Law of Contract MCQs for Judiciary, Page 4

Correct answer: B. Textbooks and stationery for school, basic clothing, and medical treatment; items suited to the minor's condition in life and actually needed at the time of supply

Section 68 ICA 1872: 'If a person, incapable of entering into a contract, or any one whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied by another person with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the person who has furnished such supplies is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable person.' Two requirements for necessaries: (1) SUITED TO CONDITION IN LIFE: luxury items that are beyond what the minor's social and economic position requires do not qualify; the test is objective, comparing to the minor's station in life; (2) ACTUALLY NEEDED at the time: if the minor was already adequately supplied (e.g., already had sufficient clothing), additional clothing is not a necessary. Nash v. Inman (1908) CA: fancy waistcoats supplied to a Cambridge undergraduate who already had sufficient clothing were not necessaries. The scope is educational materials, basic clothing, food, housing, and medical treatment suited to the minor's background.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 68 / Nash v. Inman (1908)

Correct answer: B. Yes; Section 69 ICA applies here because B had a genuine interest in preventing the sale (B's own security interest in the property would have been extinguished by the sale).

Section 69 ICA 1872: 'A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay, and who therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other.' B's INTEREST: as a co-mortgagor, B had an independent interest in the mortgaged property. A's failure to pay would lead to the mortgagee selling the property, which would extinguish both A's and B's interests. B's payment was made to protect B's own security interest. A was legally bound to pay his share of the mortgage obligation. By paying A's share as well as potentially his own, B is entitled to recover from A under Section 69 the amount A was obligated to pay. This is the classic scenario Section 69 was designed for: a co-obligor paying to protect a shared interest.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 69

Correct answer: B. Property passes when the contract of sale is made; for specific goods in a deliverable state, no further act is needed for property to pass and it passes at the moment the contract is concluded

Section 20 SOGA 1930: 'Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed.' This is the RULE FOR SPECIFIC GOODS IN DELIVERABLE STATE: property passes at the moment the contract is made, regardless of whether payment or delivery has been made. 'Deliverable state' means the goods are in such a condition that the buyer would, under the contract, be bound to take delivery. This rule has significant consequences: if the goods are destroyed after the contract but before delivery, the risk has also passed to the buyer (under Section 26 SOGA: risk follows property). The buyer must pay even for destroyed goods, though he may have claims against the seller for non-delivery.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Sections 19, 20

Correct answer: B. An act that irrevocably identifies and commits specific goods to fulfill the contract such that neither party can substitute other goods without the other's consent; this requires more than informal setting aside and typically involves delivery or an equivalent act

Section 23 SOGA 1930: 'Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods by description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer.' UNCONDITIONAL APPROPRIATION means that the goods are irrevocably identified and committed to the contract. Merely setting goods aside internally (Healy v. Howlett and Sons, 1917) is NOT unconditional appropriation because the seller could still change the goods. Delivery TO a carrier under Section 23(2) constitutes unconditional appropriation if the seller delivers goods to a carrier for transmission to the buyer and the carrier is not the seller's agent. The assent to appropriation can be given in advance or at the time of appropriation and can be implied from conduct.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 23

Correct answer: B. No; while property may have passed under Section 20, the seller was in possession of the goods as bailee for the buyer.

Section 26 SOGA 1930: 'Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the property is transferred to the buyer, but when the property in the goods is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or not. But where delivery has been delayed through the fault of either buyer or seller, the goods are at the risk of the party in fault as regards any loss which might not have occurred but for such fault.' Additionally, when the seller retains possession of goods in which property has passed to the buyer, the seller becomes a BAILEE of the buyer's goods and owes the duty of care under Section 151 ICA. The fire caused by the SELLER'S NEGLIGENCE is a separate basis of liability: the seller as bailee failed to take the care of a reasonable prudent person. The 'risk follows property' rule under Section 26 is displaced by the fault exception and the bailee's liability.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Sections 20, 26

Correct answer: B. A mercantile agent with possession and apparent authority can pass good title.

Nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what they do not have) is the general rule under Section 27 SOGA. EXCEPTIONS to nemo dat under SOGA and ICA: (1) Sale by a mercantile agent under Section 27 SOGA read with Section 178 ICA (covered in option B); (2) Sale under a voidable title (Section 29 SOGA): if the owner's title was voidable (e.g., obtained by fraud) and not yet avoided, a buyer in good faith without notice gets a good title; (3) Seller in possession after sale (Section 30(1) SOGA): seller retains possession after sale and sells again to a second bona fide buyer, second buyer gets good title; (4) Buyer in possession (Section 30(2) SOGA): buyer who has received possession before title passes sells to a third party bona fide buyer, who gets good title. A thief cannot pass title because possession obtained by theft gives no property interest. Sale by a finder is invalid because the finder has no title.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Sections 27, 29, 30

Correct answer: B. P's Official Assignee has priority; in an agreement to sell, property has not yet passed to Q.

