CLAT PG question bank

Transfer of Property Act MCQs for CLAT PG

CLAT PG Transfer of Property Act questions 1-26 of 80, with answer keys and explanations covering sale, mortgage, lease, gift, exchange, actionable claims, lis pendens, election, and part performance.

80 questions16 topics1-26 on this page
Start adaptive practiceBrowse CLAT PG

Coverage

Topics in this subject

Revise core LLB subjects through CLAT PG MCQs, passage-led questions, answer keys, explanations, statutes, and exam-oriented legal principles.

  • Attestation, Animo Attestandi, Pardanashin Women5
  • Condition Restraining Alienation, Section 10, Absolute vs Partial Restraint5
  • Conditional Transfers, Restraint on Alienation, Transfer for Unborn Persons5
  • Doctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Actual Possession5
  • Doctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Lis Pendens, Priority5
  • Doctrine of Part Performance, Section 53A TPA5
  • Gift Sections 122-123, Lis Pendens Section 52, Ostensible Owner Section 415
  • Gift Sections 122-126, Attestation Advanced, Immovable Property Nuances5
  • Immovable Property, Doctrine of Fixtures, Profit a Prendre5
  • Lease Section 105, Determination Section 111, Holding Over Section 1165
  • Lease vs License, Determination, Holdover Section 1165
  • Mortgage Types Section 58, Equity of Redemption Section 605
  • Mortgage Types, Equity of Redemption, Clog on Equity5
  • Sale Section 54, Rights of Seller and Buyer Section 555
  • Transfer of Property - General Principles, Capacity, Section 8, Section 53A5
  • Transfer of Property Section 5, Partition, Will, Doctrine of Feeding the Estoppel Section 435
Passage or principleTPA Section 3; M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib; Kumar Harish Chandra; Padarath Halwai

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines attestation as signing by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the executant sign, seen another person sign at the executant's direction, or received a personal acknowledgement from the executant. Each witness must sign in the presence of the executant, though both witnesses need not be present simultaneously. Attestation requires animo attestandi, i.e., the intention to attest. In M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib v. H. Venkata Sastri (AIR 1969 SC 1147), the Supreme Court held that a Sub-Registrar who signed only in discharge of his statutory registration duty, and identifying witnesses who signed only to confirm the executant's identity, were not attesting witnesses because they lacked animo attestandi. In Kumar Harish Chandra Singh Deo v. Bansidhar Mohanty (AIR 1965 SC 1738), the Supreme Court drew a crucial distinction: a party to the deed is incompetent to attest, but a party to the underlying transaction who is not a signatory to the deed can validly attest. In Padarath Halwai v. Ram Narain (AIR 1915 PC 21), the Privy Council allowed attestation by witnesses who recognised pardanashin women mortgagors by voice and saw the deed being executed through curtains, relaxing the strict visual identification requirement to accommodate social customs.

Question 1EasyAttestation, Animo Attestandi, Pardanashin Women

Under Section 3 TPA as described in the passage, is it necessary for both attesting witnesses to be present simultaneously?

  1. A

    Yes, both must be present at the same time

  2. B

    No, both witnesses need not be present simultaneously

  3. C

    Yes, unless the executant specifically consents

  4. D

    Yes, for mortgages but not for gifts

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. No, both witnesses need not be present simultaneously

The passage states: "though both witnesses need not be present simultaneously." This is expressly provided in Section 3 TPA.

Source note: TPA Section 3; M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib; Kumar Harish Chandra; Padarath Halwai

Question 2MediumAttestation, Animo Attestandi, Pardanashin Women

What is animo attestandi as described in the passage, and why did the Sub-Registrar lack it in the Abdul Jabbar Sahib case?

