Labour Law MCQs for Judiciary, Page 5

Correct answer: B. Regulating the relations between workmen and employers, or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and includes federations of two or more trade unions

Section 2(h) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 defines a trade union broadly as a combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers, between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and includes any federation of two or more trade unions. The definition is intentionally wide to capture organisations of workers and employers alike, as well as their federations, reflecting the Act's purpose of providing a legal framework for collective organisation and protection.

Source note: Section 2(h), Trade Unions Act 1926

Correct answer: B. Whether the Registrar's function in registering a trade union is purely ministerial or whether the Registrar can examine the genuineness of the union's objects and whether it satisfies the statutory definition under Section 2(h) before granting registration

In Rangaswami v. Registrar of Trade Unions (AIR 1962 Mad 231), the Madras High Court examined whether the Registrar's role under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 was purely ministerial (rubber-stamping any application that meets formal requirements) or whether the Registrar could substantively scrutinise whether the combination genuinely satisfies the statutory definition of a trade union under Section 2(h), including whether its primary purpose is the regulation of relations between workmen and employers. The case clarified that the Registrar exercises quasi-judicial discretion to verify genuine compliance with the statutory definition, not merely formal completeness of the application.

Source note: Rangaswami v. Registrar of Trade Unions AIR 1962 Mad 231

Correct answer: B. Seven or more members of the trade union, who must subscribe their names to the rules of the union and comply with the other provisions of the Act relating to registration

Section 4 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 requires that any seven or more members of a trade union may apply for registration by subscribing their names to the rules of the union and complying with the provisions relating to registration. This relatively low threshold reflects the legislative intent to facilitate the formation and registration of trade unions, lowering barriers to collective organisation by workers. The Trade Unions (Amendment) Act of 2001 added further requirements, including a minimum percentage of workmen membership for continued registration in certain establishments.

Source note: Section 4, Trade Unions Act 1926

Correct answer: B. No office-bearer or member of a registered trade union shall be liable to punishment under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (criminal conspiracy) in respect of any agreement made between members for the purpose of furthering any object of the trade union, unless the agreement is to commit an offence

Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 provides that no office-bearer or member of a registered trade union shall be liable to punishment under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (now the corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) in respect of any agreement made between members for the purpose of furthering any object of the trade union specified in Section 15, unless the agreement is an agreement to commit an offence. This protects legitimate collective action and union activity from being criminalised as conspiracy, while expressly excluding agreements to commit actual offences from this immunity.

Source note: Section 17, Trade Unions Act 1926

Correct answer: B. No suit or other legal proceeding shall be maintainable in any civil court against a registered trade union or any office-bearer or member thereof in respect of any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, on the ground only that such act induces some other person to break a contract of employment, or that it is in interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or labour as he wills

Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 provides that no civil suit shall be maintainable against a registered trade union or its office-bearers or members for an act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, solely on the ground that such act induces another person to break a contract of employment, or interferes with another's trade, business, or employment, or with another's right to dispose of capital or labour as they wish. This immunity is specifically targeted at protecting legitimate trade union activities like calling for strikes or picketing from common law tortious liability that would otherwise attach to inducing breach of contract or interference with business, but does not provide blanket immunity from all civil suits.

Source note: Section 18, Trade Unions Act 1926

Correct answer: B. Whether trade union leaders organising and participating in a strike, including persuading workers to join the strike, could be held criminally liable for conspiracy, and the extent to which Section 17 protects such organisational activity undertaken to further legitimate union objects

R.S. Ruikar v. Emperor (AIR 1935 Nag 149) examined whether trade union office-bearers who organised and led a strike, including efforts to persuade other workers to join the agitation, could be prosecuted for criminal conspiracy. The case considered the application of Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, which protects legitimate union activity furthering union objects from being treated as criminal conspiracy, while clarifying the boundaries of this protection where the conduct in question might exceed the legitimate furtherance of trade union objects.