Section 4 SOGA 1930: a sale is where property in goods is transferred immediately; an agreement to sell is where the transfer of property is to take place at a future time or subject to a condition. In an AGREEMENT TO SELL, property has NOT passed. Q has only a contractual right against P. When P becomes insolvent, Q becomes a creditor in the insolvency proceedings for damages for non-delivery (Section 57 SOGA: damages for non-delivery). Q CANNOT claim the goods themselves because he has no property in them. The Official Assignee takes all assets in which P had property at the date of insolvency, including these goods. This is the critical practical difference between a sale (property passed, buyer is owner, can take goods even in seller's insolvency) and an agreement to sell (property not passed, buyer is only a creditor).

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Sections 4, 57

Correct answer: B. The seller has not been paid and either: the buyer is insolvent or the goods were sold on credit terms that have expired or the goods were sold on cash terms; the seller who is still in possession can retain the goods until payment

Section 47 SOGA 1930: 'Subject to the provisions of this Act, the unpaid seller of goods who is in possession of them is entitled to retain possession of them until payment or tender of the whole of the price in the following cases, namely: (a) where the goods have been sold without any stipulation as to credit; (b) where the goods have been sold on credit, but the term of credit has expired; (c) where the buyer becomes insolvent.' The lien requires: (1) the seller to be UNPAID (Section 45 defines unpaid seller); (2) the seller to be IN POSSESSION; (3) one of the three circumstances. Loss of lien: under Section 49, the seller loses his lien by: delivering goods to a carrier for transmission without reserving right of disposal; the buyer lawfully obtaining possession; or by waiver. The lien is a right to retain, not a right to resell; for resale, the seller must follow Section 54 SOGA.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Sections 45, 47, 49

Correct answer: B. The second buyer gets good title, though the seller may still face liability.

Section 54 SOGA creates a complex interaction between the unpaid seller's right of resale and the first buyer's property rights. Section 54(3): 'Where an unpaid seller who has exercised his right of lien or stoppage in transit re-sells the goods, the buyer acquires a good title thereto as against the original buyer.' This is an exception to nemo dat: even if the resale was not strictly in accordance with the contractual or statutory procedure, the second bona fide buyer gets good title. The first buyer's remedy is damages against the seller for wrongful resale, not recovery of the goods from the second buyer. The practical effect: a bona fide purchaser from an unpaid seller in possession is protected. This provision serves commercial certainty by ensuring buyers can rely on possession as evidence of title.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 54(3)

Correct answer: B. It is sufficient that the buyer communicates the purpose either expressly or by necessary implication from the circumstances; buying goods from a specialist dealer for the dealer's usual purpose is generally sufficient communication of purpose

Section 16(1) SOGA 1930: '...the goods are reasonably fit for that purpose, whether or not that is a purpose for which such goods are commonly supplied.' The buyer need not explicitly state the purpose if it is obvious from the nature of the goods and the seller's business. Griffiths v. Peter Conway Ltd (1939): a woman bought a Harris Tweed coat that gave her dermatitis due to her abnormally sensitive skin; court held the implied condition did not apply because she had not communicated the special purpose (that the coat must suit abnormally sensitive skin). Contrast: Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills (1936 PC): a buyer who purchased underwear for wearing as underwear made the purpose known by implication; underwear is self-evidently for wearing on the body. The test is communication, express or implied, of a purpose sufficient for the seller to exercise skill and judgment about fitness.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 16(1) / Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills (1936)

Correct answer: B. Under Section 15 SOGA, goods sold by description must correspond exactly with the description; substantial compliance is insufficient.

Section 15 SOGA 1930 provides an implied condition that where goods are sold by description, the goods shall correspond with the description. The strict rule established in Arcos Ltd v. E.A. Ronaasen and Son (1933 HL): wooden staves that were slightly thicker than contractually specified were held not to correspond with the description even though they were commercially usable as intended. The buyer was entitled to reject. The House of Lords held that commercial men must be able to rely on contractual descriptions strictly. This strict approach means even minor deviations from the contractual description give the buyer the right to reject. However, this has been modified in commercial contracts where the description is truly a description and not a commercial term: the court looks at what the parties genuinely intended to constitute the 'description' as opposed to a mere collateral representation. Post the UK Sale of Goods Act amendments, there is some relaxation, but Indian SOGA 1930 retains the strict Arcos approach.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 15 / Arcos v. Ronaasen (1933 HL)

Correct answer: B. No; Section 16(2) SOGA provides an exception to caveat emptor where goods are bought from a seller who deals in goods of that description.

