Transfer of Property Act MCQs for Judiciary, Page 7

Correct answer: A. Shield protecting the transferee from being dispossessed

Section 53A of the TPA provides a defensive remedy - it is a shield, not a sword. The section protects a transferee who has taken possession under a contract for transfer of immovable property from being dispossessed by the transferor, even though the formal transfer (registered deed) has not been completed. The transferee can use Section 53A only as a defense against the transferor's claims, not as a basis for an independent suit to claim title or specific performance. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court and is a crucial distinction. The section creates a statutory right of protection but does not by itself create title in the transferee. Post-2001 amendment, the contract must also be registered to attract the protection of Section 53A.

Source note: Section 53A, TPA 1882

Correct answer: C. The contract must be for a sum not exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs

There is no monetary limit for invoking Section 53A of the TPA. The essential conditions for protection under Section 53A are: (i) there must be a contract to transfer immovable property for consideration (written and after 2001, registered); (ii) the contract must not be unenforceable under any law (before 2001 amendment - writing; post-amendment - registration also required); (iii) the transferee must have taken possession, or already being in possession have continued in possession, in part performance of the contract; (iv) the transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract; and (v) the transferee must be willing to perform their part of the contract. There is no monetary threshold limiting the section's application.

Source note: Section 53A, TPA 1882

Correct answer: B. The contract must be in writing, stamped adequately, and compulsorily registered

Before the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2001, Section 53A of the TPA required the contract to be in writing to attract protection. After the 2001 Amendment, which amended Section 53A, the contract must now be: (i) in writing; (ii) adequately stamped; and (iii) compulsorily registered as required by the Registration Act 1908. This amendment effectively eliminated the possibility of relying on an unregistered written agreement for the protection of Section 53A. The amendment was made to curb widespread evasion of stamp duty and registration requirements through unregistered agreements to sell with possession. The transferee must also be willing to perform their part and must have taken possession or continued in possession in part performance.

Source note: Section 53A, TPA 1882 (as amended in 2001); Registration and Other Related Laws Amendment Act 2001

Correct answer: B. Only the transferor and those claiming under the transferor with notice

Section 53A of the TPA protects the transferee in possession against the transferor "and all persons claiming under him." This means the protection extends against the transferor personally, their legal heirs, and subsequent transferees who take with notice of the prior transferee's possession and rights. However, Section 53A specifically provides that it does not affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or the transferee's part performance. A bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the prior contract is therefore not bound by Section 53A. This limitation underscores the shield (not sword) character of Section 53A: it protects against those with notice but not against an innocent bona fide purchaser.

Source note: Section 53A, TPA 1882

Correct answer: D. No, because after the 2001 Amendment the contract must also be registered for Section 53A to apply; an unregistered agreement cannot attract the doctrine even with clear part performance

After the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2001, Section 53A TPA was amended to require that the contract (or a memorandum of it) be registered for the section's protection to apply. Prior to the amendment, an unregistered written agreement with possession could attract Section 53A. After the amendment, even clearly evidenced part performance does not attract Section 53A unless the contract was registered. Since the agreement (2005) was post-amendment and unregistered, Section 53A is unavailable to B. B's possession, cultivation, and improvements - however extensive - cannot supply the missing registration. B would need to pursue alternative remedies such as unjust enrichment claims for improvements (Section 51 TPA if applicable), or specific performance if the contract can be admitted as evidence for collateral purposes, or a suit for damages for breach. But the Section 53A defence specifically is unavailable without registration.

Source note: Section 53A, TPA 1882; Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2001

Correct answer: A. English equity allowed part performance to validate even oral contracts if acts of part performance were sufficiently unequivocal; Section 53A requires a written contract (and post-2001, a registered contract)

The English doctrine of part performance in equity allowed a court of equity to enforce an oral contract for sale of land if the acts of part performance were sufficiently unequivocal - i.e., pointing to the existence of a contract and referable to no other title. Under English equity, even an oral agreement could be enforced if there were clear acts of part performance (taking possession, making improvements). Section 53A of the Indian TPA is more restrictive: it requires the contract to be in writing (and post-2001, also registered). Indian courts decided to codify the doctrine with stricter formal requirements to prevent fraud through fabricated oral claims and to prevent evasion of registration and stamp duty requirements. This reflects a deliberate policy choice: while equity was flexible, the statutory codification imposed additional requirements to provide certainty.