Source note: R.S. Ruikar v. Emperor AIR 1935 Nag 149

Correct answer: B. Systematic activity, organised by cooperation between employer and employee, for the production and distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celebrational, social, or spiritual needs); absence of profit motive or charitable disposition is irrelevant; if the organisation is a trade or business, it does not cease to be one because of philanthropy animating the undertaking

In Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (AIR 1978 SC 548), a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court laid down a wide and inclusive test for 'industry': systematic activity organised by cooperation between employer and employee for the production or distribution of goods or services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes, with the absence of profit motive being irrelevant to the characterisation. The Court held that even charitable, religious (where commercial activity is undertaken), or governmental sovereign functions could in principle fall within the definition unless covered by specific exceptions the Court carved out, such as purely spiritual or religious services and sovereign functions of the state like legislation, judicial administration, and defence.

Source note: Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa AIR 1978 SC 548

Correct answer: B. That the wide and inclusive definition of industry adopted in Bangalore Water Supply had led to practical difficulties, including bringing within its scope numerous activities such as charitable, educational, and even certain sovereign or welfare functions of the State, which the Court felt may require fresh examination by a larger bench in light of changing socio-economic conditions and the need for clarity and consistency in application

In State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (2005) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court expressed reservations about the practical workability and consistency of the expansive Bangalore Water Supply test, noting that its wide and inclusive approach had brought numerous activities, including charitable, educational, and certain governmental welfare functions, within the scope of 'industry', sometimes producing results that appeared inconsistent with the legislative purpose. The Court referred the matter for reconsideration by a larger bench, reflecting ongoing judicial debate about the proper scope of the definition, though the larger bench reference and reconsideration have not been conclusively resolved as of recent jurisprudence, and Bangalore Water Supply continues to be treated as the operative precedent.

Source note: State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (2005) 5 SCC 1

Correct answer: B. Employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour of any person

Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines an industrial dispute broadly as any dispute or difference between employers and employers, employers and workmen, or workmen and workmen, connected with employment or non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour of any person. This broad definition captures collective disputes affecting the employment relationship, distinguishing such collective industrial disputes from purely individual grievances, a distinction central to the operation of the Act's dispute resolution machinery.

Source note: Section 2(k), Industrial Disputes Act 1947

Correct answer: B. Following decisions holding that a dispute relating to the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or termination of services of an individual workman would not constitute an 'industrial dispute' under Section 2(k) unless other workmen or a union espoused the cause, Section 2A deems any dispute connected with the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or termination of an individual workman to be an industrial dispute even if no other workman or union is a party to the dispute

Section 2A was inserted into the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to address the practical difficulty that arose because the original definition of 'industrial dispute' under Section 2(k), interpreted in early case law, required some form of collective support or espousal of the cause of the individual workman by other workmen or a union before the dispute could be treated as an industrial dispute. Section 2A removes this requirement specifically for disputes connected with discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or termination of service of an individual workman, deeming such disputes to be industrial disputes even without collective espousal, thereby giving individual workmen direct access to the dispute resolution machinery of the Act for these specific categories of grievances.

Source note: Section 2A, Industrial Disputes Act 1947

Correct answer: B. That a dispute can be raised by workmen concerning a person who is not a workman, provided the workmen raising the dispute have a sufficient direct or substantial interest in the employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour of that person, and the dispute is not purely a matter of individual or personal interest disconnected from the general body of workmen

In Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate (AIR 1958 SC 353), the Supreme Court held that while the person who is the subject matter of the dispute need not necessarily be a 'workman' as defined under the Act, the workmen raising the dispute must have a direct and substantial interest in the matter, meaning a community of interest connecting the workmen as a class to the cause being espoused, distinguishing this from disputes of a purely personal nature unconnected to the general body of workmen's collective interests. This case established important limits on which disputes qualify as genuine 'industrial disputes' under Section 2(k).