Section 16(2) SOGA 1930: '...there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality, provided that there is no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed.' The IMPORTANT LIMITATION on the caveat emptor exception: the implied condition of merchantable quality is excluded ONLY for defects that the examination ought to have revealed. For LATENT DEFECTS (hidden defects not discoverable by reasonable examination), the implied condition of merchantable quality applies in full. The buyer is NOT expected to discover hidden defects through a superficial examination. The seller cannot hide behind caveat emptor for concealed or hidden defects. Bartlett v. Sidney Marcus Ltd (1965): a second-hand car with a latent engine defect; the condition of merchantable quality was applicable because the defect was not discoverable by ordinary inspection.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 16(2)

Correct answer: B. The clause may be effective for implied warranties but courts interpret exclusion clauses strictly; under Section 62 SOGA, parties can exclude implied conditions but such clauses must be clear and specific; additionally the Consumer Protection Act 2019 may render such clauses unfair in consumer transactions; for commercial transactions between equal parties, the exclusion may be effective

Section 62 SOGA 1930: 'Where any right, duty, or liability would arise under a contract of sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by usage, if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the contract.' In COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS between equal sophisticated parties, exclusion of implied conditions is permissible and effective if clearly worded. However: (1) Courts interpret exclusion clauses STRICTLY and contra proferentem; (2) For CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS, the Consumer Protection Act 2019 may render unfair exclusion clauses void (significant imbalance in rights and obligations); (3) The exclusion must be incorporated into the contract with adequate notice; (4) It cannot exclude liability for fraud. 'Goods sold as seen' typically applies to patent defects visible on inspection but may not effectively exclude liability for latent defects.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 62 / Consumer Protection Act 2019

Correct answer: B. Under Section 37 SOGA, where the seller delivers a quantity less than contracted, the buyer may reject; where more is delivered, the buyer may accept the contract quantity and reject the rest; most importantly, where the seller delivers mixed goods (some conforming, some not), the buyer may accept the conforming goods and reject the rest, or reject all

Section 37 SOGA 1930 provides a comprehensive code on the buyer's rights when delivery deviates from the contract: (1) SHORT DELIVERY: buyer may reject all or accept and pay at the contract rate; (2) EXCESS DELIVERY: buyer may accept contract quantity and reject excess, or reject all, or accept all at contract rate; (3) MIXED DELIVERY (conforming with non-conforming goods): buyer may accept conforming goods and reject the rest, or reject the whole. Section 37(3) expressly covers mixed delivery. Buyers have flexibility in how they respond to non-conforming delivery. However, once the buyer has ACCEPTED goods under Section 42 SOGA (by intimating acceptance, by act inconsistent with seller's ownership, or by retention without rejection after reasonable opportunity to inspect), the right to reject is lost and the buyer can only claim damages.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 37

Correct answer: B. Under Section 49 SOGA, the unpaid seller loses his lien when: he delivers the goods to a carrier for transmission to the buyer without reserving the right of disposal; when the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods; or when the seller waives his lien by express or implied agreement

Section 49 SOGA 1930: 'The unpaid seller of goods loses his lien thereon in the following cases, namely: (a) when he delivers the goods to a carrier or other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer without reserving the right of disposal of the goods; (b) when the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods; (c) by waiver thereof.' Three distinct modes: (1) delivery to carrier without reservation: Section 25(2) allows the seller to retain the right of disposal by appropriate bills of lading arrangements; if no such reservation is made, delivery to the carrier is delivery to the buyer and lien is lost; (2) buyer obtaining possession: once the buyer has physical possession, the lien cannot operate; (3) waiver: can be express or implied from conduct. Loss of lien does not mean loss of the right of stoppage in transit under Section 50 SOGA, which is a separate right that arises when the buyer becomes insolvent.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 49

Correct answer: B. The exception protects third parties who deal with sellers in possession and have no means of knowing that ownership has already passed to someone else; the commercial need for certainty in transactions means that a seller who remains in possession with the appearance of ownership can create a good title in a bona fide third party, though the original buyer can claim damages from the defaulting seller

Section 30(1) SOGA 1930 (seller in possession after sale): where a seller has sold goods but continues in possession and then delivers those goods to a second buyer who is bona fide and without notice of the prior sale, the second buyer gets good title. This is a deliberate exception to nemo dat justified by COMMERCIAL CERTAINTY. Third parties cannot easily know whether a person in possession of goods has already sold them. To protect bona fide third parties from the original buyer's secret purchase, the law protects the third party who deals with the seller in possession. The original buyer's remedy is purely personal against the seller for damages (conversion, breach of contract). This rule has significant practical application in mercantile transactions, particularly where goods are held in warehouses, and possession and paper title may be separated.

