Transfer of Property Act MCQs for Judiciary, Page 2

Correct answer: C. The doctrine against clogs on equity of redemption

The maxim "once a mortgage, always a mortgage" expresses the doctrine against clogs on the equity of redemption under Section 60 of the TPA. The right to redeem the mortgage is a statutory right that cannot be taken away or fettered by any condition in the mortgage deed. Any condition that obstructs or prevents the mortgagor from getting back the mortgaged property upon repayment is a "clog" on the equity of redemption and is void. This doctrine ensures that a lender cannot convert what is essentially a security transaction into an outright acquisition of property by inserting conditions that make redemption practically impossible. The Section contains no words "in the absence of a contract to the contrary," reinforcing that the right to redeem is absolute.

Source note: Section 60, TPA 1882; Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal, 1958 SC

Correct answer: B. The entire interest was payable only at end of 99 years making redemption practically impossible

In Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit (1989 SC), the Supreme Court held that the 99-year mortgage was a clog on equity of redemption. The Court noted that: (i) the entire amount of interest was to be paid only at the time of redemption, i.e., after 99 years; (ii) no periodical payment was permissible; and (iii) the mortgagee could demolish existing structures and reimbursement would also be due only at redemption. These combined conditions made redemption practically impossible. The Court acknowledged that freedom of contract is permissible but must not take advantage of the oppressed. A long term is not per se a clog, but when combined with other conditions making redemption practically impossible and where the mortgagor was in a vulnerable position, it amounts to a clog. The test is the total effect of all conditions combined.

Source note: Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit, 1989 SC; Section 60, TPA 1882

Correct answer: D. A long redemption period by itself is not necessarily a clog (if not the product of oppression), but any clause that extinguishes the right to redeem (converts the mortgage to sale, makes redemption absolute forfeiture) is always void as a clog regardless of oppression

Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal (1958 SC) reveals an important two-tier analysis: TIER 1 (Long term): the 85-year period was upheld because the mortgage had enabled the mortgagor to discharge an earlier mortgage and the arrangement was not the product of oppression. The test: "Was the mortgagor oppressed? Was he imposed upon?" If not, a long term is not per se a clog. TIER 2 (Conditional sale clause): the clause providing that if not redeemed within 6 months after the 85-year period the deed would be "deemed a sale deed" was ALWAYS void as a clog regardless of oppression. This is because it purports to EXTINGUISH the right to redeem (convert the mortgage to absolute ownership). The maxim "once a mortgage always a mortgage" absolutely prohibits any clause that converts a mortgage into an outright transfer. A long term delays redemption; a conditional sale clause extinguishes it. Only the latter is per se void.

Source note: Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal, 1958 SC; Section 60, TPA 1882

Correct answer: A. The mortgagor was "financially hard-pressed, " mortgaged for the meagre sum of Rs. 7,000 with the mortgagee in an advantageous position; a 99-year term for a small sum where the mortgagor was vulnerable made redemption within their practical lifetime impossible and the arrangement was oppressive

In Shivdev Singh v. Sucha Singh (2000 SC), the SC held the 99-year usufructuary mortgage was a clog based on the totality of circumstances. The Court stated: "In view of the circumstances under which the mortgage was created, the economic and financial position of the mortgagor...the mortgagee was found to be in an advantageous position qua the mortgagor." Specifically: (1) The mortgagor was "financially hard-pressed" and in a vulnerable position; (2) The consideration was only Rs. 7,000 - a meagre sum suggesting the mortgagee was exploiting the mortgagor's distress; (3) A 99-year term effectively prevented redemption within the mortgagor's lifetime; (4) The mortgagee held possession and enjoyed the usufruct - the arrangement was substantively unfair. The Court concluded: "the condition postponing the right of redemption for a period of 99 years for a meagre sum amounted to a clog; more so as the mortgagor was hard pressed."

Source note: Shivdev Singh v. Sucha Singh, 2000 SC; Section 60, TPA 1882

Correct answer: A. Mutual transfer of ownership of one thing for another, where the consideration is not money

Section 118 of the TPA defines exchange as a mutual transfer of ownership of one thing for the ownership of another where neither thing exchanged is money only. The essential elements are: (i) mutual transfer; (ii) of ownership (not possession); (iii) of one thing for another. Unlike a sale (where consideration is money) or a gift (where there is no consideration), an exchange involves reciprocal transfer where the consideration is property itself. An exchange can be of movable property, immovable property, or one for the other. The formalities for completing an exchange are the same as those required for completing a sale (Sections 119-121). Section 120 provides that each party has the same rights and liabilities as a buyer and seller respectively.

