Criminal Law (BNS 2023) MCQs for Judiciary, Page 5

Correct answer: B. The five-judge bench held death penalty is constitutionally valid as it is recognised by Articles 21 and 72 of the Constitution; the 'rarest of rare' doctrine was articulated as the guideline for its imposition; the majority held that the death penalty does not violate Article 21 as the procedure established by law (CrPC safeguards, appeals, mercy petition) is 'just, fair and reasonable'

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 898) is the constitutional foundation for the death penalty in India. The five-judge Constitutional Bench (4:1 majority, Justice Bhagwati dissenting) held: (1) The death penalty in Section 302 IPC is not unreasonable or excessive and does not violate Articles 14, 19, or 21; (2) The procedure under CrPC for trial, appeals, and mercy petition satisfies the 'procedure established by law' requirement of Article 21; (3) The sentencing discretion must be exercised considering BOTH aggravating AND mitigating circumstances; (4) The 'rarest of rare' doctrine: death should be imposed only when the alternative of life imprisonment is 'unquestionably foreclosed.' This was followed and elaborated in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1983 SC 957). Under BNS 2023, Section 4 retains death as a punishment. Section 6 BNS (commutation) allows the appropriate government to commute death to life imprisonment.

Source note: Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 898)

Correct answer: B. Trial courts must specifically and separately evaluate mitigating circumstances of the accused before imposing death penalty; mitigating circumstances include the accused's age, mental health, socioeconomic background, possibility of reform, and whether the crime was committed under duress or extreme emotional disturbance; the prosecution bears the burden of disproving mitigating factors beyond reasonable doubt

Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1) is a landmark Supreme Court judgment reforming the death sentencing procedure. The Supreme Court held that trial courts often impose death sentences retributively without properly evaluating mitigating circumstances. Key guidelines: (1) Courts must separately evaluate AGGRAVATING and MITIGATING circumstances; (2) Mitigating factors: age of accused (juvenility), mental health, socioeconomic background, lack of criminal antecedents, possibility of reform and rehabilitation, conduct in jail, whether offence was committed under duress or provocation; (3) PROSECUTION bears the burden of establishing that mitigating factors are absent or outweighed; this reversal of burden was a significant shift; (4) Courts should not impose death merely because the crime was heinous; the focus must be on the offender as well as the offence. This judgment built on Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (2009 SC) and Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra (2013 SC).

Source note: Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022 SC)

Correct answer: B. Section 8 BNS recognises: rigorous imprisonment (with hard labour), simple imprisonment (without hard labour), and imprisonment for life; community service (for specified minor offences) is also recognised under Section 4

Section 8 BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 60 IPC) deals with imprisonment. Types: (1) RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT: the offender is kept to hard labour (e.g., grinding grain, breaking stones, agricultural work in prison farm); typically imposed for serious violent offences; (2) SIMPLE IMPRISONMENT: without hard labour; typically for minor offences; (3) IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE: formerly called transportation for life under colonial IPC; now means the offender is imprisoned for the rest of their natural life unless commuted; under Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1961 SC), life imprisonment means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life; (4) COMMUNITY SERVICE (Section 4 BNS): a new punishment for specified petty offences, performed without remuneration for the benefit of the community. Section 8(5) BNS: if a person sentenced to community service defaults, the court may direct imprisonment up to the maximum prescribed for the offence.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 8

Correct answer: B. Under Section 6 BNS read with Article 72 of the Constitution, the President of India has the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or commute the death sentence; the Governor under Article 161 can commute the death sentence in cases involving State laws; the appropriate government (Central or State) also has commutation powers under Section 6 BNS