Source note: Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate AIR 1958 SC 353

Correct answer: B. The benefit of maternity leave and related benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, holding that such benefits cannot be denied merely because the women workers were employed on a casual or muster roll basis rather than as regular employees, since the beneficial provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act must be construed liberally to extend its protection to all categories of women workers including casual and daily wage workers

In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) (AIR 2000 SC 1274), the Supreme Court held that the beneficial provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 must be liberally construed to extend maternity benefits to women workers engaged on a muster roll or casual basis, rejecting the argument that such benefits should be confined only to regular, permanent employees. The Court emphasised the welfare and social justice orientation underlying labour legislation, holding that denying maternity benefits to casual women workers would defeat the very purpose of the Maternity Benefit Act and would be discriminatory and unjust.

Source note: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) AIR 2000 SC 1274; (2000) 3 SCC 224

Correct answer: B. Persons employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, and persons employed in a supervisory capacity who draw wages exceeding the statutorily prescribed limit or who exercise functions mainly of a managerial nature; the Act also excludes persons subject to the Army, Navy, or Air Force Acts, or employed in the police or as officers/employees of a prison

Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines 'workman' inclusively to cover manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, or supervisory work for hire or reward, but expressly excludes persons employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, and supervisory employees whose wages exceed a statutorily prescribed limit or whose functions are mainly managerial in nature. The Act also excludes persons governed by the Army, Navy, or Air Force Acts, and those employed in the police service or as officers or employees of a prison. The managerial/supervisory exclusion has generated significant litigation regarding the proper test for distinguishing a 'workman' from excluded managerial personnel.

Source note: Section 2(s), Industrial Disputes Act 1947

Correct answer: B. The primary test is the existence of a right of control and supervision over the manner in which the work is to be performed, vested in the employer; if the employer has the right to direct not merely what work is to be done but how it is to be done, the relationship is one of employer-employee (contract of service); the prima facie test is supplemented by other relevant factors examined holistically

In Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (AIR 1957 SC 264), the Supreme Court laid down the control and supervision test as the primary criterion for distinguishing a contract of service (creating an employer-employee/workman relationship) from a contract for service (creating an independent contractor relationship). The key inquiry is whether the employer possesses the right to control and supervise not just the end result of the work but the manner and method by which the work is carried out. This test, while foundational, has been supplemented in later cases by additional factors such as the predominant nature of duties test, particularly in cases involving more complex or skilled work arrangements.

Source note: Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1957 SC 264

Correct answer: B. That teachers do not fall within the definition of 'workman' under Section 2(s), since the primary function of teaching is imparting education, which is fundamentally different in nature from the manual, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, or supervisory categories of work specified in the definition; the work of imparting education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation rather than falling within the enumerated categories

In A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman & Diu (AIR 1988 SC 1700), the Supreme Court held that teachers employed in educational institutions do not fall within the definition of 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, since the primary function of teaching, imparting education to students, does not fit within any of the specifically enumerated categories of work (manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, or supervisory). The Court characterised teaching as a distinct vocational activity not contemplated by the statutory definition, meaning teachers generally cannot avail of the dispute resolution mechanisms under the Industrial Disputes Act, though this position has been subject to subsequent legislative and judicial reconsideration in various contexts.

Source note: A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman & Diu AIR 1988 SC 1700

Correct answer: B. The predominant nature of duties test, under which the court examines the dominant or primary nature of the duties actually performed by the employee, rather than mechanically classifying based on job title or any single incidental duty; if the principal and basic duties fall outside the categories specified in Section 2(s) (such as predominantly involving managerial, sales promotion, or other excluded functions), the employee is not a workman even if some incidental clerical work is also performed

In H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994) 5 SCC 737, the Supreme Court applied and emphasised the predominant nature of duties test, holding that where an employee performs a mix of duties, the court must examine which duties are predominant or principal in determining whether the employee is a 'workman' under Section 2(s). The case specifically addressed medical representatives or sales promotion employees who may perform some incidental clerical tasks, holding that if their predominant function is sales promotion (which does not fall within the statutory categories), they would not qualify as workmen merely because of incidental clerical duties, refining the earlier control and supervision test from Dharangadhra Chemical Works for cases involving mixed or composite job functions.

