Law of Contract MCQs for Judiciary

Correct answer: B. The principal is bound where a good-faith third party relies on apparent authority.

This is a fundamental agency law problem. A's ACTUAL authority was limited: minimum Rs. 3 lakh. But A had APPARENT AUTHORITY arising from P's act of entrusting A with the car and the authority to sell. T, as a third party dealing with A in good faith without notice of the restriction, was entitled to rely on A's apparent authority. Under Section 237 ICA (by analogy) and general agency principles: a principal who creates an apparent authority by placing the agent in a position to deal cannot deny that authority against innocent third parties. T gets good title under the doctrine of apparent authority. P's remedy is against A for breach of the instruction (Section 212 ICA: agent liable for loss from want of proper diligence; A must account for the Rs. 1 lakh shortfall). This protects the security of commercial transactions.

Source note: ICA 1872 / Apparent Authority Doctrine

Correct answer: B. The contract may be unenforceable as being ultra vires if the officer lacked statutory authority; however, the contractor may be able to claim on quasi-contract under Section 70 ICA for the reasonable value of services rendered if the corporation accepted and enjoyed the benefits

Contracts made by statutory corporations are subject to the ULTRA VIRES doctrine (beyond the powers of the corporation). Under the Companies Act and government authority rules, an officer of a statutory body must have the requisite authority. A contract made by an officer without authority is ULTRA VIRES and cannot be enforced as a contract against the corporation. However, the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal (AIR 1962 SC) allowed recovery under Section 70 ICA where: (1) the work was done lawfully; (2) not gratuitously; (3) the corporation accepted and enjoyed the benefit. The Privy Council in Sinclair v. Brougham (1914) and Indian courts have generally allowed quasi-contractual recovery for ultra vires benefits to prevent unjust enrichment, though some Indian decisions limit this approach. Article 299 of the Constitution imposes specific requirements for government contracts.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 70 / State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal (AIR 1962 SC) / Constitution Art 299

Correct answer: B. P is correct; under the law of agency, receipt of premium by ic's authorised agent A is, in law, receipt by ic.

This is a classic DEEMED RECEIPT problem in agency law. Under Section 226 ICA, when an agent receives money on behalf of the principal, that receipt is in law the principal's receipt. An insurance agent who has authority to collect premiums is acting as IC's agent for the purpose of collection. P paid the premium to A (IC's agent). That payment is deemed to have been made to IC. IC cannot hold P responsible for A's failure to remit. IC's remedy is: (1) against A for breach of duty (Section 212 ICA: agent's duty to account); (2) criminally against A for criminal breach of trust under the IPC. P's policy must be treated as having been paid and cannot be cancelled for A's non-remittance. Insurance regulatory circulars from IRDAI also confirm this principle, protecting policyholders from the consequences of agents' defaults.

Source note: ICA 1872 Sections 212, 226

Correct answer: B. The ratification may be ineffective; under Keighley Maxsted v.

This question tests the UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL and ratification rules. Keighley Maxsted and Co v. Durant (1901 HL): ratification is only possible if at the time of the original contract, the agent acted in the name of or on behalf of an identifiable principal. Where the agent contracted in his OWN NAME without any disclosure of a principal, there is NO AGENT-PRINCIPAL relationship visible to the third party. The third party contracted with R personally. There is no 'principal' that can step in and ratify. Ratification essentially adopts a prior unauthorised act as one's own, but this requires that the act was done ON THE PRINCIPAL'S BEHALF at the time. R acting in his own name was not acting on P's behalf at the time. P's option if he wants to enforce: he must do so through R (as undisclosed principal under Section 231 ICA, exercising rights through R against T), not by direct ratification.

Source note: ICA 1872 / Keighley Maxsted v. Durant (1901 HL)

Correct answer: B. No; B made a representation beyond the scope of his actual and apparent authority.

