Constitutional Law MCQs for CLAT PG, Page 4

CLAT PG Constitutional Law questions 76-100 of 100, with answer keys and explanations covering fundamental rights, federalism, Parliament, constitutional bodies, judicial review, emergency powers, and writs.

100 questions20 topics76-100 on this page

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Revise core LLB subjects through CLAT PG MCQs, passage-led questions, answer keys, explanations, statutes, and exam-oriented legal principles.

  • Anti-Defection Law - Tenth Schedule5
  • Article 14 - Right to Equality5
  • Article 19 - Freedom of Speech and Expression5
  • Article 21 and Maneka Gandhi5
  • Basic Structure Doctrine5
  • Constitutional Amendments - Article 3685
  • Directive Principles of State Policy5
  • Doctrine of Pith and Substance - Federalism5
  • Freedom of Religion - Articles 25-26 and Essential Practices5
  • Judicial Independence and Collegium System5
  • Parliamentary Privileges - Article 1055
  • Preamble and Constitutional Vision5
  • President's Rule - Article 356 and S.R. Bommai5
  • Reservation - Article 16 and Indra Sawhney5
  • Reservation - Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (Mandal Case)5
  • Right to Privacy - Article 21 and Technology5
  • Right to Privacy - Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)5
  • Secularism in the Indian Constitution5
  • Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence5
  • Writs and Article 32 - Constitutional Remedies5
Passage or principleMP Jain / Puttaswamy (2017) / Aadhaar

The right to privacy was unanimously recognised as a fundamental right under the Constitution in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017). The nine-judge bench held that privacy is intrinsic to life and liberty under Article 21 and is also protected as part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III. The Court overruled the earlier decisions in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963) to the extent they held that privacy is not a fundamental right. The right to privacy encompasses multiple dimensions: privacy of the body (bodily integrity), decisional autonomy (right to make intimate choices free from State interference), informational privacy (control over personal data and information), and privacy of communications. The right to privacy is, however, not absolute. The State can restrict it subject to three conditions: the restriction must be authorised by law; there must be a legitimate State interest proportionate to the restriction; and the means used must be proportionate and necessary to achieve the aim. This three-part test of legality, legitimacy and proportionality governs all State encroachments on the right to privacy. The judgment has become the foundational basis for several subsequent developments - it directly enabled the decriminalisation of consensual same-sex relations in Navtej Singh Johar (2018), the striking down of criminalised adultery in Joseph Shine (2018), and the constitutional debate over data protection legislation in India.

Question 76EasyRight to Privacy - Article 21 and Technology

In Puttaswamy (2017), the nine-judge bench held that the right to privacy:

  1. A

    Was not a fundamental right but a statutory right

  2. B

    Was a fundamental right intrinsic to life and liberty under Article 21 and Part III

  3. C

    Was available only to Indian citizens, not foreigners

  4. D

    Was an absolute right with no permissible restrictions

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. Was a fundamental right intrinsic to life and liberty under Article 21 and Part III

The passage states: 'privacy is intrinsic to life and liberty under Article 21 and is also protected as part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III.'

Source note: MP Jain / Puttaswamy (2017) / Aadhaar

Question 77MediumRight to Privacy - Article 21 and Technology

According to the passage, which earlier cases were overruled in Puttaswamy on the question of privacy?

  1. A

    Maneka Gandhi and A.K. Gopalan

  2. B

    M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963)

  3. C

    Kesavananda Bharati and Minerva Mills

  4. D

    E.P. Royappa and Romesh Thappar

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963)

The passage states: 'The Court overruled the earlier decisions in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963) to the extent they held that privacy is not a fundamental right.'

Source note: MP Jain / Puttaswamy (2017) / Aadhaar

Question 78MediumRight to Privacy - Article 21 and Technology

The three-part test for valid State restrictions on privacy according to the passage requires:

  1. A

    A court order, Cabinet approval and Presidential assent

  2. B

    Legality (restriction authorised by law), legitimacy (legitimate State interest proportionate to restriction), and proportionality (means must be proportionate and necessary)

  3. C

    Only Parliament's approval

  4. D

    Only that the restriction serves national security

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. Legality (restriction authorised by law), legitimacy (legitimate State interest proportionate to restriction), and proportionality (means must be proportionate and necessary)

The passage states: 'the restriction must be authorised by law; there must be a legitimate State interest proportionate to the restriction; and the means used must be proportionate and necessary to achieve the aim. This three-part test of legality, legitimacy and proportionality governs all State encroachments on the right to privacy.'

