Constitutional Law MCQs for Judiciary, Page 8

Correct answer: B. The State from treating different persons or classes differently if there is a rational basis for the difference

Article 14 embeds the principle that equals should be treated equally - but this does NOT mean all persons must be treated identically. Persons who are differently situated can and must be treated differently. The Court has consistently held since the early 1950s that differential treatment based on a reasonable classification with rational nexus to a legitimate State objective does NOT violate Article 14. What violates Article 14 is arbitrary, irrational or capricious differentiation without intelligible basis.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. A legitimate legislative purpose - the law cannot have an arbitrary or unconstitutional objective

The twin tests under Article 14 require: (1) intelligible differentia AND (2) rational nexus between that differentia and the OBJECT of the law. For the second test to be satisfied, the object itself must be legitimate and non-arbitrary - a law cannot have an unconstitutional or purely arbitrary object. In Anwar Ali Sarkar, the object of the West Bengal Special Courts Act was vague (efficient disposal of cases) - the Court found no rational nexus because the classification for referring cases was arbitrary.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: C. Ews reservation is constitutionally valid - it does not violate the basic structure and serves legitimate State aims (3:2 majority)

In Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022), the Constitution Bench upheld the 103rd Amendment by a 3:2 majority. The majority held: EWS reservation for economically weaker sections not already covered by existing reservations is a legitimate classification; the exclusion of SCs/STs/OBCs from EWS is justified because they already have reservation; the 50% ceiling is not violated as the 10% EWS is separate. Justices Ravindra Bhat and B.V. Nagarathna dissented on the exclusion of SC/ST/OBC from EWS.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: C. Socially and educationally backward classes and SCs and STs in admission to educational institutions including private unaided ones (except minority institutions)

Article 15(5) was inserted by the 93rd Amendment to enable reservation in admissions in private unaided educational institutions for SEBCs and SCs/STs (except minority institutions). It was challenged in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008), where the Supreme Court upheld the amendment while keeping the creamy layer exclusion applicable. Article 15(5) does NOT apply to minority institutions - that would violate Article 30. This is the constitutional basis for OBC reservation in IITs, IIMs etc.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: C. 102nd Amendment - Article 338B

The Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act 2018 inserted Article 338B establishing the NCBC as a constitutional body. Before this, the NCBC was only a statutory body under the NCBC Act 1993. The 102nd Amendment also inserted Article 342A enabling the President to specify SEBCs for each State/UT. Article 338A establishes the NCST for Scheduled Tribes. Article 338 establishes the NCSC for Scheduled Castes. These are frequently confused in exams.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. A functional differentiation with checks and balances - the three organs have distinct primary functions but overlap in practice, with each checking the others

In Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955), the Supreme Court observed that India does not follow strict separation of powers - the Indian Constitution has not 'recognised the doctrine...in its absolute rigidity.' Instead, India has a system of functional differentiation with checks and balances: Parliament makes law but the President (executive) must assent; courts review laws; President (executive) is part of Parliament; President appoints judges on CJI's recommendation; Parliament can impeach judges. This flexible doctrine prevents both legislative tyranny and judicial overreach.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) and subsequent cases - courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the executive on policy matters

While courts can review executive action for illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety (the Wednesbury grounds), they cannot substitute their own judgment for the executive's on policy questions. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989), the Court held that in matters of policy - economic, social, military - courts must defer to the executive unless there is clear constitutional violation. The distinction between reviewing legality (courts' role) and reviewing merits of policy (executive's role) is the cornerstone of the separation between judicial review and executive governance.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: D. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), later reinforced by the Second Judges Case and the NJAC decision, entrenched judicial independence within the basic-structure doctrine

Judicial independence as a protected basic feature is best understood as developing across cases. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) applied the basic-structure doctrine in a way that protected core constitutional adjudication, the Second Judges Case (1993) linked appointments primacy with judicial independence, and the NJAC decision (2015) reaffirmed that judicial independence cannot be compromised even by constitutional amendment. That makes the combined historical statement the most accurate option.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: C. Courts can declare legislation unconstitutional; Parliament can amend the Constitution in response (subject to basic structure).