This question tests the limits of APPARENT AUTHORITY. An agent's apparent authority arises from the principal's CONDUCT or representations, not from the agent's own statements about his authority. An agent CANNOT create his own apparent authority by asserting authority he does not have. B told Q that S would accept Rs. 90 lakh. This was beyond B's actual authority (sell for not less than Rs. 1 crore) and was B's own unsupported assertion, not something S had represented or held B out as being entitled to say. Q dealt with B knowing B was an agent negotiating on S's behalf. When told a specific price by an agent, a cautious buyer should confirm with the principal, especially for high-value property transactions. The Privy Council in Freeman and Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (1964) and general agency principles establish that apparent authority is created by the principal's representations, not the agent's own assertions.

Source note: ICA 1872 / Apparent Authority / Freeman and Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (1964)

Correct answer: B. Ratification retrospectively adopts an unauthorised act as the principal's own from the time of the original act; if the principal ratifies without full knowledge, he may inadvertently adopt obligations he did not intend to accept; full knowledge ensures informed consent to the entire transaction including any unfavorable terms

Section 198 ICA 1872: 'No valid ratification can be made by a person whose knowledge of the facts of the case is materially defective.' This requirement flows from the fundamental nature of ratification: it is a RETROSPECTIVE adoption of an unauthorised act as the principal's own, effective from the date of the original act. Since ratification creates an agreement from an earlier date, the principal could inadvertently assume obligations in transactions he would not have authorised had he known the true facts. Example: Agent A, without authority, buys shares for principal P at Rs. 100. P ratifies thinking the price was Rs. 80. If P did not know the true price, the ratification is invalid under Section 198 because P's knowledge was materially defective. P cannot adopt the transaction at the price he thought (Rs. 80) while rejecting it at the actual price (Rs. 100): he must ratify ALL or NOTHING under Section 199.

Source note: ICA 1872 Sections 196, 198, 199

Correct answer: B. This is a borderline case; Section 70 requires that the act was done lawfully for another person not intending to be gratuitous and the other person enjoys the benefit.

This is a nuanced Section 70 ICA problem. The elements are: (1) LAWFUL delivery: delivering newspapers is lawful; (2) NOT GRATUITOUS: NA clearly expected payment from someone; (3) Q ENJOYED the benefit: Q read the newspapers. The difficulty: the delivery was by MISTAKE, not purposely for Q. Q may not have known the newspapers were mistakenly delivered and may not have had an opportunity to refuse them before reading them. Courts in such cases consider: did the recipient have a genuine choice whether to accept the benefit? For consumable goods enjoyed before the mistake was apparent, courts generally allow quasi-contractual recovery (unjust enrichment principle). NA would likely recover the reasonable value of the newspapers from Q, as Q was unjustly enriched at NA's expense. NA must also sort out the billing error with P and reimburse P or give substitute newspapers.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 70

Correct answer: B. No; ic has not ratified the unauthorised policy.

This question involves the TIMING of ratification. Section 197 ICA: ratification relates back to the time of the original act. The crucial principle: ratification must occur BEFORE the situation has materially changed to the detriment of the ratifying party. In insurance law particularly: ratifying a policy after the insured event has occurred would impose the full insurance liability on IC without IC ever having borne the risk. This would be inequitable. The rule in Grover and Grover Ltd v. Mathews (1910): one cannot retrospectively ratify a contract that, by the time of ratification, has had the exact loss materialise that the contract was designed against. IC's refusal to ratify is valid in law. IC's remedy against K (the unauthorized agent): Section 212 ICA (agent liable for losses caused by exceeding authority); K is personally liable to the customer for misrepresenting his authority.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 197 / Grover v. Mathews (1910)

Correct answer: B. P is vicariously liable for A's negligence committed in the course of agency (Section 238 ICA); an agent's tortious acts committed within the scope of the agency bind the principal.