  1. A

    It is the financial interest a witness must disclose; the Sub-Registrar had a financial interest

  2. B

    It is the legal qualification required; the Sub-Registrar was not legally qualified

  3. C

    It is the requirement of understanding the document; the Sub-Registrar did not read it

  4. D

    It is the intention to attest; the Sub-Registrar signed only in discharge of his statutory registration duty, not with intent to authenticate execution

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: D. It is the intention to attest; the Sub-Registrar signed only in discharge of his statutory registration duty, not with intent to authenticate execution

The passage states animo attestandi means "the intention to attest" and that the Sub-Registrar "who signed only in discharge of his statutory registration duty... lacked animo attestandi."

Source note: TPA Section 3; M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib; Kumar Harish Chandra; Padarath Halwai

Question 3MediumAttestation, Animo Attestandi, Pardanashin Women

According to the passage, what key distinction did the Supreme Court draw in Kumar Harish Chandra Singh Deo v. Bansidhar Mohanty?

  1. A

    Between a party to the deed (incompetent to attest) and a party to the underlying transaction who is not a signatory to the deed (competent to attest)

  2. B

    Between paid witnesses and volunteer witnesses

  3. C

    Between witnesses who are relatives and those who are strangers

  4. D

    Between registered and unregistered documents for attestation purposes

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: A. Between a party to the deed (incompetent to attest) and a party to the underlying transaction who is not a signatory to the deed (competent to attest)

The passage states: "a party to the deed is incompetent to attest, but a party to the underlying transaction who is not a signatory to the deed can validly attest."

Source note: TPA Section 3; M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib; Kumar Harish Chandra; Padarath Halwai

Question 4HardAttestation, Animo Attestandi, Pardanashin Women

In Padarath Halwai v. Ram Narain, why did the Privy Council allow attestation despite the witnesses not seeing the pardanashin women's faces?

  1. A

    Because pardanashin women are exempt from attestation requirements

  2. B

    Because the mortgage deed was of low value

  3. C

    Because the witnesses recognised them by voice and saw the deed being executed through curtains, and strict application would make transfers by pardanashin women extremely difficult

  4. D

    Because the witnesses were female relatives

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. Because the witnesses recognised them by voice and saw the deed being executed through curtains, and strict application would make transfers by pardanashin women extremely difficult

The passage states the Privy Council relaxed the strict visual requirement "to accommodate social customs" where witnesses "recognised pardanashin women mortgagors by voice and saw the deed being executed through curtains."

Source note: TPA Section 3; M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib; Kumar Harish Chandra; Padarath Halwai

Question 5HardAttestation, Animo Attestandi, Pardanashin Women

Based on the passage, which of the following persons would be a competent attesting witness?

  1. A

    The mortgagor who is executing the mortgage deed

  2. B

    The moneylender who provided the funds but is not named in the mortgage deed as mortgagee

  3. C

    The sub-registrar signing only to register the document

  4. D

    A person who signs only to identify the executant

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. The moneylender who provided the funds but is not named in the mortgage deed as mortgagee

The passage explains Kumar Harish Chandra: a party to the transaction but not to the deed is competent. The moneylender provided funds (party to transaction) but was not a signatory to the deed (not a party to the deed), so they are competent. The mortgagor, sub-registrar signing only to register, and identifying witness are all incompetent per the passage.

Source note: TPA Section 3; M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib; Kumar Harish Chandra; Padarath Halwai

Passage or principleTPA Section 10; Rosher v. Rosher; Muhammad Raza v. Abbas; Zoroastrian Co-op Housing Society

Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that where property is transferred subject to a condition absolutely restraining the transferee from disposing of their interest in the property, such condition is void. The transfer itself remains valid; only the restraining condition is struck down. A key distinction exists between absolute restraints (which take away the power of alienation completely or substantially and are void) and partial restraints (which merely restrict some modes of alienation while leaving substantial power intact and are valid). In Rosher v. Rosher (1884), a testamentary condition requiring the son to offer to sell property to the widow at one-fifth of market value, combined with restrictions on leasing, was held to be an absolute restraint because it substantially prevented any real alienation. In Muhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bibi (1932 PC), a condition that the transferee should not alienate property to strangers outside the family was held to be a valid partial restraint, as it left the power to transfer within the family intact. In Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society v. District Registrar (2005 SC), a byelaw restricting members from selling their flats to non-Parsis was held to be a valid partial restraint since members had voluntarily accepted this restriction by joining the society. Section 10 contains an exception: in a lease, a condition for the benefit of the lessor restraining the lessee from alienating the leasehold is valid.

