Family Law MCQs for CLAT PG, Page 3

Correct answer: B. A marriage between sapindas (where the parties are related within the prohibited sapinda degrees) without any custom permitting such marriage

The passage states Section 11 declares marriages void where they contravene clauses (i), (iv), and (v) of Section 5 - specifically bigamy, prohibited degrees of relationship, and sapinda relationship. Marriage between sapindas without custom permitting it falls under clause (v) and is therefore void under Section 11. Age requirement and epilepsy relate to Section 5(iii) which is not in Section 11; violations of that clause make a marriage voidable under Section 12, not void. Fraud-induced consent is a ground for voidable marriage under Section 12.

Source note: HMA 1955 - Void vs Voidable Marriage

Correct answer: B. By the innocent party ratifying the marriage through continued cohabitation after discovering the grounds for annulment

The passage states that 'a voidable marriage remains binding unless one of the parties obtains a decree of nullity' and that 'the party who can seek nullity may also ratify the marriage by continued cohabitation.' Ratification through cohabitation after learning of the voidable ground (impotency, fraud, force, etc.) prevents the party from later seeking nullity. This is the application of the equitable principle that a party cannot approbate and reprobate.

Source note: HMA 1955 - Voidable Marriage - Ratification

Correct answer: B. It creates a pathway where either party can petition for divorce if cohabitation has not been resumed for one year after the judicial separation decree, converting the lesser remedy into a foundation for full dissolution

The passage states: 'Section 13(1A) creates a pathway from judicial separation to divorce: if cohabitation has not been resumed for one year after the judicial separation decree, either party can seek divorce.' The key elements from the passage are: (1) the non-resumption of cohabitation for one year; (2) either party (not just the petitioner for judicial separation) can seek divorce; (3) this 'converts what began as a lesser remedy into a foundation for full dissolution.' The divorce under Section 13(1A) does not require proof of any matrimonial fault.

Source note: HMA 1955 - Judicial Separation to Divorce Pathway

Correct answer: B. Because a void marriage produces no legal effects and neither party acquires any matrimonial rights; it is a nullity from the beginning, requiring no formal court pronouncement to establish its non-existence

The passage states that for void marriages: 'neither party acquires any matrimonial rights and no formal decree is needed to establish its nullity.' The passage identifies this as a key feature distinguishing void from voidable marriages. A void marriage is a complete nullity (void ab initio) and therefore no court action is needed to create the legal fact of nullity; it already exists. Parties may still seek a declaratory decree for practical purposes but are not required to do so.

Source note: HMA 1955 - Void Marriage - No Decree Needed

Correct answer: B. Judicial separation relieves parties of the obligation to cohabit but keeps the marriage intact; the parties remain husband and wife; divorce fully dissolves the marriage

The passage states: 'Judicial separation under Section 10 provides a middle ground: the court relieves the parties of the obligation to cohabit but does not dissolve the marriage. The parties remain husband and wife.' Divorce, in contrast, dissolves the marriage entirely. The passage describes judicial separation as a 'lesser remedy' that can serve as a 'foundation for full dissolution' if followed by non-resumption of cohabitation - but it is not mandatory to seek judicial separation before divorce.

Source note: HMA 1955 - Judicial Separation vs Divorce

Correct answer: B. The Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (2017) struck it down as unconstitutional; the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019 subsequently made it a criminal offence

The passage states two distinct events: (1) 'The Supreme Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) struck down instantaneous triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) as unconstitutional'; (2) 'the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 subsequently made it a criminal offence.' The sequence is important: constitutional invalidity (Shayara Bano 2017) followed by criminalisation (2019 Act).

Source note: Muslim Divorce - Triple Talaq - 2019 Act

Correct answer: B. The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase 'reasonable and fair provision' in the 1986 Act to require that it must cover the divorced wife's needs for her entire future life, substantially restoring the Shah Bano protective effect within the text of the 1986 Act

The passage describes the Danial Latifi interpretation: 'the Supreme Court interpreted the 1986 Act to require that the reasonable and fair provision must cover the divorced wife's needs for her entire future life, thus substantially restoring the protective effect of the Shah Bano decision.' Danial Latifi did not strike down the 1986 Act but interpreted 'reasonable and fair provision' expansively to cover lifetime needs - effectively achieving the Shah Bano result while working within the 1986 Act's framework.

Source note: Muslim Divorce - Shah Bano and Danial Latifi

Correct answer: B. Shah Bano (1985) first held maintenance was available beyond iddat; the 1986 Act was then enacted apparently limiting this.

The passage establishes the chronological sequence: 'In Shah Bano Begum v. Mohammed Ahmed Khan (1985), the Supreme Court held...' followed by 'The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was enacted in response' and finally 'In Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001), the Supreme Court interpreted the 1986 Act...' This sequence of: judicial protection, legislative restriction, then judicial reinterpretation expanding protection back, is the central narrative of Muslim women's maintenance rights.