Source note: Sale of Goods Act 1930 Section 30(1)

Correct answer: B. Contracts involving performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise; contracts entirely dependent on the personal volition of the promisor.

Section 14 SRA 1963 (as amended) lists contracts that are not specifically enforceable even after the 2018 Amendment made specific performance the default remedy. These include: (1) contracts where compensation in money is an adequate remedy; (2) contracts that run into minute detail or require constant supervision that courts cannot practically exercise; (3) contracts for personal service; (4) contracts where the performance depends entirely on the personal volition of the promisor (you cannot force a person to paint a picture with their own hands); (5) contracts involving determinable uncertain terms. The post-2018 shift was intended to make specific performance easier to obtain for COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (especially real estate) where the court does not need to supervise performance continuously. The distinction is between a one-time act (sign the deed, transfer the property) which courts CAN order, and a continuing series of personal acts which courts CANNOT practically supervise.

Source note: Specific Relief Act 1963 Section 14

Correct answer: B. The plaintiff must demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the date of the decree; failure to perform or willingness to perform the plaintiff's side of the contract at any point during this period may disentitle him

Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011) SC 3 SCC 566 is the definitive modern authority on Section 16(c) SRA 1963. The Supreme Court held that: (1) readiness and willingness is a CONDITION PRECEDENT to the court's jurisdiction to grant specific performance; (2) the obligation is CONTINUOUS, from the date of the contract through the date of the decree; (3) it must be specifically PLEADED in the plaint with supporting particulars (financial ability, steps taken to arrange funds, etc.); (4) mere oral assertion of readiness is insufficient; the plaintiff must lead evidence of actual financial capacity. A buyer of land who claimed specific performance but could not show that he had or could arrange the funds throughout the suit period was denied relief. The court also noted that in land transactions, unexplained delay in filing suit raises an inference against readiness and willingness.

Source note: Specific Relief Act 1963 Section 16(c) / Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011 SC)

Correct answer: B. C purchased with notice (actual or constructive) of B's prior contract; if C is a bona fide purchaser without notice of B's prior contract, C is protected and B's remedy is against V only

Section 19 SRA 1963: specific performance may be enforced against 'any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a purchaser for valuable consideration who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract.' The NOTICE principle is decisive. If C: (1) paid valuable consideration; (2) acted in good faith; (3) had NO notice (actual, constructive, or imputed) of B's prior contract; then C is a bona fide purchaser and is protected. B cannot enforce specific performance against C. However, if C had notice of B's contract (e.g., B was in possession of the plot, or the contract was registered, or C actually knew), C is not protected and B can enforce against C. This principle intersects with the Transfer of Property Act doctrines of actual notice and constructive notice. Registration of B's sale agreement (though not compulsory under SRA) provides constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.

Source note: Specific Relief Act 1963 Section 19

Correct answer: B. Only where specific performance has been partly obtained or is practicable only in part and the plaintiff has suffered loss from breach of the remaining part; compensation in addition to partial specific performance makes the plaintiff whole

Section 22 SRA 1963: '(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code 1908, the court in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale or purchase of immovable property may, in its discretion, direct the party in breach to perform specifically so much of the contract as can be performed, and award, in addition to or in substitution for such performance, compensation to the party not in breach. (2) No compensation shall be awarded under this section unless the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so in the circumstances of the case.' Section 22 therefore allows HYBRID relief: partial specific performance PLUS compensation for the part that cannot be specifically performed. This is particularly relevant where: (1) a portion of the land contracted for is not available; (2) performance is delayed and the plaintiff has suffered loss during the delay; (3) part of the contractual improvements promised are not done. The court has wide discretion under Section 22.