Source note: H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994) 5 SCC 737

Correct answer: B. A cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding of any number of persons who are or have been so employed, to continue to work or to accept employment

Section 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines a strike as a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment. The essential elements are: (1) collective action (acting in combination or under a common understanding, distinguishing it from an individual's refusal to work); and (2) cessation of work or refusal to continue work or accept employment. This definition has been interpreted to include various forms of collective work stoppage, including go-slow tactics in certain circumstances, as recognised in subsequent case law.

Source note: Section 2(q), Industrial Disputes Act 1947

Correct answer: B. A strike may be illegal (in violation of statutory restrictions, such as those under Section 22 or 23 of the Act, or in breach of a prohibition or restriction) yet may still be considered justified on its merits if the workmen had genuine and reasonable grievances; conversely, a strike may be technically legal yet unjustified if resorted to without adequate cause or before exhausting other reasonable avenues; this distinction is significant for determining consequential remedies, such as wages for the strike period

In Management of Chandramalai Estate v. Its Workmen (AIR 1960 SC 902), the Supreme Court clarified the important distinction between the legality of a strike (whether it complies with the statutory restrictions and procedural requirements of the Industrial Disputes Act) and its justifiability (whether the underlying cause and circumstances of the strike were reasonable and adequate). A strike could be illegal for failing to comply with statutory notice or other requirements, yet still be found justified on the merits if the workmen had genuine grievances, which has significant practical consequences, particularly for determining whether workers are entitled to wages for the period of the strike, since courts have held that wages may be allowed for a strike that, while perhaps technically irregular, was substantively justified.

Source note: Management of Chandramalai Estate v. Its Workmen AIR 1960 SC 902

Correct answer: B. That whether workers are entitled to wages for a strike period depends on whether the strike was both legal and justified; if the strike is illegal, no wages are payable.

In Syndicate Bank v. K. Umesh Nayak (1994) 5 SCC 572, the Supreme Court consolidated and clarified the principles governing entitlement to wages during a strike period, holding that the determination depends on a combined assessment of both legality and justifiability of the strike. If a strike is illegal, the workers are generally not entitled to wages for that period. If the strike is legal but unjustified (lacking adequate cause), wages may still be denied or reduced. It is generally only where the strike is found to be both legal and justified that workers are entitled to wages for the strike period, with the assessment requiring detailed examination of the specific facts and circumstances surrounding each strike.

Source note: Syndicate Bank v. K. Umesh Nayak (1994) 5 SCC 572

Correct answer: B. That government employees have no fundamental right, statutory right, or even a moral or equitable right to go on strike; the Court upheld the dismissal of a large number of government employees in Tamil Nadu who had participated in a strike, emphasising the essential nature of public services and the disruption caused to public administration and public interest by a strike of government servants

In T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2003) 6 SCC 581, the Supreme Court made the significant and controversial pronouncement that government employees do not have a fundamental right, a statutory right, or even a moral or equitable right to strike. The Court upheld the Tamil Nadu government's mass dismissal of striking government employees, reasoning that a strike by government employees causes immense inconvenience to the public, disrupts essential administrative functions, and that the public interest in the continuity of governmental functions outweighs any claimed right of government employees to strike, a position that has generated significant academic and policy debate regarding the proper balance between collective labour rights and public service obligations.