Source note: Muslim Divorce - Legislative History

Correct answer: B. Khul (returning the mahr to the husband who then pronounces divorce), mubarat (mutual agreement), and seeking court-ordered dissolution under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 on specified grounds

The passage mentions three forms available to wives: 'Khul divorce (wife-initiated divorce by returning the mahr) and mubarat (divorce by mutual agreement) are recognised alternatives to talaq. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 provides Muslim women with statutory grounds to seek court-ordered dissolution, including the husband's cruelty, failure to maintain, and other specified grounds.' Together these represent the wife's personal law and statutory options.

Source note: Muslim Divorce - Wife-Initiated Divorce Options

Correct answer: B. The mandatory waiting period for a Muslim woman after the dissolution of her marriage; during this period she is entitled to maintenance from the former husband

The passage states: 'Iddat is the mandatory waiting period for a Muslim woman after the dissolution of her marriage.' Although the passage does not elaborate on all iddat consequences, the Shah Bano discussion implicitly confirms that during iddat the wife is entitled to maintenance. The iddat period serves to ascertain pregnancy, allow for possible reconciliation in revocable divorces, and observe mourning if the dissolution was due to the husband's death.

Source note: Muslim Divorce - Iddat Purpose and Effect

Correct answer: B. The same coparcenary rights and liabilities as sons: coparcener status by birth, equal right to demand partition, ability to be Karta, equal inheritance from coparcenary, and retention of these rights even after marriage

The passage lists the rights conferred: 'A daughter born into a Mitakshara family becomes a coparcener by birth, acquires the same rights as a son to demand partition, can be the Karta of the joint family, and inherits from the coparcenary in equal measure with sons. She retains this status even after marriage.' This is a comprehensive statement of equal coparcenary rights.

Source note: HSA 1956 - Daughters Coparcenary Rights Post-2005

Correct answer: B. The daughter's coparcenary right arises by birth and is not dependent on whether she was born before or after the 2005 amendment; however the coparcener father must have been alive on 9 September 2005

The passage states: 'The Court held that the daughter's coparcenary right arises by birth and is not dependent on whether she was born before or after the 2005 amendment. However, the Court also held that the coparcener father must have been alive on the date when the amendment came into force (9 September 2005).' Both parts of the holding are important: birth-based right regardless of when born (subject to the father's survival condition).

Source note: HSA 1956 - Vineeta Sharma - Key Holding

Correct answer: B. Prakash v. Phulavati (2015) had held the amendment applied only to living daughters of living coparceners; Danamma v. Amar (2018) held it applied irrespective of the father's death.

The passage describes: 'Prior to Vineeta Sharma there were conflicting decisions: Prakash v. Phulavati (2015) had held the amendment only applied to living daughters of living coparceners; Danamma v. Amar (2018) had held it applied irrespective of the father's death. Vineeta Sharma resolved this conflict in favour of the daughter's birth-based right, subject to the condition about the father's life on the amendment date.' Vineeta Sharma thus sided more closely with Danamma while adding the father's survival condition.

Source note: HSA 1956 - Conflicting Precedents Before Vineeta Sharma

Correct answer: B. Daughters had no coparcenary rights; only sons were coparceners acquiring interest by birth; daughters could not demand partition

The passage states clearly: 'Before the amendment, only sons were coparceners in a Mitakshara Hindu joint family, acquiring by birth an interest in coparcenary property. Daughters had no coparcenary rights and could not demand partition.' This succinctly describes the pre-2005 position of complete exclusion of daughters from coparcenary.

Source note: HSA 1956 - Pre-Amendment Position

Correct answer: B. Because in Mitakshara coparcenary an interest vests in property from the moment of birth; this is what distinguishes coparcenary property from self-acquired or inherited property.

The passage explains Mitakshara coparcenary as one where members 'acquir[e] by birth an interest in coparcenary property.' The 2005 amendment extended this to daughters: 'A daughter born into a Mitakshara family becomes a coparcener by birth.' Vineeta Sharma confirmed that this right arises at birth - making the question of when she was born irrelevant (subject to the father's survival condition), because the right is by birth in the family, not by legislative enactment after birth.

Source note: HSA 1956 - Mitakshara vs Pre-Amendment System

Correct answer: B. Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956, which provides maintenance rights during the subsistence of marriage independent of any court proceeding

The passage specifically states: 'Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides a separate maintenance right for a Hindu wife during the subsistence of the marriage. Unlike Section 24 HMA (which requires pending proceedings), Section 18 HAMA can be availed even without any matrimonial proceeding.' The passage explicitly distinguishes Section 18 HAMA from Section 24 HMA on the basis that Section 18 HAMA does not require pending proceedings.