Indian checks and balances work through: (1) Courts declare laws unconstitutional under Article 13 - checking the legislature; (2) Parliament can amend the Constitution to override judicial interpretations - checking the courts, subject to basic structure; (3) President (executive) must assent to bills but can return non-money bills; (4) Parliament can impeach President and judges; (5) The Cabinet is accountable to Lok Sabha - checking the executive. No single organ is supreme - each is supreme within its sphere subject to constitutional limits.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. That courts, while not substituting executive judgment, can issue specific mandates protecting fundamental rights (Article 21) from executive violation even in sensitive security matters

The Jeet S. Bisht case and the broader 'encounter killing' jurisprudence show that judicial review extends to all executive action including law enforcement. Courts cannot direct police operational decisions but can: (1) mandate investigation of all encounter deaths; (2) require magisterial inquiry; (3) award compensation where encounters are found to be fake; (4) direct prosecution. The right to life under Article 21 cannot be extinguished by executive action without due process - even of criminals or terrorists. PUCL v. State of Maharashtra (2014) consolidated guidelines on encounter deaths.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. Without Article 32, the Fundamental Rights would be mere paper rights - Article 32 makes them real and enforceable

Dr. Ambedkar said: 'If I was asked to name any particular article in this Constitution as the most important - an article without which this Constitution would be a nullity - I could not refer to any other article except this one.' The logic: Fundamental Rights without enforcement are meaningless. Article 32 is itself a Fundamental Right - the right to enforcement of other Fundamental Rights. It is the constitutional guarantee that makes rights real rather than aspirational.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: D. Quo warranto

Quo warranto (literally 'by what warrant/authority') is issued to inquire into the legality of a claim to hold a public office of permanent character created by statute or the Constitution. If the Court finds the person has no legal right to hold the office, it ousts them. Unlike other writs, quo warranto can be filed by any member of the public (not just the aggrieved party). It is used to challenge appointments to constitutional bodies, public corporations, etc.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. Certiorari quashes an order already made by an inferior court; Prohibition prevents an inferior court from proceeding - it is issued before the act is done

Both certiorari and prohibition are supervisory writs - they deal with jurisdictional excesses of inferior courts/tribunals. The crucial distinction: PROHIBITION is preventive (anticipatory) - issued to stop an inferior tribunal from proceeding when it is about to act without/beyond jurisdiction, BEFORE it passes the order. CERTIORARI is curative - issued to QUASH an order ALREADY MADE by an inferior court/tribunal acting without/beyond jurisdiction or in violation of natural justice.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. Article 32 jurisdiction includes power to award compensation for State violation of Fundamental Rights - it is not limited to issuing writs alone

Rudul Sah was detained for 14 years after his acquittal through a State error. The Court held: Article 32 includes the power to award monetary compensation to enforce Fundamental Rights - it is not confined to merely issuing writs. If the Court is powerless to compensate for loss caused by State violation of Article 21, the right under Article 32 is illusory. This established the constitutional tort remedy - compensation for fundamental rights violations by State actors.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. Any person or organisation acting bona fide in public interest, even if not personally aggrieved

PIL relaxed locus standi - the traditional requirement that only a person personally aggrieved by State action can approach the Court. Justices P.N. Bhagwati and V.R. Krishna Iyer pioneered PIL in cases like Hussainara Khatoon, Bandhua Mukti Morcha and Sunil Batra. Any public-spirited person or organisation can file a PIL on behalf of those who cannot access courts themselves (prisoners, bonded labourers, destitute persons, etc.) - the Court even treated letters written by public-spirited citizens as PILs.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. An extraordinary remedy of last resort after review petition is dismissed - available only on limited grounds to prevent gross miscarriage of justice

The curative petition is available ONLY after: (1) a review petition has been dismissed. Available grounds are extremely narrow: (1) the opposing party was not heard (violation of natural justice - audi alteram partem), (2) the judge should have recused but did not (bias - nemo judex in causa sua), or (3) earlier proceedings were ab initio void. The curative petition must be circulated to the three senior-most judges of the Supreme Court plus the bench that decided the case. It is a safety valve of last resort.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: C. Forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be excluded even by constitutional amendment