Question 6EasyCondition Restraining Alienation, Section 10, Absolute vs Partial Restraint

Under Section 10 TPA as described in the passage, when a restraint on alienation is found to be void, what is the effect on the transfer itself?

  1. A

    The entire transfer is also void

  2. B

    The transferee must return the property to the transferor

  3. C

    The transfer remains valid; only the restraining condition is struck down

  4. D

    The court must determine an appropriate condition to substitute

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. The transfer remains valid; only the restraining condition is struck down

The passage states: "The transfer itself remains valid; only the restraining condition is struck down."

Source note: TPA Section 10; Rosher v. Rosher; Muhammad Raza v. Abbas; Zoroastrian Co-op Housing Society

Question 7EasyCondition Restraining Alienation, Section 10, Absolute vs Partial Restraint

According to the passage, what distinguishes an absolute restraint (void) from a partial restraint (valid)?

  1. A

    An absolute restraint is in writing; a partial restraint is oral

  2. B

    An absolute restraint takes away the power of alienation completely or substantially; a partial restraint merely restricts some modes while leaving substantial power intact

  3. C

    An absolute restraint applies to immovable property; a partial restraint applies to movable property

  4. D

    An absolute restraint requires court approval to become void

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. An absolute restraint takes away the power of alienation completely or substantially; a partial restraint merely restricts some modes while leaving substantial power intact

The passage explains: "absolute restraints (which take away the power of alienation completely or substantially and are void) and partial restraints (which merely restrict some modes of alienation while leaving substantial power intact and are valid)."

Source note: TPA Section 10; Rosher v. Rosher; Muhammad Raza v. Abbas; Zoroastrian Co-op Housing Society

Question 8HardCondition Restraining Alienation, Section 10, Absolute vs Partial Restraint

Why was the condition in Rosher v. Rosher held to be an absolute restraint despite being framed as a right of first refusal?

  1. A

    Because it applied only to the widow and not to all family members

  2. B

    Because the condition was in a Will rather than a sale deed

  3. C

    Because the property had been occupied by the widow for many years

  4. D

    Because it substantially prevented real alienation by combining a restriction on the buyer (one specific person) with a drastically reduced price (one-fifth of value) and restrictions on leasing

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: D. Because it substantially prevented real alienation by combining a restriction on the buyer (one specific person) with a drastically reduced price (one-fifth of value) and restrictions on leasing

The passage states it was an absolute restraint "because it substantially prevented any real alienation." The combination of limiting the buyer to one person, fixing the price at one-fifth of value, and restricting leasing effectively destroyed the power of alienation.

Source note: TPA Section 10; Rosher v. Rosher; Muhammad Raza v. Abbas; Zoroastrian Co-op Housing Society

Question 9MediumCondition Restraining Alienation, Section 10, Absolute vs Partial Restraint

In Muhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bibi, why was the condition not to alienate to "strangers" held to be a valid partial restraint?

  1. A

    Because the transferee retained substantial freedom to transfer within the family, and the restriction to a class (family members) is a partial, not absolute, restraint

  2. B

    Because the condition was agreed to by both parties

  3. C

    Because Privy Council decisions are not bound by Section 10

  4. D

    Because the property was Muslim personal property exempt from TPA

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: A. Because the transferee retained substantial freedom to transfer within the family, and the restriction to a class (family members) is a partial, not absolute, restraint

The passage states it was "a valid partial restraint, as it left the power to transfer within the family intact." A restriction to a class (family) is partial; a restriction to one specific named individual would be absolute.