Source note: MP Jain / Puttaswamy (2017) / Aadhaar

Question 79EasyRight to Privacy - Article 21 and Technology

Which of the following dimensions of privacy is described in the passage as 'informational privacy'?

  1. A

    Bodily integrity

  2. B

    Right to make intimate choices free from State interference

  3. C

    Control over personal data and information

  4. D

    Privacy of the home

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. Control over personal data and information

The passage defines informational privacy as 'control over personal data and information' - one of the multiple dimensions of the right to privacy identified in Puttaswamy.

Source note: MP Jain / Puttaswamy (2017) / Aadhaar

Question 80HardRight to Privacy - Article 21 and Technology

According to the passage, the Puttaswamy judgment directly enabled which subsequent constitutional development?

  1. A

    The 73rd Amendment on Panchayati Raj

  2. B

    Decriminalisation of consensual same-sex relations in Navtej Singh Johar (2018)

  3. C

    Introduction of Goods and Services Tax

  4. D

    The Right to Education Act

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. Decriminalisation of consensual same-sex relations in Navtej Singh Johar (2018)

The passage states Puttaswamy 'directly enabled the decriminalisation of consensual same-sex relations in Navtej Singh Johar (2018).'

Source note: MP Jain / Puttaswamy (2017) / Aadhaar

Passage or principleMP Jain Ch.3 / K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court unanimously held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution of India. The judgment arose in the context of a challenge to the Aadhaar scheme and its mandatory linkage to various government services. The Court held that the right to privacy inheres in individuals as human beings - it is an inalienable natural right antecedent to the State and flows from the notion of ordered liberty. The right is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III. The bench overruled the earlier decisions in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963) to the extent they held or suggested that the Constitution does not protect privacy as a fundamental right. The Court recognised that the right to privacy encompasses several aspects: informational privacy (control over personal data), decisional autonomy (freedom to make intimate choices), and bodily integrity. The right to privacy is not absolute and may be restricted by the State subject to three conditions: the restriction must be authorised by law; there must be a legitimate State aim; and the means employed must be proportionate and necessary to achieve the aim. The proportionality doctrine, borrowed from comparative constitutional law, was adopted as the standard for evaluating State intrusions into the right to privacy.

Question 81EasyRight to Privacy - Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

The nine-judge bench in Puttaswamy held that the right to privacy is:

  1. A

    A statutory right created by the Information Technology Act

  2. B

    Not a fundamental right but a constitutional value

  3. C

    A fundamental right under the Constitution

  4. D

    An international human right not part of Indian domestic law

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. A fundamental right under the Constitution

The passage states the bench 'unanimously held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution of India.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.3 / K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

Question 82MediumRight to Privacy - Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

The Puttaswamy judgment overruled earlier decisions that had held the Constitution does not protect privacy. Which two cases were specifically overruled on this point?

  1. A

    Maneka Gandhi and A.K. Gopalan

  2. B

    M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

  3. C

    Romesh Thappar and Sakal Papers

  4. D

    Adm Jabalpur and E.P. Royappa

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

The passage states 'The bench overruled the earlier decisions in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963).'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.3 / K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

Question 83EasyRight to Privacy - Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

Which of the following is described in the passage as an aspect of the right to privacy?

  1. A

    Right to vote in elections

  2. B

    Right to bear arms

  3. C

    Informational privacy - control over personal data

  4. D

    Right to form trade unions

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. Informational privacy - control over personal data

The passage states the right 'encompasses several aspects: informational privacy (control over personal data), decisional autonomy, and bodily integrity.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.3 / K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

Question 84MediumRight to Privacy - Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

According to the passage, the three conditions for a valid State restriction on the right to privacy are:

  1. A

    Parliamentary sanction, executive implementation, and judicial approval

  2. B

    Authorised by law, legitimate State aim, and proportionate and necessary means

  3. C

    National security, public order, and morality

  4. D

    Emergency proclamation, Cabinet approval, and presidential assent

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. Authorised by law, legitimate State aim, and proportionate and necessary means

The passage states restrictions must meet three conditions: 'authorised by law; there must be a legitimate State aim; and the means employed must be proportionate and necessary.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.3 / K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

Question 85HardRight to Privacy - Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