Section 6 BNS 2023 (Section 54 IPC): the appropriate government (Central Government or State Government as applicable) may commute sentences. Additionally: Article 72 of the Constitution: the PRESIDENT has the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment, or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence: (a) in cases where punishment is for offences against Union laws; (b) in cases where sentences are those of death. Article 161: the GOVERNOR has similar powers for state laws except death sentence. The advice of the Council of Ministers binds the President and Governor in exercise of these powers (Maru Ram v. Union of India, 1981 SC). In Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014 SC), the Supreme Court held that unexplained inordinate delay in execution of death sentence can be a ground for commutation to life imprisonment.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 6 / Constitution Articles 72, 161

Correct answer: B. Murder requires either intention to cause death or knowledge that the act will likely cause death; Section 106 BNS (Section 304A IPC) applies to deaths caused by rash or negligent acts falling short of culpable homicide; the accused must have done an act without proper care and caution leading to an unintended death

Cherubin Gregory v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 205) is the leading case on Section 304A IPC (now Section 106 BNS). The accused erected an electrified fence on his land. A neighbour climbed the fence and died from electrocution. The Supreme Court held: (1) Section 304A applies to rash or negligent acts causing death that do not amount to culpable homicide; (2) 'Rash act' involves a hazardous act done with conscious disregard of the risk; (3) 'Negligent act' involves an act done without exercising the degree of care that a reasonable person would exercise; (4) The accused must have caused death through an act that a reasonable person would recognise as creating a risk of harm; (5) Section 304A is not applicable where the accused intended death or had knowledge that the act was likely to cause death (those cases fall under Section 101/100 BNS). The distinction: Section 106 BNS (culpable negligence) vs Section 100/101 BNS (intentional/knowing causing of death).

Source note: Cherubin Gregory v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 205) / BNS 2023 Section 106

Correct answer: B. Solitary confinement is limited to: not more than 14 days at any one time with intervals of not less than one month between periods; cannot be ordered for the whole term of imprisonment.

Section 13 BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 73 IPC) limits solitary confinement: 'Whenever any person is convicted of an offence for which under this Sanhita the Court has power to sentence him to rigorous imprisonment, the Court may, by its sentence, order that the offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for any portion or portions of the imprisonment to which he is sentenced, not exceeding three months in the whole, according to the following scale: (a) a time not exceeding one month if the term of imprisonment shall not exceed six months; (b) a time not exceeding two months if the term shall not exceed one year; (c) a time not exceeding three months if the term shall exceed one year.' Section 14 BNS: limit on solitary confinement: 'In executing a sentence of solitary confinement, such confinement shall in no case exceed fourteen days at a time, with intervals between the periods of solitary confinement of not less than such intervals as are sufficient to prevent injury to the health of the offender.'

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 13, 14

Correct answer: B. The maximum imprisonment for fine default is limited: one-fourth of the maximum imprisonment for the offence if the offence is punishable with 3 years or more; and lesser fractions for offences with shorter maximum sentences; the imprisonment for default runs concurrently with the substantive sentence if any

Section 11 BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 64 IPC) provides for imprisonment in default of fine payment. The scale: (1) If the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or fine or imprisonment up to 10 years, fine default can result in imprisonment up to 2 years; (2) If the offence is punishable with imprisonment up to 3 years but not with fine as the only punishment, default imprisonment is up to one-fourth of the maximum; (3) If the offence is punishable only with fine not exceeding Rs. 50, default imprisonment is up to 2 months; (4) If the offence is punishable only with fine not exceeding Rs. 100, default imprisonment is up to 4 months; (5) Any other fine only offence: default imprisonment up to 6 months. Section 12 BNS: the imprisonment for fine default terminates on payment of the fine during the period. The accused does not 'purchase' freedom by serving the default imprisonment; the fine remains due unless specifically remitted.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 11

Correct answer: B. A prisoner retains fundamental rights except limits inherent in custody

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1978 SC 1675) is a landmark prisoners' rights case. The Supreme Court held: (1) A prisoner is not a non-person; he retains his fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21 subject only to the restrictions imposed by the fact of imprisonment and the legitimate needs of prison administration; (2) Courts have the power under Article 32 (habeas corpus) to investigate complaints of torture, inhuman treatment, or illegal detention within prisons; (3) The right to life and liberty (Article 21) protects prisoners from torture, unnecessary solitary confinement, and degrading treatment; (4) The concept of 'prisoner's jurisprudence' emerged from this case, establishing that the state's duty of care to prisoners is part of their constitutional rights. This judgment, along with Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979 SC) on undertrial prisoners, forms the foundation of prisoner rights jurisprudence in India.