Source note: Section 118, TPA 1882

Correct answer: B. Purchase money paid in advance before delivery of possession

Section 55(6)(b) of the TPA provides that the buyer has, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a charge upon the immovable property in the hands of the seller (or his legal representatives) as against whom specific performance of the contract for sale has been ordered by the court, for the amount of any purchase money already paid and for the interest on such amount. This buyer's lien (charge) protects the buyer who has paid consideration but has not yet received delivery of possession. It is the counterpart of the seller's lien under Section 55(4)(b). Both the seller's and buyer's liens reflect the principle that the transfer is complete once the contract is made, subject to payment and delivery obligations.

Source note: Section 55(6)(b), TPA 1882

Correct answer: B. A made an erroneous representation of having transferable interest and subsequently acquired title

This scenario illustrates the operation of Section 43 (doctrine of feeding the estoppel). A, when contracting to sell, erroneously represented that they had a present transferable interest in the property while they were merely a tenant. B acted on this representation for consideration. When A subsequently acquired the property by purchase, Section 43 provides that this subsequently acquired title "feeds" the earlier transfer - the property transfers to B as if A had the title at the time of the contract. This is the principle established in Jumma Masjid Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Devaiah (AIR 1962 SC 847). The protection is available to B provided B did not have notice of A's lack of title at the time of the contract (i.e., did not know A was merely a tenant).

Source note: Section 43, TPA 1882; Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Devaiah, AIR 1962 SC 847

Correct answer: A. Testamentary transfers (transfer by Will)

The Transfer of Property Act 1882 does not apply to transfers by operation of law (e.g., inheritance through intestate succession, court auctions, vesting by statute) or to testamentary transfers (Wills) which are governed by the Indian Succession Act 1925. Section 2 of the TPA itself saves transfers by operation of law. A Will operates after the death of the testator, and by definition Section 5 requires a "living person" to convey - making Will-transfers outside the TPA's scope. Additionally, certain states have exemptions under Section 2 for agricultural land. The TPA applies to sales, mortgages, leases, exchanges, and gifts of immovable property involving living persons.

Source note: Section 2 and 5, TPA 1882; Indian Succession Act 1925

Correct answer: D. The right of re-entry for breach of a condition

Section 6 of the TPA lists properties that cannot be transferred. Among the non-transferable interests is the right of re-entry for breach of a condition or for breach of condition subsequent (Section 6(c)). A right of re-entry is a right to take back possession of property upon breach of a condition; it is personal to the holder and cannot be transferred separately. Other non-transferable interests under Section 6 include: spes successionis (6(a)), mere right to sue (6(e)), public office (6(f)), pensions and service pay (6(g)), unlawful objects (6(h)), and the right of easement in gross (6(c)). A right of fishery, vested interest, and mortgage right are all transferable under the TPA.

Source note: Section 6, TPA 1882

Correct answer: D. Any provision of law, opposed to public policy, immoral, or forbidden by any court order

Section 6(h) of the TPA provides that property of any kind cannot be transferred if the transfer is in so far as it is opposed to the nature of the interest affected thereby; or in so far as being for an unlawful object or consideration within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, or is opposed to public policy. This incorporates the illegality principle from contract law: transfers for unlawful purposes (e.g., transferring property to evade a creditor fraudulently), or for immoral purposes, or those opposed to public policy, are void under Section 6(h) read with Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Court orders restraining transfer also render subsequent transfers void under this provision.

Source note: Section 6(h), TPA 1882; Section 23, Indian Contract Act 1872

Correct answer: A. The gift is void only as to the share of the donee who did not accept

Section 124 of the TPA provides that where a gift is made of certain existing property to two or more donees, and one of them does not accept the gift, the gift is void as to the interest which he was to take. This means that the gift fails only to the extent of the non-accepting donee's share; the rest of the gift remains valid. Under Section 125, a gift of a thing to two or more donees jointly, where one of them is not in existence at the time of the gift, fails as to the interest of such unborn person. Combining Sections 124 and 125: non-acceptance by one donee renders the gift void as to their share without affecting the other donees' shares, reflecting the principle that a gift requires acceptance to be complete.

Source note: Sections 124-125, TPA 1882

Correct answer: C. The gift must be accepted by or on behalf of the donee during the donor's lifetime

Section 122 of the TPA provides that a gift must be accepted by or on behalf of the donee during the lifetime of the donor and while the donor is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void. The six essential requirements for a valid gift are: (i) transfer of ownership; (ii) transfer of existing movable or immovable property; (iii) transfer without consideration; (iv) voluntary transfer by the donor; (v) competency of the donor; and (vi) acceptance by the donee. A gift can be of movable or immovable property. No consideration whatsoever can be present - even a small monetary payment would convert the gift into a sale or exchange. A minor can be a donee but not a donor.