Source note: Maintenance - Multiple Legal Frameworks

Correct answer: B. No, Section 24 is gender-neutral: 'either spouse can claim maintenance pendente lite'; it is available to any spouse without independent sufficient income during the pendency of matrimonial proceedings

The passage states: 'Under Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, either spouse can claim maintenance pendente lite (during proceedings) and permanent alimony after a matrimonial decree. Section 24 is available to any spouse without independent sufficient income.' The words 'either spouse' and 'any spouse' confirm gender neutrality. A husband without sufficient income during matrimonial proceedings can also claim maintenance pendente lite from his wife under Section 24.

Source note: Maintenance - Section 24 HMA - Gender Neutrality

Correct answer: B. All women regardless of religion who are in a domestic relationship; this includes women in relationships in the nature of marriage such as live-in relationships

The passage states: 'The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 provides another avenue for monetary relief... The Act applies to all women regardless of religion who are in a domestic relationship. The Act's definition of domestic relationship includes relationships in the nature of marriage, enabling women in live-in relationships to access maintenance.' The key features are: all religions, broad definition of domestic relationship, includes live-in relationships.

Source note: Maintenance - PWDVA - Applicability to All Religions

Correct answer: B. If she is unchaste or has ceased to be Hindu by conversion to another religion

The passage states: 'The wife loses this right if she is unchaste or has ceased to be Hindu by conversion.' These are the only two grounds mentioned in the passage for forfeiture of Section 18 HAMA maintenance. Income alone does not forfeit the right (though it affects the quantum). Filing for divorce relates to HMA proceedings, not Section 18 HAMA. Refusing to follow to another city may affect the right but is not mentioned in the passage.

Source note: Maintenance - Section 18 HAMA - Loss of Right

Correct answer: B. It is a secular summary remedy available to wives, children, and parents of all religions; it is not limited to Hindus like HMA and HAMA.

The passage distinguishes Section 125 as 'a secular summary remedy for maintenance available to wives, children, and parents of all religions.' This contrasts with HMA and HAMA which apply only to Hindus. The passage also notes it applies to divorced wives (unlike Section 18 HAMA which requires subsisting marriage). Section 125 is administered by criminal magistrates (a summary procedure) rather than family courts, making it quicker and accessible.

Source note: Maintenance - Section 125 CrPC - Secular Application

Correct answer: B. The Indian Succession Act 1925 applies instead of the Hindu Succession Act 1956; the Hindu who marries under the SMA steps out of the Hindu personal law succession framework

The passage states: 'A Hindu who marries under the Special Marriage Act is no longer governed by the Hindu Succession Act for purposes of inheritance; instead the Indian Succession Act, 1925 applies.' This is a significant consequence of marrying under the SMA: the person steps out of Hindu personal law succession framework entirely. This affects coparcenary rights, inheritance order, and testamentary succession.

Source note: Comparative Family Law: HMA, Muslim Law, SMA, DV Act

Correct answer: B. Because the Special Marriage Act has its own monogamy requirement; a Muslim who has married under the SMA cannot rely on Muslim personal law to claim a second marriage is permissible

The passage states: 'A Muslim who marries under the SMA cannot take a second wife by claiming Muslim personal law permits polygamy, because the SMA is governed by its own monogamy requirement.' Once a Muslim elects to marry under the SMA they are bound by SMA rules, including monogamy. Their personal law cannot be selectively applied to benefit them.

Source note: Comparative Family Law: HMA, Muslim Law, SMA, DV Act

Correct answer: B. The couple must hold themselves out as husband and wife; both must be of legal age; both must be otherwise qualified to marry; a mere concubinage does not qualify

The passage states: 'In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010), the Supreme Court held that a relationship in the nature of marriage under the DV Act requires the couple to hold themselves out as husband and wife, both being of legal age and otherwise qualified to marry. A mere concubinage does not qualify.' The passage identifies three conditions and specifically excludes concubinage from the definition.

Source note: Comparative Family Law: HMA, Muslim Law, SMA, DV Act

Correct answer: B. The 2005 amendment giving daughters coparcenary rights; the Supreme Court striking down triple talaq in 2017.

The passage identifies specifically: 'the 2005 amendment giving daughters coparcenary rights, the Supreme Court striking down triple talaq in 2017, and legislative responses including the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019 all represent constitutional values transforming personal law regimes.' These represent Article 14 (equality) operating to reform discriminatory personal law practices.

Source note: Comparative Family Law: HMA, Muslim Law, SMA, DV Act

Correct answer: B. Hindu Marriage Act treats marriage as a social institution with religious elements permitting dissolution; Muslim personal law treats nikah as a civil contract (aqd) following contractual principles with specific financial obligations including mahr and maintenance during iddat

The passage states: 'The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 treats marriage as a social institution with religious elements, permitting dissolution...' and 'The Muslim personal law treats nikah as a civil contract (aqd) whose legitimacy and dissolution follow contractual principles, with specific financial obligations including mahr (dower) and maintenance during iddat.' The Hindu-as-social-institution vs Muslim-as-contract distinction is directly stated.

Source note: Comparative Family Law: HMA, Muslim Law, SMA, DV Act