The proportionality doctrine adopted in Puttaswamy is described in the passage as:

  1. A

    An ancient principle codified in the Indian Constitution

  2. B

    A doctrine borrowed from comparative constitutional law to evaluate State intrusions into privacy

  3. C

    A statutory standard laid down in the it Act

  4. D

    A judicial invention without basis in any other legal system

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. A doctrine borrowed from comparative constitutional law to evaluate State intrusions into privacy

The passage states: 'The proportionality doctrine, borrowed from comparative constitutional law, was adopted as the standard for evaluating State intrusions into the right to privacy.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.3 / K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

Passage or principleMP Jain Ch.1, Ch.3 / SR Bommai / Articles 25-28

The Indian Constitution is a secular document. Although the term 'secular' was formally inserted into the Preamble by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976, the Constitution as originally enacted already embodied the essential features of a secular State. Indian secularism is often described as 'positive secularism' - distinct from the Western model of strict separation between religion and State. In the Indian model, the State does not merely tolerate all religions while remaining indifferent to them; rather, it actively engages with religious matters to ensure equal treatment of all religions and to eliminate social evils with a religious basis, such as untouchability. Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution provide the framework for religious freedom. Article 25 gives every person the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health, and to other provisions of Part III. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage their own affairs in matters of religion, and own and administer property. Article 27 prohibits the levying of taxes specifically for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion. Article 28 prohibits religious instruction in wholly State-funded educational institutions. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court declared secularism to be a basic feature of the Constitution. The Court held that any State government which pursues an anti-secular agenda or fosters religious discrimination acts contrary to the constitutional mandate and is liable to be dismissed under Article 356.

Question 86EasySecularism in the Indian Constitution

The term 'secular' was formally inserted into the Preamble by which Constitutional Amendment?

  1. A

    38th Amendment

  2. B

    40th Amendment

  3. C

    42nd Amendment

  4. D

    44th Amendment

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. 42nd Amendment

The passage states 'the term secular was formally inserted into the Preamble by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.1, Ch.3 / SR Bommai / Articles 25-28

Question 87MediumSecularism in the Indian Constitution

According to the passage, Indian secularism is described as 'positive secularism', which means:

  1. A

    The State promotes one religion as superior to others

  2. B

    The State completely separates itself from all religious matters

  3. C

    The State actively engages with religious matters to ensure equal treatment and eliminate socio-religious evils

  4. D

    Religion is banned from the public sphere

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. The State actively engages with religious matters to ensure equal treatment and eliminate socio-religious evils

The passage states 'the State...actively engages with religious matters to ensure equal treatment of all religions and to eliminate social evils with a religious basis.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.1, Ch.3 / SR Bommai / Articles 25-28

Question 88EasySecularism in the Indian Constitution

Article 27 of the Constitution as described in the passage prohibits:

  1. A

    All religious institutions from receiving State grants

  2. B

    The levying of taxes specifically for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion

  3. C

    Public celebration of religious festivals

  4. D

    Religious organisations from acquiring property

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. The levying of taxes specifically for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion

The passage states 'Article 27 prohibits the levying of taxes specifically for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.1, Ch.3 / SR Bommai / Articles 25-28

Question 89MediumSecularism in the Indian Constitution

In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court declared secularism to be:

  1. A

    A directive principle in Part IV

  2. B

    A statutory right under the Representation of People Act

  3. C

    A basic feature of the Constitution

  4. D

    A policy matter within the executive's discretion

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. A basic feature of the Constitution

The passage states 'the Supreme Court declared secularism to be a basic feature of the Constitution.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.1, Ch.3 / SR Bommai / Articles 25-28

Question 90EasySecularism in the Indian Constitution

According to the passage, Article 25 is subject to which of the following limitations?