Source note: Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1978 SC 1675)

Correct answer: B. Hurt means: whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any person; the term includes causing disease (not just physical injury) and infirmity (temporary loss of capacity).

Section 114 BNS 2023 (Section 319 IPC): 'Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.' Three categories: (1) BODILY PAIN: any physical pain caused to the body; (2) DISEASE: communicating a disease to another person (e.g., infecting someone with a communicable disease intentionally); (3) INFIRMITY: a temporary impairment of any organ's function. Notable: hurt does not require a visible injury; causing intense pain without any marks can be hurt. Section 115 BNS 2023 (Section 321 IPC): voluntarily causing hurt = intentionally or knowingly causing hurt. Section 132 BNS: punishment for voluntarily causing hurt is imprisonment up to 1 year, or fine up to Rs. 10,000, or both. Section 116 BNS 2023 (Section 320 IPC): defines grievous hurt - eight categories of injuries classified as grievous due to their severity (emasculation, permanent loss of sight, loss of hearing, loss of a member/joint, permanent disfigurement of face/head, fracture/dislocation of bone, hurt causing a 20-day danger to life or severe bodily pain).

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 114

Correct answer: B. Causing a person to suffer intense physical pain for a few hours without any lasting injury or medical consequence

Section 116 BNS 2023 (Section 320 IPC) lists eight categories of grievous hurt: (1) Emasculation; (2) Permanent privation of sight of either eye; (3) Permanent privation of hearing of either ear; (4) Privation of any member or joint; (5) Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; (6) Permanent disfiguration of the head or face; (7) Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; (8) Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. A few hours of intense pain WITHOUT any lasting injury or medical consequence (Option B) does NOT satisfy any of these eight categories. The pain must either endanger life or cause the person to be in severe pain or unable to follow their ordinary pursuits for TWENTY DAYS. Transient intense pain is mere hurt under Section 114 BNS, not grievous hurt.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 116

Correct answer: B. Any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death or any means of fire, heated substance, poison, corrosive substance, explosive, or any substance which is deleterious to the human body (e.g., acid, boiling water) when used to cause grievous hurt

Section 117 BNS 2023 (Section 326 IPC) provides enhanced punishment (up to 10 years plus fine) for voluntarily causing grievous hurt 'by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal.' The definition of 'dangerous weapon' is functional and contextual: an ordinary kitchen knife becomes a dangerous weapon when used with sufficient force to cut or stab; acid (as in acid attacks covered by Section 117(1)-(2) BNS) is inherently a dangerous substance; firearms and explosives are inherently dangerous. The Supreme Court in Mathai @ Joby v. George (2016 SC) held that whether an instrument is dangerous depends on how it is used.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 117

Correct answer: B. Wrongful restraint prevents a person from moving in a certain direction while the person can still move in other directions; wrongful confinement prevents a person from moving in any direction whatsoever, completely limiting freedom of movement

Section 127 BNS 2023 (Section 339 IPC): Wrongful restraint: 'Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.' Section 128 BNS (Section 340 IPC): Wrongful confinement: 'Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said wrongfully to confine that person.' Key distinction: RESTRAINT limits movement in ONE DIRECTION (or certain directions) while the person retains freedom to move in other directions; CONFINEMENT eliminates freedom to move in any direction beyond certain limits (a circumscribed area). Example: Blocking a person from turning left but allowing them to go straight = restraint. Locking a person in a room = confinement. Confinement is the more serious offence (Section 128 BNS: up to 1 year or fine or both; Section 130 BNS for confinement for more than 3 days: up to 3 years).