Source note: Section 122, TPA 1882

Correct answer: B. A registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, attested by two witnesses

Section 123 of the TPA provides that for making a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. Unlike a sale where delivery of possession can constitute transfer for properties under Rs. 100, a gift of immovable property always requires a registered, attested instrument regardless of value. Mere delivery of possession, without a registered instrument, cannot constitute a valid gift of immovable property. If the gift deed is registered but not attested by two witnesses, the gift is void. For movable property, the gift may be effected either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.

Source note: Section 123, TPA 1882

Correct answer: D. A gift can be revoked if an agreed event occurs, but not at the donor's mere will

Section 126 of the TPA allows revocation of a gift in two ways: (i) the donor and donee may agree that on the happening of a specified event (which does not depend on the will of the donor) the gift shall be suspended or revoked; and (ii) a gift may be revoked in cases where, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded (e.g., fraud, coercion, undue influence). However, a gift that the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor is void. This means that the donee's failure to maintain the donor can be a ground for revocation only if the gift deed expressly provides for it (Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa, 1962). The event triggering revocation must be specified and must not depend on the donor's will.

Source note: Section 126, TPA 1882; Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa, 1962

Correct answer: B. For revocation, the gift deed must expressly state both: (i) the condition; and (ii) that failure of the condition will result in revocation.

In Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa (1962 Orissa), A made a gift deed to daughter-in-law W, expressing the hope that W would live with her and look after her. The court held the gift irrevocable stating: (1) "If the deed is a conditional gift, the fact that it is conditional must be apparent from the language of the document"; (2) "The document should also provide that in case the condition is not fulfilled, the gift would be revoked. It is only in such a situation that the gift can be revoked. Thus, unless the gift deed contains a clause for its revocation, it cannot be revoked"; (3) The gift deed expressed a wish, not an express revocation condition with consequence for non-fulfillment; (4) What was contained "was the wish of a mother that the daughter-in-law would live with her and look after her. But it did not provide as to what would happen if she did not comply with her wishes"; (5) Therefore: "The gift was held as an absolute gift, and once it was executed, it could not be revoked."

Source note: Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa, 1962; Section 126, TPA 1882

Correct answer: A. The collaterals took a leading part in execution and the donor did not understand the document

In Kartari v. Kewal Krishan (AIR 1972), the court held the gift deed invalid on grounds of undue influence and fraud. The collaterals (beneficiaries) had taken a leading part in procuring the execution of the gift deed. Taking a leading part in obtaining a gift is itself sufficient to prove domination of the donor's will. Additionally, the beneficiaries failed to prove that the old widow understood the document's contents or that it was read over and explained to her in a language she knew. The court found that the physical act of signing did not coincide with the mental intention to gift the property. The natural heir (daughter) who had been caring for the donor was deprived of all properties, further evidencing unfair advantage taken.

Source note: Kartari v. Kewal Krishan, AIR 1972; Section 126, TPA 1882

Correct answer: D. The beneficiaries failed to prove (i) the 70-year-old ailing widow understood the deed; (ii) it was read over and explained to her.

In Kartari v. Kewal Krishan (AIR 1972), the court found undue influence and fraud based on multiple reinforcing facts: (1) The collaterals (distant relatives) took the ailing 70-year-old widow to a different location under the pretext of taking her to a doctor; (2) The gift deed was ALREADY PREPARED when they took her; (3) The deed was ATTESTED AND REGISTERED ON THE SAME DAY they took her out; (4) The beneficiaries FAILED TO PROVE she understood the deed or that it was read over and explained to her; (5) The deed was in a language she was unfamiliar with; (6) "The physical act of signing the deed did not coincide with the mental act of an intention to sign it"; (7) The NATURAL HEIR (the donor's daughter, who had been caring for her mother and managing her properties) was ENTIRELY EXCLUDED. Taking a leading part + failing to prove informed voluntary consent + excluding the natural heir = sufficient proof of undue influence and fraud.