Source note: TPA Section 10; Rosher v. Rosher; Muhammad Raza v. Abbas; Zoroastrian Co-op Housing Society

Question 10HardCondition Restraining Alienation, Section 10, Absolute vs Partial Restraint

In Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society v. District Registrar, why was the restriction on selling to non-Parsis upheld?

  1. A

    Because religious communities have a constitutional right to preserve their property

  2. B

    Because the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act overrides Section 10 TPA

  3. C

    Because members voluntarily accepted this restriction by joining the society, making it a partial restraint rather than an externally imposed absolute restraint

  4. D

    Because the restriction applied only to transfer of membership, not the property itself

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. Because members voluntarily accepted this restriction by joining the society, making it a partial restraint rather than an externally imposed absolute restraint

The passage states the Supreme Court upheld it "since members had voluntarily accepted this restriction by joining the society." The voluntary assumption of restriction through membership was key to holding it a partial, not absolute, restraint.

Source note: TPA Section 10; Rosher v. Rosher; Muhammad Raza v. Abbas; Zoroastrian Co-op Housing Society

Passage or principleTPA Sections 10, 13, 14, 25; Rosher v Rosher; Zoroastrian Co-op; Ram Newaz v Nankoo

Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that a condition absolutely restraining the transferee from parting with or disposing of their interest in the property is void; the transfer itself remains valid. The key distinction is between absolute restraints (void) and partial restraints (valid). In Rosher v. Rosher (1884 26 Ch D 801), a testamentary condition requiring the son to sell property only to a specific widow at one-fifth of its market value, combined with severe restrictions on leasing, was held to constitute an absolute restraint because it substantially prevented any real alienation. In Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar (2005 SC), a byelaw restricting transfer of flats to non-Parsis was upheld as a valid partial restraint because members had voluntarily accepted this restriction by joining the society, and they remained free to sell to the class of Parsi members. Section 25 provides that an interest dependent on a condition precedent fails if the condition is impossible, immoral, or opposed to public policy; unlike conditions subsequent (where the transfer stands but the void condition is ignored), if a condition precedent is void, the entire transfer fails. Section 13 TPA governs transfers for the benefit of unborn persons: property may be transferred for the benefit of an unborn person provided there is a prior life estate for a living person and the unborn person receives the absolute (not limited) interest; the unborn person's interest vests at birth though possession is deferred until the life holder dies. Section 14 TPA embodies the rule against perpetuity: vesting must occur within the lifetime of living persons specified in the transfer plus the minority (up to 18 years) of the ultimate beneficiary.

Question 11EasyConditional Transfers, Restraint on Alienation, Transfer for Unborn Persons

According to Section 10 TPA as described in the passage, when an absolute restraint on alienation is found to be void, what is the effect on the transfer itself?

  1. A

    The entire transfer is also void because it was made subject to the void condition

  2. B

    The transfer becomes conditional on the court approving the remainder of the terms

  3. C

    The transfer is voidable at the option of the original transferor

  4. D

    The transfer remains valid; only the void condition is struck down and the transferee holds free of it

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: D. The transfer remains valid; only the void condition is struck down and the transferee holds free of it

The passage states: "a condition absolutely restraining the transferee from parting with or disposing of their interest in the property is void; the transfer itself remains valid."

Source note: TPA Sections 10, 13, 14, 25; Rosher v Rosher; Zoroastrian Co-op; Ram Newaz v Nankoo

Question 12HardConditional Transfers, Restraint on Alienation, Transfer for Unborn Persons

According to the passage, why was the condition in Rosher v. Rosher held to be an absolute (not partial) restraint?