Section 238 ICA 1872: 'Misrepresentations made, or frauds committed, by agents acting in the course of their business for their principals, have the same effect on agreements made by such agents as if such misrepresentations or frauds had been made or committed by the principals.' While Section 238 specifically addresses misrepresentations and fraud, the general principle of VICARIOUS LIABILITY in agency extends to all tortious acts of the agent committed in the course of the agency. This is reinforced by the Law of Torts. The test for vicarious liability: was A acting within the scope of the agency at the time of the negligent act? Driving P's car on P's business = clearly within scope. Both A (as the direct tortfeasor) and P (as the principal vicariously liable) can be sued. P's remedy is contribution from A after paying T. P cannot escape liability by denying authorization of A's specific manner of driving.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 238 / Vicarious Liability

Correct answer: B. The agent must have a proprietary or financial interest in the subject matter of the agency itself (not merely an interest in the commission earned); the interest must pre-exist or be concomitant with the grant of the authority and must give the agent a right that the authority was granted to protect

Section 202 ICA 1872: 'Where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject-matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest.' The key: the agent must have an interest in the SUBJECT MATTER ITSELF. Example: P owes A money and authorises A to sell P's goods and retain his debt from the proceeds. A's interest is in the goods (the subject matter). P cannot revoke A's authority to sell without paying A's debt first. This is agency coupled with interest. CONTRAST: an agent who merely earns commission from the sale has an interest in the commission (future income from performing the agency) but NOT in the subject matter. Such interest does NOT make the agency irrevocable. The distinction is critical and is tested by asking: does the agent have a pre-existing right against the PROPERTY that the authority was granted to protect?

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 202

Correct answer: B. Award reasonable compensation as best it can on available evidence; Section 73 ICA requires proof of loss but does not require mathematical precision.

Maula Bux v. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 1955) is important for the proposition that difficulty in assessing damages does not preclude an award. The Supreme Court held that Section 73 ICA requires proof of loss but not mathematical certainty in its assessment. Where damages flow naturally from the breach (first limb of Hadley v. Baxendale), courts must do their best to assess the loss on available evidence rather than leaving the innocent party without remedy merely because precise calculation is difficult. This principle applies particularly to: loss of future business opportunities, loss of goodwill, and other intangible losses. The court assesses on the balance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt. However, the claimant must provide the best available evidence of loss; entirely speculative claims without any evidential foundation are denied.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 73 / Maula Bux v. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC)

Correct answer: B. Proved on the balance of probabilities.

The doctrine of LOSS OF CHANCE damages has been developed in Anglo-Indian contract law. Where a breach deprives the claimant of a CHANCE (not a certainty), courts assess the value of the chance rather than awarding the full value of what might have been achieved. The probability of the chance materializing is central: if there was a 60% chance of acquiring the customers, the claimant recovers 60% of the expected profits from those customers. Chaplin v. Hicks (1911 CA) established this: a beauty contestant who was deprived of the chance to compete recovered damages representing the value of her lost chance. In commercial contracts, the same principle applies. Allied Maples Group v. Simmons and Simmons (1995 CA) confirmed: for loss of chance depending on the actions of a third party, the claimant must show a real or substantial (not merely speculative) chance, and then recovers a proportionate amount.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 73 / Chaplin v. Hicks (1911 CA)

Correct answer: B. The court vindicates the plaintiff's legal right even though no actual loss has been suffered; nominal damages acknowledge that a legal right was infringed without significant consequence

NOMINAL DAMAGES are a small sum awarded to acknowledge that a legal right was infringed even though no substantial loss resulted. They serve a declaratory function: the court confirms the plaintiff had a legal right and it was violated. Under Section 73 ICA, 'compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach' but where a breach is proven with no resulting loss, courts award nominal damages (typically Rs. 1 or a small fixed sum). This is distinct from substantial damages (where actual loss is proven) and from exemplary/punitive damages (which are not available in Indian contract law). Nominal damages are important because they: (1) establish the plaintiff's legal right for future reference; (2) may form the basis for a costs order; (3) in some cases determine priority of interests. They are awarded as of right on proof of breach even without proof of loss.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 73

Correct answer: B. Where there is no available market, the court assesses damages as the difference between the contract price and the estimated value of the goods at the date of breach, determined on the best available evidence including comparable transactions, discounted cash flow analysis, expert valuation, or any other reliable method