Source note: Section 53A, TPA 1882; Walsh v. Lonsdale, 1882

Correct answer: C. No, Section 53A is exclusively a defence (shield not sword); it debars the transferor from enforcing rights but does not confer title or the right to sue third parties for declaration of title

Section 53A TPA is exclusively a shield (defence), not a sword (offence). The section specifically provides: "the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be DEBARRED from enforcing against the transferee" any rights in the property. This debarment prevents the transferor from evicting the transferee, claiming possession, or otherwise acting inconsistently with the contract. However, Section 53A does NOT: (1) confer title on the transferee; (2) allow the transferee to sue third parties for declaration of ownership; (3) allow the transferee to seek specific performance; (4) allow the transferee to sue for possession against strangers. For all these offensive purposes, the transferee needs to rely on other provisions - specific performance (Specific Relief Act), or a registered deed. Section 53A merely prevents the transferor from using their legal title as a weapon against the transferee in possession under the contract.

Source note: Section 53A, TPA 1882

Correct answer: B. No; Section 53A is an equitable remedy based on the principle that one who seeks equity must do equity; a transferee refusing to pay cannot invoke equitable protection

Section 53A TPA requires 'has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.' The EQUITABLE REQUIREMENT: (1) Section 53A is grounded in equity - the maxim HE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST DO EQUITY applies; (2) A transferee who has taken possession but refuses to pay the balance is: in breach of their obligations; not 'willing to perform'; seeking the benefit of the contract without performing their side; (3) Courts have consistently held that such a transferee cannot shelter behind Section 53A; (4) The transferee must tender the balance or deposit it in court to demonstrate genuine willingness to perform.

Source note: Section 53A, TPA 1882

Correct answer: C. The date of completion of the sale (i.e., up to when ownership passes to the buyer by execution of the registered sale deed)

Section 55(1)(g) TPA: the seller is bound 'to pay all public charges and rent accrued due in respect of the property up to the date of the sale.' The DATE OF THE SALE = date of COMPLETION = date ownership passes = date of execution of the registered sale deed. Therefore: (1) BEFORE COMPLETION: all public charges (government rates, taxes, municipal taxes, water charges) and rent due to superior landlords accrued UP TO that date are the seller responsibility; (2) AFTER COMPLETION: all such charges become the buyer responsibility. Practical importance for buyers: insist on proof that the seller has paid all outstanding charges before completing the purchase, as certain statutory charges (like municipal taxes under Section 100 TPA) may remain as charges on the property if unpaid.

Source note: Section 55(1)(g), TPA 1882

Correct answer: B. Separately from the dominant tenement; an easement automatically passes with the dominant tenement but cannot be transferred independently from that land

Section 6(b) TPA: 'An easement cannot be transferred apart from the dominant heritage.' An easement appurtenant benefits the dominant tenement, not its owner personally. It CANNOT be transferred separately from the dominant tenement because: (1) An easement exists to benefit the land; separating it from the land would change its fundamental nature; (2) It AUTOMATICALLY PASSES with the dominant tenement when that land is transferred (Section 8 TPA - legal incidents); (3) No separate mention is needed in the deed. EASEMENT IN GROSS (personal easement not attached to any land) is altogether non-transferable. When the dominant tenement is sold, gifted, or otherwise transferred, the appurtenant easements pass automatically as legal incidents.