  1. A

    Because the combined conditions of selling only to one specific person at one-fifth market value plus severe leasing restrictions substantially prevented any real alienation

  2. B

    Because the condition was contained in a Will rather than a conveyance deed

  3. C

    Because the widow was a specific named individual

  4. D

    Because the condition related to both sale and leasing simultaneously

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: A. Because the combined conditions of selling only to one specific person at one-fifth market value plus severe leasing restrictions substantially prevented any real alienation

The passage states: "it substantially prevented any real alienation." The combination of restricting the buyer to one specific person, drastically reducing the price, and severely restricting leasing together operated as an absolute restraint.

Source note: TPA Sections 10, 13, 14, 25; Rosher v Rosher; Zoroastrian Co-op; Ram Newaz v Nankoo

Question 13MediumConditional Transfers, Restraint on Alienation, Transfer for Unborn Persons

According to the Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society case as described in the passage, the byelaw restricting sales to Parsis was upheld as a valid partial restraint because?

  1. A

    Religious communities have a fundamental right to restrict property transfers

  2. B

    The Bombay Co-operative Societies Act overrides Section 10 TPA

  3. C

    Members voluntarily accepted this restriction by joining the society and remained free to sell to the class of Parsi members

  4. D

    The restriction applied only to membership transfer, not property transfer

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. Members voluntarily accepted this restriction by joining the society and remained free to sell to the class of Parsi members

The passage states: "members had voluntarily accepted this restriction by joining the society, and they remained free to sell to the class of Parsi members."

Source note: TPA Sections 10, 13, 14, 25; Rosher v Rosher; Zoroastrian Co-op; Ram Newaz v Nankoo

Question 14HardConditional Transfers, Restraint on Alienation, Transfer for Unborn Persons

According to Section 25 TPA as described in the passage, what happens when a condition precedent is void (as opposed to a condition subsequent being void)?

  1. A

    The transfer still stands; only the void condition is ignored

  2. B

    The entire transfer fails when the condition precedent is impossible, immoral, or opposed to public policy

  3. C

    The court substitutes a workable condition to save the transfer

  4. D

    The transferee can waive the void condition and take the property

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. The entire transfer fails when the condition precedent is impossible, immoral, or opposed to public policy

The passage states: "unlike conditions subsequent (where the transfer stands but the void condition is ignored), if a condition precedent is void, the entire transfer fails."

Source note: TPA Sections 10, 13, 14, 25; Rosher v Rosher; Zoroastrian Co-op; Ram Newaz v Nankoo

Question 15MediumConditional Transfers, Restraint on Alienation, Transfer for Unborn Persons

Under Section 13 TPA as described in the passage, when an unborn person receives an absolute interest in property (with a prior life estate for a living person), when does the unborn person vested interest accrue?

  1. A

    At the death of the life holder when the unborn person obtains possession

  2. B

    Retrospectively from the date the transfer deed was made

  3. C

    Only when the unborn person becomes an adult

  4. D

    At the birth of the unborn person, even though possession is deferred until the life holder dies

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: D. At the birth of the unborn person, even though possession is deferred until the life holder dies

The passage states: "the unborn person receives the absolute (not limited) interest; the unborn person interest vests at birth though possession is deferred until the life holder dies."

Source note: TPA Sections 10, 13, 14, 25; Rosher v Rosher; Zoroastrian Co-op; Ram Newaz v Nankoo

Passage or principleTPA Section 3; Ahmedabad MC v. Haji Abdul Gafur; Ram Niwas v. Bano; H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 distinguishes actual notice (where a person actually knows a fact) from constructive notice (where, but for wilful abstention from inquiry or gross negligence, the person would have known it). Constructive notice arises in five circumstances: wilful abstention from inquiry, gross negligence, registration of a document (Explanation I), actual possession of property by another person (Explanation II), and notice received by an agent in the course of agency business (Explanation III). In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Haji Abdul Gafur (AIR 1971 SC 1201), the Supreme Court held that constructive notice is not automatic but depends on whether there was a duty to find out in the circumstances, not merely whether the means to find out existed. Since the purchaser had made general inquiries from the Official Receiver and was given no information about tax arrears, and since the municipality itself was more negligent, no constructive notice was imputed. In Ram Niwas v. Bano (2000 6 SCC 685), the Supreme Court held that a purchaser who sees a tenant in actual possession has a duty to inquire from that tenant about their rights, and that the word notice in Section 3 is of wider import than knowledge. In H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Deveeramma (AIR 1981 Kant 93), constructive notice was found on two grounds: wilful abstention from inquiry, and actual possession by the other party.