In L. Chandra Kumar (1997), the Court held that the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of High Courts and Article 32 of the Supreme Court is a part of the BASIC STRUCTURE and cannot be excluded even by constitutional amendment. Earlier, Parliament had tried to exclude court jurisdiction through Article 323A (Administrative Tribunals) and 323B (Other Tribunals). The Court said tribunals are subject to supervisory jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 227 - this cannot be ousted.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: C. A private person who has not been entrusted with any public duty

Mandamus compels performance of a public duty imposed by law. The key requirement is that the respondent must have a PUBLIC DUTY - a legal obligation imposed by statute or common law to perform a specific act. A purely private person with no public duty cannot be compelled by mandamus. However, if a private body or person has been entrusted with a public function (e.g., a private school running on government grants), mandamus may lie against them for their public functions.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: D. Article 142 - power to do complete justice

Article 142 gives the Supreme Court a unique, plenary power: the Court may, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Under Article 142, the Court can: pass orders contrary to statutory provisions (to achieve justice), dissolve marriages, direct payment of compensation, resolve industrial disputes, give environmental directions, etc. However, Article 142 cannot override the Constitution itself.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1979) and M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra (1978)

In M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra (1978), Justice Krishna Iyer held that the right to legal aid at State expense for an accused who cannot afford counsel is part of 'reasonable, fair and just procedure' under Article 21. This was confirmed in Hussainara Khatoon (1979) where the Court directed release of prisoners who had been in jail longer than the maximum sentence for their offence - partly because they had no legal representation. The Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 gives statutory effect to this constitutional mandate.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. 6-14 years

Article 21A provides: 'The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years.' The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 (RTE Act) implements this provision. Note: the 86th Amendment ALSO amended Article 45 - now covering early childhood care for children BELOW 6 years (as a DPSP). The distinction between the enforceable fundamental right (6-14) and the non-enforceable DPSP (under 6) is important.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: C. Both State and private individuals who have illegally detained a person

Habeas corpus is the broadest writ - it secures personal liberty against illegal detention by ANYONE - State or private individuals. In cases of kidnapping or illegal confinement by private persons, habeas corpus can lie to secure the detainee's release. However, it cannot be used to challenge detention by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its jurisdiction - detention pursuant to a valid court order (e.g., imprisonment after conviction) cannot be challenged by habeas corpus.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. The Court exercised PIL jurisdiction and its Article 141 law-making power to fill a legislative vacuum - the guidelines were binding until Parliament enacted legislation

In Vishaka (1997), the Court found no domestic law specifically addressing sexual harassment at the workplace. Exercising PIL jurisdiction (any person could bring the matter in public interest), the Court issued comprehensive guidelines making employers responsible for preventing sexual harassment, establishing Complaints Committees, etc. The basis was Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21. The guidelines had the force of law under Article 141 until the POSH Act 2013 was enacted.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. The Court cannot refuse jurisdiction but may, by way of judicial policy, direct the petitioner to first approach the High Court if it can adequately deal with the matter - this is discretionary practice, not refusal of jurisdiction

Article 32 jurisdiction cannot be ousted or refused - it is a fundamental right to move the Supreme Court. However, the Court may, as a matter of judicial policy (not law), direct petitioners to first exhaust alternative remedies or approach the appropriate High Court. This is a discretionary practice to manage the Court's docket and give High Courts the opportunity to deal with matters within their jurisdiction. The distinction between 'declining jurisdiction' (impermissible) and 'directing alternate forum' (permissible) is legally important.

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References

Correct answer: B. Article 32 is available only for Fundamental Rights enforcement; Article 226 jurisdiction is wider - available for enforcement of any legal right and for any other purpose

Article 32 jurisdiction is specifically for enforcement of Fundamental Rights (Part III). Article 226 High Court jurisdiction is WIDER - High Courts can issue writs or directions not only for enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also for enforcement of any other legal right and 'for any other purpose.' Also: Article 226 allows writs against any person or authority including government - the geographical scope is within the High Court's territorial jurisdiction. High Courts can even issue writs in matters not related to Fundamental Rights (e.g., challenging a statutory tribunal's order).

Source note: MP Jain Constitutional Law / Standard References