  1. A

    It is an absolute right not subject to any restriction

  2. B

    Subject to public order, morality and health, and other provisions of Part III

  3. C

    Subject only to Parliamentary legislation, not executive action

  4. D

    Available only to citizens of India, not minorities

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. Subject to public order, morality and health, and other provisions of Part III

The passage states Article 25 grants the right to practise religion 'subject to public order, morality and health, and to other provisions of Part III.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.1, Ch.3 / SR Bommai / Articles 25-28

Passage or principleMP Jain / Second Judges Case (1993) / NJAC (2015)

The independence of the judiciary is a basic feature of the Indian Constitution. The Constitution provides structural safeguards for judicial independence including security of tenure (judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts can be removed only through impeachment by Parliament), fixed service conditions that cannot be varied to their disadvantage after appointment, and salaries charged to the Consolidated Fund not subject to Parliamentary vote. The question of who appoints judges - and whether judicial primacy or executive primacy operates in appointments - has been the subject of landmark constitutional adjudication. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (First Judges Case, 1981), the Supreme Court held that 'consultation' with the Chief Justice of India did not mean his concurrence was necessary, and the executive had primacy. This was overruled in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (Second Judges Case, 1993), where a nine-judge bench held that in appointments to the Supreme Court and transfers of High Court judges, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India - acting through a collegium of the two senior-most judges - would have primacy and the President must give effect to it. The collegium system was further elaborated in the Third Judges Case (1998) to include the CJI and four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. Parliament responded by enacting the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act 2014, which inserted Articles 124A, 124B and 124C establishing a National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) with balanced membership from judiciary, executive and civil society. In the Fourth Judges Case - Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) - a five-judge bench by a 4:1 majority struck down the 99th Amendment as violating the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining judicial independence. The lone dissenting judge, Justice Chelameswar, held that the NJAC was a legitimate constitutional reform that actually strengthened judicial accountability without destroying independence.

Question 91EasySeparation of Powers and Judicial Independence

In the First Judges Case (1981), the Supreme Court held that 'consultation' with the Chief Justice of India in judicial appointments:

  1. A

    Meant the cji's concurrence was mandatory

  2. B

    Did not require the cji's concurrence - the executive had primacy

  3. C

    Made the cji's opinion the final word

  4. D

    Required consultation only for Supreme Court appointments, not High Courts

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. Did not require the cji's concurrence - the executive had primacy

The passage states: 'In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (First Judges Case, 1981), the Supreme Court held that consultation with the Chief Justice of India did not mean his concurrence was necessary, and the executive had primacy.'

Source note: MP Jain / Second Judges Case (1993) / NJAC (2015)

Question 92EasySeparation of Powers and Judicial Independence

The Second Judges Case (1993) overruled the First Judges Case and held that the opinion of the cji in appointments would:

  1. A

    Be merely advisory with the final decision remaining with the President

  2. B

    Have primacy - the President must give effect to it

  3. C

    Be subject to Cabinet override

  4. D

    Apply only to High Court appointments

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. Have primacy - the President must give effect to it

The passage states: 'the opinion of the Chief Justice of India...would have primacy and the President must give effect to it.'

Source note: MP Jain / Second Judges Case (1993) / NJAC (2015)

Question 93MediumSeparation of Powers and Judicial Independence

The collegium for Supreme Court appointments as elaborated in the Third Judges Case (1998) consists of:

  1. A

    The cji alone

  2. B

    The cji and two senior-most judges

  3. C

    The cji and four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court

  4. D

    All sitting judges of the Supreme Court

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. The cji and four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court

The passage states: 'the Third Judges Case (1998) to include the CJI and four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court.'

Source note: MP Jain / Second Judges Case (1993) / NJAC (2015)

Question 94MediumSeparation of Powers and Judicial Independence

The NJAC established by the 99th Amendment was struck down because:

  1. A

    It did not have enough judicial members

  2. B

    A 4:1 majority held it violated the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining judicial independence

  3. C

    It was not ratified by the required number of States

  4. D

    The President had not consented to the Amendment

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. A 4:1 majority held it violated the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining judicial independence

The passage states: 'a five-judge bench by a 4:1 majority struck down the 99th Amendment as violating the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining judicial independence.'

Source note: MP Jain / Second Judges Case (1993) / NJAC (2015)

Question 95HardSeparation of Powers and Judicial Independence

Justice Chelameswar's dissent in the Fourth Judges Case (NJAC case) held:

  1. A

    That no commission could ever replace the collegium

  2. B

    That the NJAC was a legitimate constitutional reform that strengthened judicial accountability without destroying independence

  3. C

    That the cji alone should appoint all judges

  4. D

    That the matter should be referred to a larger bench

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. That the NJAC was a legitimate constitutional reform that strengthened judicial accountability without destroying independence

The passage states: 'The lone dissenting judge, Justice Chelameswar, held that the NJAC was a legitimate constitutional reform that actually strengthened judicial accountability without destroying independence.'