Question 16EasyDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Actual Possession

According to the passage, how many circumstances give rise to constructive notice under Section 3 TPA?

  1. A

    Two

  2. B

    Three

  3. C

    Seven

  4. D

    Five

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: D. Five

The passage states: "Constructive notice arises in five circumstances: wilful abstention from inquiry, gross negligence, registration of a document (Explanation I), actual possession of property by another person (Explanation II), and notice received by an agent in the course of agency business (Explanation III)."

Source note: TPA Section 3; Ahmedabad MC v. Haji Abdul Gafur; Ram Niwas v. Bano; H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu

Question 17MediumDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Actual Possession

What principle did the Supreme Court establish in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Haji Abdul Gafur regarding constructive notice?

  1. A

    Constructive notice depends on whether there was a duty to find out in the circumstances, not merely whether the means existed

  2. B

    Constructive notice is automatic whenever tax arrears exist on a property

  3. C

    A court auction purchaser is always protected from prior charges

  4. D

    Municipal taxes are not charges on property under TPA

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: A. Constructive notice depends on whether there was a duty to find out in the circumstances, not merely whether the means existed

The passage states the Supreme Court held "constructive notice is not automatic but depends on whether there was a duty to find out in the circumstances, not merely whether the means to find out existed."

Source note: TPA Section 3; Ahmedabad MC v. Haji Abdul Gafur; Ram Niwas v. Bano; H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu

Question 18MediumDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Actual Possession

According to Ram Niwas v. Bano as described in the passage, what duty does a purchaser have when they see a tenant in actual possession?

  1. A

    Only to verify whether the tenant has a registered lease

  2. B

    To obtain a no-objection certificate from the tenant

  3. C

    To inquire from that tenant about their rights, since notice under Section 3 is wider than mere knowledge

  4. D

    To ensure the tenant vacates before completing the purchase

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. To inquire from that tenant about their rights, since notice under Section 3 is wider than mere knowledge

The passage states: "a purchaser who sees a tenant in actual possession has a duty to inquire from that tenant about their rights, and that the word notice in Section 3 is of wider import than knowledge."

Source note: TPA Section 3; Ahmedabad MC v. Haji Abdul Gafur; Ram Niwas v. Bano; H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu

Question 19EasyDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Actual Possession

In H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Deveeramma, on how many grounds was constructive notice established?

  1. A

    One ground: registration

  2. B

    Two grounds: wilful abstention from inquiry and actual possession by the other party

  3. C

    Three grounds including agent's notice

  4. D

    No constructive notice was found in that case

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. Two grounds: wilful abstention from inquiry and actual possession by the other party

The passage states: "In H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Deveeramma (AIR 1981 Kant 93), constructive notice was found on two grounds: wilful abstention from inquiry, and actual possession by the other party."

Source note: TPA Section 3; Ahmedabad MC v. Haji Abdul Gafur; Ram Niwas v. Bano; H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu

Question 20HardDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Actual Possession

Based on the passage, which of the following would constitute gross negligence (as distinct from wilful abstention) as a form of constructive notice?