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 127, 128

Correct answer: B. Enhanced punishment under Section 130 BNS applies when wrongful confinement exceeds three days (up to 3 years imprisonment); further enhanced under Section 131 BNS when confinement exceeds ten days (up to 5 years); and also enhanced when the confinement is to extort property or force the person to commit an offence (Section 133-134 BNS)

Section 129 BNS 2023 (Section 342 IPC): basic wrongful confinement: imprisonment up to 1 year or fine up to Rs. 5,000 or both. Section 130 BNS (Section 343 IPC): confinement for more than THREE DAYS: imprisonment up to 3 years plus fine. Section 131 BNS (Section 344 IPC): confinement for more than TEN DAYS: imprisonment up to 5 years plus fine. Section 133 BNS (Section 347 IPC): wrongful confinement to EXTORT PROPERTY or force the commission of an offence: imprisonment up to 3 years plus fine. Section 134 BNS (Section 348 IPC): wrongful confinement to EXTORT a confession or to compel restoration of property: imprisonment up to 3 years plus fine. The gradation of punishment based on duration and purpose reflects the increasing harm to personal liberty caused by prolonged or purpose-driven confinement.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 129-134

Correct answer: B. Long wrongful confinement attracts enhanced punishment and possible victim compensation.

Section 131 BNS 2023 increases punishment for confinement of 10 or more days to imprisonment up to 5 years plus fine. The procedural consequence under Section 363 BNSS 2023: where a person is wrongfully confined, the Magistrate trying the case may award compensation to the wrongfully confined person from the person who wrongfully confined them. The court must be satisfied that: (1) the accused wrongfully confined the person; (2) the confinement was without legal justification. The compensation provision reflects that wrongful confinement of extended duration causes serious harm to the victim's liberty, livelihood, health, and family. Under Article 21 of the Constitution (personal liberty), unlawful detention is a fundamental rights violation for which the Supreme Court has awarded compensation through writ petitions (D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 1997 SC).

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 131 / BNSS 2023 Section 363

Correct answer: B. Where an accused intends to cause hurt to Person A but actually causes hurt or death to Person B through the same act, the accused's malice 'transfers' to the actual victim; the accused is liable for the offence committed against the actual victim as if he had intended to harm that person

In Re Thavamani (AIR 1943 Mad 571) dealt with what English law calls 'transferred malice' - the doctrine that when an accused person intends to commit a crime against Person A but accidentally commits it against Person B, the guilty intent transfers to the act actually done. The Madras High Court applied this doctrine. Under BNS/IPC, this is reflected in several provisions: Section 100 BNS Exception 1 specifically mentions causing death of a person 'other than the person who gave the provocation' by mistake or accident. The principle from R v. Latimer (1886 UK) is directly applied: if A throws a stone at B intending to hurt B, but the stone hits C and hurts C, A is guilty of voluntarily causing hurt to C. The intent transfers. This applies to hurt (Section 132 BNS), grievous hurt (Section 135 BNS), and murder (Section 100 BNS). Contrast with Palani Goundan case where the doctrine raised complex issues about the sequence of intent and actus reus.

Source note: In Re Thavamani (AIR 1943 Mad 571) / BNS 2023 Section 132

Correct answer: B. Rigorous imprisonment of not less than 10 years which may extend to life imprisonment, and fine (which shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses of the victim); the fine is payable to the victim

Section 124 BNS 2023 (Section 326A IPC, inserted after the Laxmi v. Union of India, 2014 SC direction): 'Whoever causes permanent or partial damage or deformity to, or burns or maims or disfigures or disables, any part or parts of the body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on or by administering acid to that person, or by using any other means with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause such injury or hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine: Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses of the treatment of the victim: Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim.' Section 125 BNS (Section 326B IPC): voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid: imprisonment of 5 to 7 years plus fine. Laxmi v. Union of India (2014 SC) directed regulation of sale of acid to prevent acid attacks.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 124 / Laxmi v. Union of India (2014 SC)