Source note: Section 6(b), TPA 1882

Correct answer: C. A personal injury claim for unliquidated damages resulting from a road accident

Section 6(e) TPA: 'A mere right to sue cannot be transferred.' MERE RIGHT TO SUE (non-transferable): right to recover UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES for PERSONAL WRONGS (tort, defamation, personal injury); personal to the injured party; uncertain in amount; public policy prohibits assignment (prevents champerty). CONTRAST with ACTIONABLE CLAIMS (transferable): (1) Claim for arrears of rent = specific debt = actionable claim (transferable); (2) Book debt for goods sold = specific debt = actionable claim (transferable); (3) Insurance claim for specific sum = liquidated claim = actionable claim (transferable); (4) Personal injury claim for UNLIQUIDATED damages = mere right to sue (non-transferable). After a court DECREE, even a personal injury claim becomes a liquidated judgment debt which may then be assignable.

Source note: Section 6(e), Section 3, TPA 1882

Correct answer: D. Be entitled to the property (be the owner) or authorised to dispose of it (such as a power of attorney holder, trustee with power of sale, or court-appointed receiver)

Section 7 TPA: 'Every person competent to contract and entitled to transferable property, or authorised to dispose of transferable property not his own, is competent to transfer.' TWO requirements: (1) COMPETENT TO CONTRACT (ICA Sections 11-12): majority (18 years); sound mind; not disqualified; (2) ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY: be the owner, OR authorised to dispose of it (power of attorney holder, trustee with power of sale, executor, court receiver). CANNOT TRANSFER: minors; persons of unsound mind; undischarged insolvents without court permission. The phrase 'authorised to dispose of property NOT HIS OWN' recognizes agents, trustees, executors as legitimate transferors of property they do not personally own.

Source note: Section 7, TPA 1882

Correct answer: A. All the interest the transferor has in the property and all legal incidents thereof including appurtenant easements, rents and profits accruing after transfer, and fixtures attached to the earth

Section 8 TPA: 'Unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof.' What passes automatically: (1) ALL the transferor's INTEREST in the property - nemo dat quod non habet; (2) LEGAL INCIDENTS: all appurtenant EASEMENTS benefiting the property (rights of way, drainage, light); all RENTS and profits accruing after transfer; all things ATTACHED TO EARTH (fixtures); all rights of action for breach of conditions affecting the property. If a sale deed is silent about a right of way easement benefiting the property, it automatically passes as a legal incident without specific mention. A seller who wants to RETAIN a fixture must expressly exclude it in the deed.

Source note: Section 8, TPA 1882

Correct answer: A. A mere chance or possibility of succeeding to an estate, not a present interest

Spes successionis means the chance or hope of succession, i.e., the mere possibility of inheriting property in future. It is not a present property right but a contingent expectation. Examples include the expectation of an heir apparent to succeed to the estate upon the death of the current holder, or a potential legatee's hope of receiving property under a Will that has not yet taken effect. Section 6(a) of the TPA expressly declares that the chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature cannot be transferred. Contrast this with a contingent interest (Section 21) which is transferable as it is more than a mere possibility.

Source note: Section 6(a), TPA 1882; Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Devaiah, AIR 1962 SC 847

Correct answer: C. The release by A was executed after the Section 43 transfer had already vested in the original transferee when the reversioners acquired title on W3's death; Jumma Masjid's subsequent dealing from the same source could not defeat the already-vested Section 43 title

In Jumma Masjid Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Devaiah (AIR 1962 SC 847), the Court explained why Jumma Masjid's two claims both failed: (1) Gift from W3: W3's own interest (her life estate) ended on her death when the reversioners' title vested; W3 could not gift what the reversioners would take. (2) Release from reversioner A for Rs. 300: The sequence was - original Section 43 transfer to the transferee (who acted on the reversioners' false representation) → W3 dies → reversioners A, B, C acquire title → SIMULTANEOUSLY the Section 43 transfer fastens on this title → the transferee acquires title at the moment the reversioners do. A's release to Jumma Masjid came LATER. The Court stated: "the subsequent dealing by way of release did not operate to vest any title in Jumma Masjid." Once Section 43 had vested the property in the original transferee, neither A's nor any reversioner's subsequent dealing could defeat this title.