Section 58 SOGA 1930: 'Where the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods to the buyer, the buyer may maintain an action against the seller for damages for non-delivery. The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach of contract.' Where there IS an available market (Section 58(2)), the difference between contract price and market price at the date of breach is used. Where NO available market exists (as for shares in a private company), the court must assess the VALUE of what was not delivered using the best available evidence. For shares: (1) comparable market transactions; (2) asset-based valuation; (3) discounted future earnings; (4) expert valuation. The fact that there is no formal market does not mean damages are speculative; it merely means a different method of valuation must be used.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 58

Correct answer: B. W can claim: reliance loss (Rs. 5 lakh wasted expenditure incurred in reliance on the contract) and expectation loss (Rs. 20 lakh anticipated profit); however, W cannot recover both in full if that would put W in a better position than had the contract been performed; W must elect or the court assesses the measure that does not lead to double recovery

Under Section 73 ICA, two measures of damage are available: EXPECTATION LOSS (protecting the bargain: what W expected to earn, the Rs. 20 lakh profit) and RELIANCE LOSS (protecting wasted expenditure: the Rs. 5 lakh preparatory costs). These are ALTERNATIVE, not cumulative measures. In Anglia Television v. Reed (1972 CA), the plaintiff recovered expenditure incurred before the contract was concluded that was wasted by the defendant's breach. The key limit: the plaintiff cannot recover both measures in full because that would OVERCOMPENSATE. If W recovers expectation loss (Rs. 20 lakh profit), that already accounts for the profitability of the contract (the profit assumes the preparatory costs were worthwhile). Recovery of both in full may double count. Courts generally allow: full expectation loss, OR wasted reliance expenditure (if expectation loss is harder to prove), but not both in full unless they represent truly distinct heads of loss.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 73 / Anglia Television v. Reed (1972 CA)

Correct answer: B. Rs. 3 lakh; the court awards reasonable compensation not exceeding the contractual ceiling.

This question requires careful application of Section 74 ICA as interpreted in ONGC v. Saw Pipes (AIR 2003 SC 2002) and Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Das (AIR 1963 SC 1405). Section 74 operates as a CEILING on recovery, not a floor. The court awards REASONABLE COMPENSATION, subject to the ceiling of the stipulated amount. Here: (1) The per-day calculation gives Rs. 7 lakh (70 x Rs. 10,000); (2) The contractual maximum caps this at Rs. 5 lakh; (3) The actual proven loss is Rs. 3 lakh; (4) Reasonable compensation is the actual loss of Rs. 3 lakh. The hospital recovers Rs. 3 lakh because that is what was reasonably proved as loss. The hospital cannot recover Rs. 5 lakh (contractual maximum) because actual loss was only Rs. 3 lakh and Section 74 requires reasonable compensation. The ceiling (Rs. 5 lakh) would only matter if actual loss exceeded it.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 74 / ONGC v. Saw Pipes (AIR 2003 SC)

Correct answer: B. Section 21 sra provides that the court may award compensation either in addition to, or in substitution for, specific performance; the compensation is assessed as if Section 73 ICA applied, looking at what damages the plaintiff could have obtained if he had sued for breach from the outset; Section 21 compensation aims to place the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the contract been performed

Section 21 SRA 1963: '(1) In a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff may also claim compensation for its breach, either in addition to, or in substitution for, such performance. (2) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific performance ought not to be granted, but that there is a contract between the parties which has been broken by the defendant, and that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for that breach, it shall award him such compensation accordingly.' The assessment mirrors Section 73 ICA damages (loss naturally arising from breach, or loss within the reasonable contemplation of both parties). Critically, if the plaintiff ONLY claimed specific performance without also praying for compensation under Section 21, and specific performance is refused, the plaintiff may not be able to get damages in the same suit. This is why competent pleaders always include an alternative prayer for compensation under Section 21 in specific performance suits.

Source note: Specific Relief Act 1963 Section 21

Correct answer: B. M is entitled to the full contract price (Rs. 40 lakh) minus the employer's right to deduct: (1) the cost of completing the remaining 30% work; (2) any damages for delays or defects.