Source note: Specific Relief Act 1963 Section 22

Correct answer: B. Where the defendant is about to destroy a unique tree on his land that is the subject of a covenant with the plaintiff restraining such destruction, and monetary damages would be an inadequate remedy since the tree cannot be replaced

Section 38 SRA 1963: '(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in, or referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication. (2) When such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II. (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of, property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases: where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff, where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused or likely to be caused by the invasion, or where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief.' Option B satisfies all these requirements: (1) covenant creates an obligation; (2) the unique tree cannot be replaced (no standard for damage, compensation inadequate); (3) imminent irreversible harm. A debt can be compensated in money (Option A), not a basis for injunction. A sale at wrong price (Option C) has an adequate remedy in damages.

Source note: Specific Relief Act 1963 Section 38

Correct answer: B. Not immediately; where time is expressly or impliedly stated not to be of the essence, S must give B a notice to complete specifying a reasonable time within which B must pay.

Where TIME IS NOT OF THE ESSENCE (a common stipulation in contracts for immovable property in equity), delay alone does not entitle the seller to terminate. The principle: S must give B a NOTICE TO COMPLETE making time of the essence for the purpose of that notice. The notice must: (1) give B a REASONABLE period (what constitutes reasonable depends on all circumstances; courts have held 6-8 weeks to be reasonable in property transactions); (2) clearly communicate that failure to complete within the period will result in termination. Only AFTER the notice period expires without completion can S treat the contract as repudiated and claim forfeiture of any earnest money (subject to Section 74 ICA). This equitable principle prevents sellers from lying in wait and then suddenly terminating at a commercially opportune moment after extended delay by the buyer.

Source note: ICA 1872 Section 55 / Equity / Notice to Complete

Correct answer: B. No; under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, where a valid arbitration agreement exists, the court must stay the specific performance suit and refer the parties to arbitration; however, B can seek specific performance as A relief in the arbitration; the arbitrator has power to grant specific performance post-2018 sra amendment

Section 8 Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996: where parties have an arbitration agreement, a court before which action is brought in a matter covered by the agreement must refer the parties to arbitration. B cannot simultaneously litigate for specific performance in court AND arbitrate. However, B's remedy is to seek specific performance AS PART OF THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS. Post the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 2018, Section 10A confirms that specific performance can be directed by the court even in matters that have been referred to arbitration. The arbitral tribunal itself may also have powers to order specific performance depending on the scope of the arbitration clause. B must invoke the arbitration clause and seek specific performance as a relief in the arbitration, not in court.

Source note: Arbitration Act 1996 Section 8 / Specific Relief Act 1963

Correct answer: B. The party must give the defaulting party a written notice asking it to perform within a reasonable time; only if the defaulting party still fails to perform within that notice period can the innocent party arrange substituted performance by a third party and subsequently claim the costs and expenses incurred from the defaulting party

Section 20 SRA 1963 (inserted by 2018 Amendment): '(1) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in the Indian Contract Act 1872, and except as otherwise agreed upon by the parties of the contract, where a contract is broken due to non-performance of promise by any party, the party who suffers by such breach shall have the right to obtain substituted performance through a third party or by its own agency, and to recover the expenses and other costs actually incurred, spent or suffered by him, from the party committing such breach. (2) No substituted performance of a contract shall be undertaken under sub-section (1) unless the party suffering from breach of contract has given a prior notice in writing, of not less than 30 days, to the party in breach requiring him to perform the contract within such time as specified in the notice; and such party has failed to perform the contract within such period.' The 30-day notice requirement is mandatory before substituted performance can be arranged.

Source note: Specific Relief Act 1963 Section 20 (2018 Amendment)

Correct answer: B. The three-part test: a prima facie case (the plaintiff has a plausible legal claim); balance of convenience (greater inconvenience to the plaintiff if the injunction is refused than to the defendant if it is granted); and irreparable harm (damages would not be an adequate remedy if the injunction is refused)

Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1991) 4 SCC 130 established the three-part test for temporary injunctions in India: (1) PRIMA FACIE CASE: not a final determination on merits, but a case that is not frivolous and raises arguable questions of law or fact; (2) BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE: the court weighs the inconvenience to the plaintiff of refusing the injunction against the inconvenience to the defendant of granting it; grants the injunction if the plaintiff's inconvenience outweighs the defendant's; (3) IRREPARABLE HARM or INJURY: would the plaintiff suffer loss that cannot be adequately compensated by money damages if the injunction is refused? All three must be established. This test governs applications under Order 39 CPC (temporary injunctions), read with Section 37 SRA 1963. The test is also known as the American Cyanamid test in English law (American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd, 1975 HL).

Source note: Specific Relief Act 1963 Section 37 / Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1991 SC)