Correct answer: B. Force becomes criminal when it is used intentionally against a person without consent and the person intended or knows that by using force he will cause injury, fear, or annoyance to the person against whom it is used

Section 130 BNS 2023 (Section 349 IPC) defines force broadly: 'A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion or change of motion or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling.' Section 131 BNS 2023 (Section 350 IPC) defines criminal force: force is CRIMINAL when used: (1) Intentionally; (2) Without the consent of the other person; (3) Intending to cause or knowing likely to cause injury, fear, or annoyance to the person against whom it is used. Therefore: (a) pushing someone accidentally is force but not criminal force; (b) pushing someone intentionally to cause injury or annoyance is criminal force. Section 132 BNS 2023 (Section 351 IPC) defines assault: making a gesture or preparation intending or knowing that such gesture/preparation causes apprehension of criminal force.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 130, 131

Correct answer: B. Section 136 BNS specifies: physical contact with sexual overtones, demand or request for sexual favours, showing pornography against someone's will, and making sexually coloured remarks; all constitute sexual harassment

Section 136 BNS 2023 (Section 354A IPC inserted by Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013): 'A man committing any of the following acts: (i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or (ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or (iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or (iv) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.' Punishment: for acts (i), (ii), and (iii): rigorous imprisonment up to 3 years and/or fine; for act (iv): imprisonment up to 1 year and/or fine. Section 136 BNS differs from workplace sexual harassment under the Prevention, Protection and Redressal of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Act 2013 (POSH Act): Section 136 BNS is the criminal law; POSH Act creates an additional civil/administrative remedy through Internal Complaints Committee. Both may apply to the same incident. Section 75 BNS 2023 deals with assault or use of criminal force on women with intent to outrage modesty.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 136

Correct answer: B. Death penalty or imprisonment for life, and also fine; this is one of the most serious offences in the BNS with mandatory death or life imprisonment

Section 139 BNS 2023 (Section 364A IPC, inserted in 1993 responding to the rise of kidnapping for ransom cases): 'Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt...with a view to compelling the Government or any foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.' Key elements: (1) Kidnapping or abduction; (2) Threat of death or hurt; (3) Purpose of extorting ransom or compelling act by government/organisation/person. This is one of the few BNS offences where DEATH is mandated as one of the only two possible punishments (the other being life imprisonment). State v. Ravi Kumar (1986 SC) and Vadivelu v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006 SC) are important cases on Section 364A IPC.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 139

Correct answer: B. The intent must be to cause that person to be secretly and wrongfully confined; the purpose distinguishes this offence from general kidnapping

Section 141 BNS 2023 (Section 365 IPC): 'Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person with intent to cause that person to be secretly and wrongfully confined, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.' The key element is the PURPOSE: SECRET AND WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT. This makes the offence distinct from: Section 137 BNS (general kidnapping); Section 139 BNS (kidnapping for ransom where the purpose is to extort); Section 143 BNS (abduction for marriage/sexual exploitation). The 'secretly' element is important: if a person is confined in a known location and the family is aware, it may not satisfy the 'secretly' requirement. However, courts have interpreted this broadly to include any confinement that hides the person's whereabouts from those who have a right to know.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 141

Correct answer: B. The negligence must be 'culpable' in the sense of being gross, reckless, or wanton; ordinary inadvertence or momentary inattention is not enough.

SN Hussain v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1972 SC 685) is the leading case on the standard of negligence under Section 304A IPC (now Section 106 BNS). The Supreme Court held: (1) Section 304A requires CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE, not merely civil negligence; (2) Culpable negligence means 'gross, wanton, reckless negligence' showing disregard for the safety of others; (3) A momentary lapse of attention or ordinary inadvertence that any careful driver might commit does NOT satisfy Section 304A; (4) The test is whether a reasonably competent person exercising proper care would have avoided the risk; (5) Mere involvement in an accident does not prove culpable negligence. Compare: civil negligence (ordinary care standard) vs. criminal negligence (gross or wanton disregard standard). In the context of Section 106(2) BNS (hit and run), the element of fleeing without reporting adds a separate aggravating element beyond the underlying rash/negligent driving.