This is a wrongful prevention case. The employer wrongfully expelled M before completion. The PREVENTION DOCTRINE applies: the employer cannot rely on M's non-completion as a bar to payment when the employer's own wrongful act caused the non-completion. M's remedy depends on whether the entire contracts doctrine or substantial performance applies. Since completion was prevented by the employer: (1) M is entitled to the CONTRACT PRICE for the full scope of work; (2) LESS the cost of completing the remaining 30% that M did not perform (since M would have incurred this cost to earn the full price); (3) LESS any damages the employer can prove for defects in the 70% done. Under this calculation: Rs. 40 lakh minus Rs. 10 lakh (completion cost) = Rs. 30 lakh approximately, subject to any other deductions. Alternatively, M may claim on quantum meruit for the value of 70% work done at cost plus reasonable profit.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 73 / Prevention Doctrine

Correct answer: B. No; exemplary or punitive damages are not available for breach of contract in Indian law.

The principle that CONTRACT DAMAGES are COMPENSATORY, not punitive, is firmly established in Indian and English law. Section 73 ICA: 'compensation for loss or damage caused by the breach.' The purpose is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the contract been performed, not to punish the defendant. Addis v. Gramophone Co. (1909 HL) established in English law that exemplary damages are not available for breach of contract even if the breach was deliberate and high-handed. Indian courts have followed this principle. However: (1) where the breach is ACCOMPANIED BY FRAUD, the plaintiff may have BOTH a contract claim (compensation) and a TORT claim (deceit, allowing exemplary damages in appropriate cases); (2) under the Consumer Protection Act 2019, courts can award compensation for mental agony and punitive costs in consumer complaints; (3) in employment wrongful dismissal cases, some courts have awarded generous damages for loss of reputation.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 73 / Addis v. Gramophone (1909 HL)

Correct answer: B. P can claim damages for fraudulent misrepresentation: the measure is the difference between the price paid for the shares and their actual value at the time of purchase (not the current value); additionally P can recover any consequential losses that were within reasonable contemplation; rescission being unavailable does not bar a damages claim for fraud

This question tests the relationship between rescission and damages for misrepresentation. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION under Section 17 ICA gives the victim the right to RESCIND under Section 19 AND damages in TORT (deceit). Rescission being barred (by the impossibility of restitution since the company is in liquidation) does NOT bar the damages claim. The measure of damages for deceit in English law (Doyle v. Olby Ironmongers, 1969 CA): the plaintiff recovers all losses flowing DIRECTLY from the fraudulent misrepresentation, including all consequential losses even if not foreseeable. This is more generous than the contractual Hadley v. Baxendale measure. The court awards: (1) the difference between the price paid and the ACTUAL value of the shares at the DATE OF PURCHASE (not current value); (2) any consequential losses directly caused by the fraud. The current worthlessness due to market forces may reduce the actual damages if the shares would have become worthless anyway.

Source note: ICA 1872 Sections 17, 19 / Doyle v. Olby Ironmongers (1969 CA)

Correct answer: B. Under Section 74, the court can award only reasonable compensation not exceeding the stipulated sum; if the stipulated sum is so disproportionately high that it represents an unconscionable penalty, the court exercises its power under Section 74 to award only what is 'reasonable' as compensation, which may be far less than the stipulated amount

Section 74 ICA 1872 provides for 'reasonable compensation' as the standard, not mechanical enforcement of the stipulated sum. The Supreme Court in ONGC v. Saw Pipes (AIR 2003 SC 2002) and the earlier Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Das (AIR 1963 SC) confirmed that the court's function under Section 74 is to award reasonable compensation, using the stipulated sum as a CEILING. Where the stipulated sum bears no reasonable relationship to the likely loss (unconscionable penalty), the court may award far less. This is the practical effect of Section 74's 'reasonable compensation' standard: it prevents punitive enforcement of outrageously high penalty clauses. The court's power under Section 74 is NOT to void the clause entirely (that would deprive the innocent party of all remedy) but to award fair compensation reflecting actual loss up to the ceiling. Section 74 therefore achieves a balance between respecting contractual freedom and preventing unjust enrichment through disproportionate penalties.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 74 / ONGC v. Saw Pipes (AIR 2003 SC)