Source note: Jumma Masjid Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Devaiah, AIR 1962 SC 847

Correct answer: B. Extend to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor

Section 13 of the TPA provides that where an interest in property is created for the benefit of an unborn person, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, such interest shall not take effect unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property. The mechanism is: (i) a life estate must first be created in favour of a living person; (ii) after the life estate, absolute interest must vest in the unborn person; (iii) the interest for the unborn person must be absolute (the whole remaining interest), not limited. A limited interest (e.g., life interest) for an unborn person is specifically prohibited. When the unborn person is born during the life estate, title vests in them immediately, but possession follows only after the life holder's death.

Source note: Section 13, TPA 1882

Correct answer: A. Provide a uniform statutory code for transfer of property in India, primarily replacing English common law rules

The Transfer of Property Act 1882 was enacted to provide a uniform statutory code governing the transfer of property in India. Before the Act, Indian courts applied English common law and rules of equity, justice and good conscience which were often unsuitable to Indian conditions and led to conflicting decisions. The Act, drafted in 1870 and enacted in 1882, was based primarily on English law of real property but moulded to suit Indian conditions. It does not cover personal laws of Hindus and Muslims in their entirety (certain provisions are inapplicable to Muslims where inconsistent with Quranic law). It governs sale, mortgage, lease, exchange, and gift of immovable property, and certain provisions relating to movable property. The Act was amended in 1929 to apply fully to Hindus.

Source note: Preamble, TPA 1882; History and background of TPA

Correct answer: C. A living person to one or more other living persons, or to himself

Section 5 of the TPA defines "Transfer of Property" as an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons. The term "living person" includes companies, associations, or bodies of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The essential elements are: (i) an act; (ii) by a living person; (iii) who conveys (creates new title or interest); (iv) in present or future; (v) property; (vi) to another living person or to himself. A transfer through a Will does not fall under Section 5 as the Will operates after the testator's death, as held in Kenneth Solomon v. Dan Singh Bawa (AIR 1986 Del 1) and N. Ramaiah v. Nagaraj S (AIR 2001 Kant 395).

Source note: Section 5, TPA 1882

Correct answer: B. A coparcener already has an antecedent title; partition only separates collective rights into individual rights

In V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai (AIR 1966 SC 432), the Supreme Court held that partition of coparcenary property does not amount to transfer within the meaning of Section 5 of the TPA. Each coparcener in a Hindu joint family has an antecedent title to the coparcenary property; all coparceners jointly possess the title. Partition merely separates the community of interest and unity of possession into individual rights over specific shares. Since no new title or interest is created - the property in partition "in a sense already belonged" to the coparcener - there is no conveyance as contemplated by Section 5. This distinction is important for determining applicable law (rent control/tenancy laws) regarding acquisition by transfer.

Source note: V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai, AIR 1966 SC 432

Correct answer: D. Not a transfer as it does not involve a living person conveying property

Devolution of property through inheritance or testamentary succession (Will) is not a transfer under Section 5 of the TPA. In Kenneth Solomon v. Dan Singh Bawa (AIR 1986 Del 1), the Delhi High Court held that a Will, by its very nature, is revocable and does not vest any right in the legatee during the testator's lifetime; it operates only after the testator's death. Since Section 5 requires a "living person" to convey property, transfers that take effect upon or after death do not qualify. Similarly, intestate succession involves operation of law rather than an act of conveyance by a living person. These transactions are governed by the applicable succession laws, not by the TPA.