Source note: SN Hussain v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1972 SC 685) / BNS 2023 Section 106

Correct answer: B. Where kidnapping or abduction is committed in order to subject the person to grievous hurt, slavery, unnatural lust, or any other reason that threatens the person's life or safety, the punishment is enhanced to imprisonment up to 10 years plus fine

Section 144 BNS 2023 (Section 367 IPC): 'Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be subjected, or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subjected, to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it to be likely that such person will be so subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.' The enhanced punishment (up to 10 years vs. up to 7 years for Section 141 BNS) reflects the more serious nature of the purpose (threat to physical integrity, risk of slavery or sexual abuse). This provision is relevant in human trafficking cases where victims are abducted and subjected to forced labour or sexual exploitation. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO) 2012 and the anti-trafficking provisions under Section 143 BNS also interact with Section 144 BNS in trafficking cases involving minors.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 144

Correct answer: B. Section 124A IPC (sedition) is limited to acts or words that have a tendency or intention to incite violence or cause public disorder; mere expression of dissatisfaction, criticism of government policies, or advocacy of change through lawful means is not sedition and is protected by Article 19(1)(a)

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 955) is the foundational constitutional case on sedition. The Supreme Court, while upholding Section 124A IPC as constitutionally valid, read it down significantly: (1) The section covers only acts or words that excite or attempt to excite DISAFFECTION towards the government with a tendency to INCITE VIOLENCE or CREATE PUBLIC DISORDER; (2) Mere criticism of the government, strong language against government policies, comments on government measures, expression of disapproval, and advocacy of change are NOT sedition; (3) These activities are protected by Article 19(1)(a) (free speech) as 'reasonable restrictions' under Article 19(2) require the speech to be connected to 'public order' or 'sovereignty/integrity of India'; (4) Only speech that poses a REAL AND REASONABLY PROXIMATE connection to public disorder or violence is sedition. This reading-down principle should guide the interpretation of Section 152 BNS which replaced sedition. Vinod Dua v. Union of India (2021 SC) applied these principles to protect a journalist.

Source note: Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 955)

Correct answer: B. The public servant must be engaged in the discharge of his public functions at the time of the obstruction; the obstruction must be voluntary (intentional).

Section 195 BNS 2023 (Section 186 IPC): 'Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand five hundred rupees, or with both.' Essential elements: (1) VOLUNTARY obstruction: the act must be intentional, not accidental; (2) PUBLIC SERVANT: the obstructed person must fall within the definition of Section 2(26) BNS; (3) IN DISCHARGE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS: the public servant must be performing his official duties at the time; an off-duty public servant being obstructed does not attract Section 195 BNS. Section 195(2) BNS (NEW): assault or obstruction of a public servant when suppressing riot or dispersing unlawful assembly attracts enhanced punishment. Compare Section 191 BNS (unlawful assembly) where collectively obstructing law enforcement is a separate aggravated offence.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 195

Correct answer: B. The prosecution must prove that: the accused made or published written/spoken words or signs; these were likely to cause feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language, regional groups, castes or communities, or between persons on the ground of sex or gender identity or sexual orientation; and the act was done with intent to cause such enmity or ill-will

Section 197(1)(a) BNS 2023 (Section 153A IPC): 'Whoever: (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, or between persons on the ground of sex or gender identity or sexual orientation, or commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity; shall be punished...' Key: (1) The promotion of enmity must be on the specified grounds; (2) The act must be likely to disturb public tranquillity; (3) In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 7 SCC 431, the SC held that there must be CLEAR INTENT to promote enmity; a general statement about religious differences is not sufficient.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 197(1)(a) / Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of AP (1997 SC)