Correct answer: B. Deficiency in service under Section 2(11) cpa 2019 includes: failure, imperfection, shortcoming, inadequacy in quality, nature, or manner of performance required to be maintained under a law or contract; this encompasses breaches of contractual service obligations and therefore provides an additional consumer forum remedy alongside ordinary contract law

Section 2(11) of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 defines 'deficiency' very broadly: 'any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise.' This overlaps significantly with contract law's breach of implied terms (conditions and warranties under SOGA, service standards under the ICA). A consumer can therefore use: (1) the Consumer Protection Act for faster adjudication in Consumer Dispute Redressal Commissions; (2) ordinary civil courts under the ICA for larger claims or where the consumer relationship does not apply. The CPA provides ADDITIONAL remedies: compensation for mental agony, punitive damages (not available in contract law), and return of goods. However, a consumer cannot use both forums simultaneously for the same cause of action.

Source note: Consumer Protection Act 2019 Section 2(11)

Correct answer: B. Competing manufacturers agreeing to charge a minimum price for their respective products in the same market (horizontal price-fixing agreement between competitors)

Section 3(3) Competition Act 2002: agreements between enterprises at the SAME level of the production chain (horizontal agreements between competitors) that: (a) fix prices, (b) control production, (c) divide markets, or (d) result in bid rigging are PRESUMED to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India. A horizontal price-fixing agreement between competing manufacturers is a 'hardcore cartel' under competition law. The presumption under Section 3(3) is that such agreements are anti-competitive and void. No analysis of actual market effect is needed; the presumption applies. Under Section 23 ICA, such agreements are also void as being against public policy. In contrast: Section 3(4) deals with VERTICAL agreements (between parties at different levels, like manufacturer-distributor) which are assessed under the 'rule of reason' standard (actual AAEC must be proven). Options A, C, and D are vertical or non-cartel pricing decisions.

Source note: Competition Act 2002 Section 3 / ICA 1872 Section 23

Correct answer: B. Under Section 49 cpa 2019 (unfair contract terms) and the general principles applicable to consumer contracts, a clause that purports to exclude all liability for the company's own negligence causing data loss would likely be declared an 'unfair contract term' void as causing significant imbalance in rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer

Section 49 of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 gives the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) power to issue guidelines on unfair contract terms and declare void terms that cause significant imbalance. An exclusion of ALL liability including for the company's OWN NEGLIGENCE causing data loss is: (1) contrary to public policy under Section 23 ICA (courts will not permit exclusion of liability for fraud and are reluctant to permit exclusion of liability for gross negligence); (2) 'unfair' under the CPA 2019 because it causes significant imbalance (consumer has no remedy for the company's own fault); (3) subject to the CONTRA PROFERENTEM rule even if technically incorporated. The broader principle: exclusion clauses cannot effectively exclude liability for the fundamental purpose of the contract. If a data storage company completely excludes liability for data loss, this contradicts the very purpose of the storage contract.

Source note: Consumer Protection Act 2019 Section 49 / ICA 1872 Section 23

Correct answer: B. RERA is a special law specifically designed for real estate disputes; under the principle that a special law overrides a general law, RERA proceedings before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority have jurisdiction over complaints about real estate agreements; however, the sra courts retain jurisdiction for specific performance and parties may choose their forum, though simultaneous proceedings on the same cause of action should be avoided

RERA 2016 creates a specialized regulatory framework for real estate: Section 31 RERA allows buyers to file complaints before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority for delay in delivery, claiming interest at the prescribed rate for delayed possession. RERA provides faster administrative relief. The RERA Regulatory Authority and Appellate Tribunal are the primary forums for RERA complaints. However, RERA Section 79 specifically provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction over matters that RERA authorities can adjudicate. This raises the question of whether specific performance suits under SRA are barred. The Supreme Court has clarified in Pioneer Urban Land v. Union of India (2019 SC) that RERA and insolvency proceedings can run simultaneously; general principle: RERA does not completely bar civil court remedies for specific performance, but filing two simultaneous proceedings on the same cause of action may invite objections.

Source note: Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 2016 / Specific Relief Act 1963