  1. A

    A purchaser deliberately avoiding opening a letter from the seller about a charge on the property

  2. B

    A purchaser relying on the seller's oral representations without making any inquiry

  3. C

    A purchaser's agent acquiring information and informing the principal

  4. D

    A purchaser forgetting to check for registered encumbrances despite obvious signs warning of adverse claims

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: D. A purchaser forgetting to check for registered encumbrances despite obvious signs warning of adverse claims

The passage distinguishes wilful abstention (deliberate avoidance) from gross negligence (extreme carelessness). Option A describes deliberate avoidance (wilful abstention). Option B describes extreme carelessness amounting to gross negligence. Options C and D are different scenarios altogether.

Source note: TPA Section 3; Ahmedabad MC v. Haji Abdul Gafur; Ram Niwas v. Bano; H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu

Passage or principleTPA Sections 3, 48, 52; Ahmedabad MC; Ram Niwas v Bano; G.T. Girish v Y. Subba Raju

The doctrine of notice under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 determines the rights of competing claimants to immovable property. A person has notice of a fact when they actually know it (actual notice) or when, but for wilful abstention from inquiry or gross negligence, they would have known it (constructive notice). The Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Haji Abdul Gafur Haji Hussenbhai (AIR 1971 SC 1201) held that constructive notice is not automatic but depends on whether in the circumstances there was a duty to find out; the question is not whether the person had the means to find out but whether they had a duty to do so. In Ram Niwas v. Bano (2000) 6 SCC 685, the Supreme Court held that the word "notice" in Section 3 is of wider import than the word "knowledge" and that a purchaser who sees a third party in actual possession has a duty to inquire about that party's rights under Explanation II to Section 3. Section 52 TPA embodies the doctrine of lis pendens, providing that during the pendency of any non-collusive suit in a competent court in which a right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, no party to the suit can transfer the property so as to affect the rights of other parties. Transfers pendente lite are not void but are subject to the outcome of the suit; crucially, the doctrine operates regardless of whether the transferee had notice of the pending suit, as affirmed in G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju (2022 LiveLaw SC 61). Section 48 TPA provides the rule of priority: earlier-created rights prevail over later-created rights; only a bona fide purchaser for value without notice takes free of prior equities.

Question 21MediumDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Lis Pendens, Priority

According to the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case as described in the passage, the test for constructive notice is?

  1. A

    Whether the person had the means to find out the relevant fact

  2. B

    Whether the relevant fact was registered in the public registry

  3. C

    Whether in the circumstances there was a duty to find out, not merely whether the means existed

  4. D

    Whether the person was a professional (such as a lawyer) who should have known

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. Whether in the circumstances there was a duty to find out, not merely whether the means existed

The passage states: "constructive notice is not automatic but depends on whether in the circumstances there was a duty to find out; the question is not whether the person had the means to find out but whether they had a duty to do so."

Source note: TPA Sections 3, 48, 52; Ahmedabad MC; Ram Niwas v Bano; G.T. Girish v Y. Subba Raju

Question 22MediumDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Lis Pendens, Priority

According to Ram Niwas v. Bano, what is the significance of a third party being in actual possession of the property that a purchaser intends to buy?

  1. A

    The third party in possession has no legal rights against the purchaser

  2. B

    The purchaser has a duty to inquire about the third party rights under Explanation II to Section 3; failure to inquire results in constructive notice of those rights

  3. C

    The purchaser can rely entirely on the vendor assurances

  4. D

    The third party possession is only relevant if it has lasted more than 12 years

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. The purchaser has a duty to inquire about the third party rights under Explanation II to Section 3; failure to inquire results in constructive notice of those rights

The passage states: "a purchaser who sees a third party in actual possession has a duty to inquire about that party rights under Explanation II to Section 3."

Source note: TPA Sections 3, 48, 52; Ahmedabad MC; Ram Niwas v Bano; G.T. Girish v Y. Subba Raju

Question 23EasyDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Lis Pendens, Priority

According to the passage, transfers pendente lite under Section 52 TPA are?