Source note: Section 5, TPA 1882; Kenneth Solomon v. Dan Singh Bawa, AIR 1986 Del 1

Correct answer: C. A transfer is irrevocable and comes into effect immediately or on a certain contingency; a Will is revocable and comes into operation only after the testator's death - "the concept of transfer by a living person is wholly alien to a Will"

In N. Ramaiah v. Nagaraj S (AIR 2001 Kant 395), the Karnataka HC stated: "A transfer is a conveyance of an existing property by one living person to another (transfer inter vivos). On the other hand, a Will does not involve any transfer, nor effects any transfer inter vivos, but is a legal expression of the wishes and intention of a person in regard to his properties which he desires to be carried into effect after his death. The concept of transfer by a living person is wholly alien to a Will. When a person makes a Will, he provides for testamentary succession and does not transfer any property. While a transfer is irrevocable and comes into effect either immediately or on the happening of a specified contingency, a Will is revocable and comes into operation only after the death of the testator." Hence, the widow's Will did not violate the status quo order; it was not a "transfer or alienation" of the property. The legatee was entitled to pursue the litigation.

Source note: N. Ramaiah v. Nagaraj S, AIR 2001 Kant 395; Section 5, TPA 1882

Correct answer: A. Negative covenants restricting use of land that bind purchasers with notice

Tulk v. Moxhay (1848) established that a restrictive covenant (negative covenant) relating to land, if known to the purchaser, runs with the land and binds all subsequent purchasers with notice. The court applied equitable principles: no one purchasing with notice of an equity can stand in a different situation from the original party. Under Section 11 of the TPA read with the principle of Tulk v. Moxhay, a person who transfers immovable property may impose conditions directing the enjoyment of their retained property. These negative covenants bind not only the direct transferee but also subsequent transferees who take with notice. The critical limitation is that only negative (restrictive) covenants bind subsequent purchasers with notice; positive covenants do not.

Source note: Tulk v. Moxhay, 1848; Section 11, TPA 1882

Correct answer: B. The settlor's intent was to benefit the sons and their heirs, and the event making it contingent (discharge of debts) was uncertain while death was certain

In Rajesh Kanta Roy v. Shanti Debi (1957 SC), the Supreme Court held that the interest of the sons was vested. The trust would end upon: (i) discharge of debts (uncertain event) and (ii) death of the settlor (certain event). The court held that while the discharge of debts was uncertain, the settlor's death was certain. Looking at the settlor's intent, the emphasis was on benefiting the sons and their heirs rather than the debt-discharge condition. The court held that the interest was "vested in title but restricted in enjoyment" during the settlor's lifetime. Since a vested interest is not defeated by the transferee's death, it was attachable by the widow's decree. The interest was vested because it did not primarily depend on the fulfillment of the uncertain condition but on the certain death of the settlor.

Source note: Rajesh Kanta Roy v. Shanti Debi, 1957 SC; Section 19, TPA 1882

Correct answer: D. Without specifying when it takes effect, or specifying it takes effect forthwith or on a certain event

Section 19 of the TPA provides that where an interest is created without specifying the time when it is to take effect, or in terms specifying it takes effect forthwith or on the happening of an event which must happen, the interest is vested. A vested interest is not defeated by the death of the transferee before they obtain possession. It represents a present proprietary right even if enjoyment is postponed. For example, a transfer to A for life and after A's death to B creates a vested interest in B because B's right becomes absolute upon A's death, which is a certain event. The essential features of a vested interest: it does not depend on a condition precedent, it is immediately acquired, and it is transferable and heritable.

Source note: Section 19, TPA 1882

Correct answer: C. The rule against perpetuity applies to property rights, not personal contractual agreements

In Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra (1967 SC), the Supreme Court held that a right of pre-emption is a personal covenant that runs with the land and does not violate the rule against perpetuity. The Court held that the rule against perpetuity, as formulated under Section 14, falls within the branch of property law and aims to restrain the creation of future conditional interests in property. The rule does not apply to personal agreements or contracts as such. A mere contract for sale of immovable property does not create any interest in such property, and therefore the rule does not apply. A right of pre-emption is in the nature of a personal obligation and a covenant running with the land, not a future interest in property that could violate perpetuity rules.

Source note: Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra, 1967 SC; Section 14, TPA 1882