Source note: T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2003) 6 SCC 581

Correct answer: B. A workman shall not go on strike without giving to the employer notice of strike within six weeks before striking, or within fourteen days of giving such notice, or before the expiry of the date of strike specified in the notice, or during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings; similar restrictions apply to employers regarding lockouts in public utility services

Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 imposes specific procedural restrictions on strikes (and correspondingly, Section 22 also restricts lockouts) in public utility services, recognising the essential and disruption-sensitive nature of such services. Workmen must give advance notice of strike, the notice has a validity period (within six weeks of giving notice, with a minimum gap before striking), and strikes are also prohibited during the pendency of conciliation proceedings and for a period after their conclusion. Failure to comply with these notice and timing requirements renders the strike illegal under Section 24 of the Act, though as discussed in the Chandramalai Estate case, illegality does not automatically mean the strike was unjustified on its merits.

Source note: Section 22, Industrial Disputes Act 1947

Correct answer: B. The failure, refusal, or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power, or raw materials, or the accumulation of stocks, or the breakdown of machinery, or natural calamity, or for any other connected reason, to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched

Section 2(kkk) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines lay-off as the failure, refusal, or inability of an employer to give employment to a workman whose name is on the muster rolls and who has not been retrenched, due to specified causes such as shortage of coal, power, or raw materials, accumulation of stocks, breakdown of machinery, natural calamity, or any other connected reason. Lay-off is distinct from retrenchment in that the employment relationship is not terminated; the workman remains on the rolls and is typically entitled to lay-off compensation under Section 25C of the Act, reflecting the temporary, involuntary nature of the work stoppage from the employer's side.

Source note: Section 2(kkk), Industrial Disputes Act 1947

Correct answer: B. Voluntary retirement of the workman; retirement on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment provides for it.

Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines retrenchment broadly as termination of service by the employer for any reason whatsoever, except as a punishment by way of disciplinary action, but the definition specifically excludes: voluntary retirement of the workman; retirement on reaching the age of superannuation as per the contract; termination due to continued ill health; and termination resulting from non-renewal of a fixed-term contract on its natural expiry or termination under the contract's own terms. This wide definition, combined with specific exclusions, has generated extensive litigation regarding what types of termination fall within or outside the scope of retrenchment and its accompanying statutory protections such as notice and compensation requirements.

Source note: Section 2(oo), Industrial Disputes Act 1947

Correct answer: B. Section 25F requires that a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year shall not be retrenched until: he has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment (or wages in lieu of notice); he has been paid compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service; and notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate government

In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1990) 3 SCC 682, the Supreme Court emphasised that the conditions precedent under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are mandatory and must be strictly complied with before retrenchment can be validly effected for workmen with one year or more of continuous service. These conditions are: one month's notice in writing (or wages in lieu thereof) indicating reasons for retrenchment; payment of retrenchment compensation at the rate of fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service (or any part thereof in excess of six months); and notice served on the appropriate government in the prescribed manner. Non-compliance with these conditions renders the retrenchment invalid and void.

Source note: Section 25F, Industrial Disputes Act 1947; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1990) 3 SCC 682

Correct answer: B. Section 25B defines continuous service and provides that a workman who has not actually worked for the entire period but has worked for not less than 240 days (in a year of twelve calendar months preceding the relevant date) is deemed to be in continuous service for one year for the purposes of provisions such as retrenchment compensation and notice requirements; the case examined how this deemed continuous service provision interacts with actual employment patterns to determine eligibility for statutory protections

In The Workmen of Fire Stone Tyre & Rubber Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Fire Stone Tyre & Rubber Co. Pvt. Ltd. (1976) 3 SCC 819, the Supreme Court examined Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which defines continuous service and importantly provides a deeming provision: a workman who has actually worked for at least 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar months is deemed to have completed one year of continuous service for the purposes of statutory entitlements such as retrenchment compensation under Section 25F, even if there were breaks or interruptions during that period that would otherwise disqualify the period from being treated as literally continuous. This deeming provision is crucial in protecting workers, including those in seasonal or intermittent employment, from being denied statutory benefits purely on technical grounds of non-continuous attendance.

Source note: Section 25B, Industrial Disputes Act 1947; Workmen of Fire Stone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Fire Stone Tyre & Rubber Co. (1976) 3 SCC 819