Source note: MP Jain / Second Judges Case (1993) / NJAC (2015)

Passage or principleMP Jain Ch.4 / ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) / Puttaswamy (2017)

Article 32 of the Constitution confers on every person the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar described Article 32 as the most important article in the Constitution - without it, the Constitution would be a nullity. It is itself a fundamental right. The Supreme Court under Article 32 may issue directions, orders, or writs including writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. The five writs serve distinct purposes: habeas corpus secures personal liberty by requiring that a detained person be brought before the court; mandamus compels performance of a public duty; prohibition prevents an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction; certiorari quashes an order already made in excess of jurisdiction; and quo warranto challenges the authority by which a person holds public office. In ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976), decided during the Emergency, the Supreme Court by a majority of 4:1 held that the right of a detainee to move the Court for habeas corpus was suspended during Emergency and that no person had any locus standi to challenge preventive detention. Only Justice H.R. Khanna dissented, holding that the right to life and personal liberty could not be suspended by executive order even during Emergency. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge bench, while unanimously recognising the right to privacy as a fundamental right, expressly overruled ADM Jabalpur, endorsing Justice Khanna's dissent. The Court reaffirmed that the Constitution is not the sole repository of the right to life and liberty, and that judicial remedies under Article 32 are a precious and undeniable feature of the rule of law.

Question 96EasyWrits and Article 32 - Constitutional Remedies

According to the passage, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar described Article 32 as:

  1. A

    A directive principle guiding State policy

  2. B

    An ordinary statutory right enforceable in High Courts

  3. C

    The most important article - without it the Constitution would be a nullity

  4. D

    A right available only to citizens, not foreigners

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. The most important article - without it the Constitution would be a nullity

The passage states: 'Dr. B.R. Ambedkar described Article 32 as the most important article in the Constitution - without it, the Constitution would be a nullity.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.4 / ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) / Puttaswamy (2017)

Question 97EasyWrits and Article 32 - Constitutional Remedies

Which writ, according to the passage, compels performance of a public duty?

  1. A

    Habeas corpus

  2. B

    Certiorari

  3. C

    Prohibition

  4. D

    Mandamus

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: D. Mandamus

The passage states 'mandamus compels performance of a public duty.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.4 / ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) / Puttaswamy (2017)

Question 98MediumWrits and Article 32 - Constitutional Remedies

In adm Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, how did the Supreme Court hold (by majority) on the right to move for habeas corpus during Emergency?

  1. A

    The right was fully available and could not be suspended

  2. B

    The right was suspended during Emergency and no person had locus standi to challenge preventive detention

  3. C

    The right was available but only in the Supreme Court, not High Courts

  4. D

    The right required parliamentary approval to enforce during Emergency

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: B. The right was suspended during Emergency and no person had locus standi to challenge preventive detention

The passage states the majority held 'that the right of a detainee to move the Court for habeas corpus was suspended during Emergency.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.4 / ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) / Puttaswamy (2017)

Question 99MediumWrits and Article 32 - Constitutional Remedies

According to the passage, who gave the lone dissent in adm Jabalpur holding that personal liberty could not be suspended by executive order even during Emergency?

  1. A

    Justice P.N. Bhagwati

  2. B

    Justice Y.V. Chandrachud

  3. C

    Justice H.R. Khanna

  4. D

    Justice A.N. Ray

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. Justice H.R. Khanna

The passage states 'Only Justice H.R. Khanna dissented, holding that the right to life and personal liberty could not be suspended by executive order even during Emergency.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.4 / ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) / Puttaswamy (2017)

Question 100HardWrits and Article 32 - Constitutional Remedies

In Puttaswamy (2017), what did the nine-judge bench do with respect to the adm Jabalpur judgment?

  1. A

    It upheld adm Jabalpur as correctly decided

  2. B

    It distinguished adm Jabalpur without overruling it

  3. C

    It expressly overruled adm Jabalpur, endorsing Justice Khanna's dissent

  4. D

    It referred the question to a larger bench for reconsideration

View answer and explanation

Correct answer: C. It expressly overruled adm Jabalpur, endorsing Justice Khanna's dissent

The passage states 'expressly overruled ADM Jabalpur, endorsing Justice Khanna's dissent.'

Source note: MP Jain Ch.4 / ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) / Puttaswamy (2017)