Source note: Kartari v. Kewal Krishan, AIR 1972; Section 126, TPA 1882; Section 16, Contract Act 1872

Correct answer: D. Standing timber

Section 3 of the TPA 1882 specifically excludes standing timber, growing crops, and grass from the definition of immovable property. Standing timber is classified as movable property under the Act. The General Clauses Act 1897 defines immovable property to include land, benefits arising out of land, and things attached to the earth. Hereditary allowances and benefits arising out of land are expressly included as immovable property under the Registration Act 1908. The exclusion of standing timber reflects the legislative intent that property intended for early severance and conversion is movable.

Source note: Section 3, TPA 1882; State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills, AIR 1985 SC 1293

Correct answer: A. Immovable property as it was a profit a prendre

In Shantabai v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 532), the Supreme Court held that a right to enter another's land, cut and carry away wood over 12.5 years was a profit a prendre, i.e., a benefit arising out of land, and therefore immovable property. The Court distinguished between trees intended for vegetative growth versus those meant for early severance. Since the trees would derive sustenance from soil for years before being felled, the right was not merely in standing timber (movable) but in the land's produce. As the document was unregistered and unattested, the petitioner could not enforce this right in immovable property. This case is the leading authority on the distinction between standing timber and profit a prendre.

Source note: Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532

Correct answer: D. Movable property as the annexation was temporary in nature

In Bamadev Panigrahi v. Monorama Raj (AIR 1974 AP 226), the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the cinema projector and diesel engine were movable property despite being embedded in earth. The decisive factors were: (i) the business was "Kumar Touring Talkies," indicating temporary use at any given location; (ii) the license for cinema shows was only for one year; (iii) the person who fixed them was not the owner of the land; and (iv) the items were in fact later removed. The court emphasized that the tests are the intendment, object, and purpose of attachment. Where the purpose is temporary and the nature of business itself is peripatetic, the attachment does not convert movable property into immovable property. The suit was accordingly dismissed as time-barred.

Source note: Bamadev Panigrahi v. Monorama Raj, AIR 1974 AP 226

Correct answer: A. Immovable property as it is a benefit arising out of land (profit a prendre)

A right of fishery, i.e., the right to catch and collect fish from a pond, tank, lake, or river, is recognized as immovable property being a benefit arising out of land (profit a prendre). The Registration Act 1908 expressly includes fisheries in its definition of immovable property along with rights of way, lights, ferries, and hereditary allowances. The principle established in Shantabai v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 532) clarifies that any benefit arising out of immovable property, even if the subject matter appears movable (like fish), is itself immovable property. Such a right, if for more than one year in value, requires a registered instrument for valid transfer under the TPA.

Source note: Section 3, TPA 1882; Registration Act 1908; Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532

Correct answer: C. A grant of profit a prendre being immovable property

In State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills (AIR 1985 SC 1293), the Supreme Court held that a bamboo contract for felling, cutting, and removing bamboos over 14 years was not a contract for sale of goods (movable property) but a grant of profit a prendre, i.e., a benefit arising out of land, which is immovable property. The Court held that bamboos drew sustenance from soil and would continue to do so until felled; they could not be called "standing timber" as they were not in a state fit for use as timber nor meant to be cut at a reasonably early date. The contract embraced future bamboos yet to grow, making it impossible to bifurcate it into separate contracts for existing and future goods. Being immovable property, it required proper documentation for enforcement.

Source note: State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills, AIR 1985 SC 1293

Correct answer: B. Growing crops of wheat

Growing crops such as wheat, paddy, and barley are classified as movable property under the TPA. Section 3 specifically excludes growing crops and grass from the definition of immovable property. The rationale is that crops are bound to be harvested in the near future when ripe and have no utility except their produce. In contrast, hereditary allowances, equity of redemption, and rights of way are all forms of immovable property being benefits arising out of or connected to land. Section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act 1930 also treats growing crops as movable property. This distinction is crucial for determining whether a transaction requires registration.

Source note: Section 3, TPA 1882; Section 2(7), Sale of Goods Act 1930

Correct answer: D. Degree/mode of annexation and object/purpose of annexation

The two established English law tests for determining whether movable property has become immovable property by attachment are: (i) Degree or Mode of Annexation - if the property rests on its own weight, the presumption is it remains movable; if fixed to the land even slightly, there is a presumption of immovability; and (ii) Object or Purpose of Annexation - whether it was attached for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of the land/building (immovable) or merely for the better enjoyment of the object itself (movable). These tests were laid down in Holland v. Hoggson (1872) and have been consistently applied by Indian courts including in Bamadev Panigrahi v. Monorama Raj (AIR 1974 AP 226) and Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2000 1 SCC 633).

Source note: Section 3, TPA 1882; Holland v. Hoggson (1872); Duncans Industries v. State of UP, 2000 1 SCC 633