  1. A

    Absolutely void from the date of the transfer

  2. B

    Valid against all parties except the plaintiff in the pending suit

  3. C

    Void only if the transferee had actual notice of the pending suit

  4. D

    Not void but subject to the outcome of the pending suit

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: D. Not void but subject to the outcome of the pending suit

The passage states: "Transfers pendente lite are not void but are subject to the outcome of the suit."

Source note: TPA Sections 3, 48, 52; Ahmedabad MC; Ram Niwas v Bano; G.T. Girish v Y. Subba Raju

Question 24EasyDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Lis Pendens, Priority

According to the passage, does a transferee pendente lite need to have notice of the pending suit for Section 52 TPA to bind them?

  1. A

    No; the doctrine operates regardless of whether the transferee had notice of the pending suit

  2. B

    Yes, notice is essential; without notice the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply

  3. C

    Notice is required only for registered transfers

  4. D

    Notice is required only if the suit was filed more than one year before the transfer

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: A. No; the doctrine operates regardless of whether the transferee had notice of the pending suit

The passage states: "the doctrine operates regardless of whether the transferee had notice of the pending suit, as affirmed in G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju (2022 LiveLaw SC 61)."

Source note: TPA Sections 3, 48, 52; Ahmedabad MC; Ram Niwas v Bano; G.T. Girish v Y. Subba Raju

Question 25HardDoctrine of Notice, Constructive Notice, Lis Pendens, Priority

According to the passage, under Section 48 TPA, when is a later-created right protected against an earlier-created right?

  1. A

    When the later right is created by a registered instrument

  2. B

    When the later right involves a higher monetary value

  3. C

    When the person acquiring the later right is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the prior right

  4. D

    When the earlier right was not registered

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. When the person acquiring the later right is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the prior right

The passage states: "Section 48 TPA provides the rule of priority: earlier-created rights prevail over later-created rights; only a bona fide purchaser for value without notice takes free of prior equities."

Source note: TPA Sections 3, 48, 52; Ahmedabad MC; Ram Niwas v Bano; G.T. Girish v Y. Subba Raju

Passage or principleTPA Section 53A; 2001 Amendment

Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 embodies the doctrine of part performance. It provides that where a person contracts to transfer immovable property for consideration by a writing signed by the transferor, and the transferee has taken possession in part performance of the contract or continued in possession in part performance and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee is willing to perform their part, then the transferor is debarred from enforcing any right against the transferee in respect of the property. Section 53A operates as a defence, not as a source of title. It is described as a shield, not a sword: the transferee can use it to resist dispossession by the transferor but cannot assert an independent title claim against third parties through this section. The protection is not available against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the contract or the part performance. Prior to the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001, an unregistered written agreement could attract Section 53A. After the 2001 Amendment, the contract must also be registered for Section 53A protection to apply. An unregistered written agreement, however clearly supported by part performance, does not attract Section 53A after the amendment.

Question 26EasyDoctrine of Part Performance, Section 53A TPA

Section 53A is described in the passage as a "shield, not a sword." What does this mean?

  1. A

    Section 53A gives the transferee an absolute title to the property

  2. B

    The transferee can use Section 53A to resist dispossession by the transferor but cannot assert an independent title claim against third parties through it

  3. C

    The transferor can use Section 53A to recover possession

  4. D

    Section 53A can be used both offensively and defensively

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. The transferee can use Section 53A to resist dispossession by the transferor but cannot assert an independent title claim against third parties through it

The passage states: "It is described as a shield, not a sword: the transferee can use it to resist dispossession by the transferor but cannot assert an independent title claim against third parties through this section."

Source note: TPA Section 53A; 2001 Amendment

Continue revision

Administrative Law100 questions with explanationsADR and Arbitration20 questions with explanationsBSA70 questions with explanationsCode of Civil Procedure 190845 questions with explanationsConstitutional Law100 questions with explanationsCriminal Law (BNS 2023)85 questions with explanations