyright protection (for a young author this could be 100+ years) versus a maximum of fifteen years for designs - is the basis of the legislature's intervention through Section 15(2). Without the fifty-article rule, manufacturers could potentially use copyright to protect industrial products for many more decades than the Designs Act intends to allow. The passage also notes that the expiry of design protection contributes to competition and lower consumer prices.

Source note: Designs Act 2000, Section 11

Correct answer: C. Only the aesthetic external shape of the chair may attract design protection, because design protection covers only features judged solely by the eye; the internal spring mechanism, being a functional feature that is not visible in the finished article, cannot be protected as a design

The passage states that the Designs Act protects features that 'appeal to and are judged solely by the eye.' This 'eye-appeal' requirement means that only visually perceptible, aesthetic features that influence consumer purchasing decisions based on visual appearance can be protected as designs. A feature that is purely functional and not visible in the finished article (such as an internal spring mechanism that the consumer never sees) does not 'appeal to and is not judged solely by the eye' and therefore falls outside the scope of design protection. Such a functional invention might be patentable (if it meets the requirements of novelty and inventive step), but it cannot be a 'design' under the Designs Act. The external aesthetic shape of the chair, by contrast, is precisely the type of visual feature that the Designs Act protects.

Source note: Designs Act 2000, Section 2(d)

Correct answer: B. The threshold represents the legislature's judgment that at the point of industrial-scale production, an artistic work transitions from individual creative expression to industrial manufacture, making the shorter-term design protection regime more appropriate than the long-term copyright regime

The passage explicitly states the policy rationale: 'The legislature's judgment [is] that at the point of industrial-scale production, an artistic work has crossed from the domain of individual creative expression into the domain of industrial manufacture, and the appropriate protection regime shifts from the long-term copyright (life of the author plus sixty years) to the shorter-term design protection (a maximum of fifteen years under Section 11 of the Designs Act).' The distinction between individual creative expression and industrial manufacture is the key policy principle. Industrial products should not benefit from copyright's excessively long term. Options A and C introduce considerations not mentioned in the passage. Option D is a possible effect but not the identified rationale.

Source note: Copyright Act 1957, Section 15(2); Designs Act 2000