Criminal Law (BNS 2023) MCQs for Judiciary, Page 3

Correct answer: B. Cruelty includes: wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself; or harassment to coerce her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands for property; Section 85 BNS covers both physical and mental cruelty

Section 85 BNS 2023 (Section 498A IPC): 'Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.' Section 86 BNS defines cruelty as: (a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; (b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Key features: Section 85 BNS is a COGNIZABLE, NON-BAILABLE offence; a serious provision that has been subject to misuse concerns as raised in Rajesh Sharma v. State of UP (2017) 10 SCC 638 (though those guidelines were substantially modified).

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 85

Correct answer: B. The act of slapping or patting on the buttocks of a female IAS officer by a senior public servant constituted the offence of outraging the modesty of a woman; 'modesty' is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class; the offence is complete when an act is done with intent or knowledge that it will outrage the woman's modesty

Kanwar Pal Singh Gill v. State (Admin., U.T. Chandigarh) through Secy. (2005) 6 SCC 161 is the famous 'DGP Gill' case. The accused, the Director General of Police, Punjab, slapped and patted the buttocks of a woman IAS officer at a public party. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction under Section 354 IPC (now Section 74 BNS) and held: (1) 'Modesty' as used in Section 354 IPC is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class; (2) Any act which shocks the sense of decency of a woman would amount to outraging her modesty; (3) The test is not whether the woman was actually outraged but whether the accused committed the act with INTENT or KNOWLEDGE that it would outrage her modesty; (4) Position of authority provides no immunity from criminal liability. Section 74 BNS (Section 354 IPC): punishment is imprisonment of at least 1 year, extendable to 5 years, plus fine.

Source note: Kanwar Pal Singh Gill v. State (2005) 6 SCC 161 / BNS 2023 Section 74

Correct answer: B. Voyeurism means watching, or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a private act in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed either by the perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator

Section 77 BNS 2023 (Section 354C IPC inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013 after the Nirbhaya case) defines voyeurism: 'Any man who watches, or captures the image of a woman engaging in a private act in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed either by the perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator, or disseminates such image, shall be punished...' 'Private act' includes an act of watching carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy, and where the victim's genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim is doing a sexual act not of a kind ordinarily done in public. Punishment: first conviction: imprisonment of 1 to 3 years; subsequent conviction: imprisonment of 3 to 7 years. Dissemination of such images makes the offence more serious.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 77

Correct answer: B. Stalking means when a man: follows a woman and contacts or attempts to contact such woman despite a clear indication of disinterest; or monitors the use of the internet, email, or any other form of electronic communication; or any other similar conduct; the definition explicitly requires that such conduct causes fear or distress

Section 79 BNS 2023 (Section 354D IPC, inserted by Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013): 'Any man who follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman, or monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email, or any other form of electronic communication, or watches, or spies on a person in a manner that results in a fear of violence or serious alarm or distress in the mind of such woman, or interferes with her mental peace commits the offence of stalking.' Exception: stalking is NOT an offence if: (1) done in pursuance of a course of conduct prevented or authorised by a law; (2) done under legal obligations; (3) done in the course of duty to prevent or detect crime; (4) the conduct was reasonable and justified under particular circumstances. Punishment: first conviction: imprisonment of 1 to 3 years; subsequent conviction: imprisonment of 3 to 5 years.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 79

Correct answer: B. The misuse of Section 498A IPC in filing false or exaggerated complaints; the Supreme Court reviewed and modified the automatic arrest provision, directing that arrest under Section 498A should not be made immediately on filing of a complaint but should follow preliminary inquiry; however these directions were subsequently modified by later judgments

Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443 followed the controversy over the Rajesh Sharma v. State of UP (2017) 10 SCC 638 judgment which had imposed significant pre-conditions on arrest under Section 498A IPC, including forming a Family Welfare Committee in each district to examine complaints before arrest. The Supreme Court in Social Action Forum reviewed these conditions and modified them significantly, restoring the effectiveness of Section 498A while acknowledging the concern about misuse. The Court held that: (1) Section 498A cannot be diluted by judicial directions; (2) The Family Welfare Committee mechanism was inappropriate; (3) The regular arrest provisions under CrPC apply; but (4) Magistrates should apply judicial mind while authorizing detention. Under the BNSS 2023, Section 85 BNS provides the substantive offence (cruelty by husband/relatives) and procedural provisions of BNSS govern arrest.

Source note: Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India (AIR 2018 SC)

Correct answer: C. Rape committed on a woman by her live-in partner

BNS 2023 separates these enhanced-punishment categories across provisions: Section 64(2) covers aggravated rape by persons such as police officers, public servants, armed-forces members, persons in authority or trust, and other listed circumstances; Section 65 separately covers rape of women under sixteen and under twelve years of age; Section 70 covers gang rape; and Section 71 covers repeat offenders. Rape by a live-in partner (Option C) is NOT itself a specifically enumerated enhanced-punishment category. Depending on the facts, it would be prosecuted under the ordinary rape provision in Section 64 read with the definition in Section 63, or another applicable offence if the statutory ingredients are satisfied.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 64, 65, 70 and 71

Correct answer: B. First: act done with the intention of causing death; Second: act done with the intention of causing bodily injury known to be likely to cause the death of the person.

Section 100 BNS 2023 (Section 300 IPC): culpable homicide is murder if it falls under any of the four clauses: (1) CLAUSE FIRSTLY: Act done with INTENTION of causing death; (2) CLAUSE SECONDLY: Act done with intention of causing bodily injury, with KNOWLEDGE that the particular person is likely to die from that injury; (3) CLAUSE THIRDLY: Act done with intention of causing bodily injury which is SUFFICIENT IN ORDINARY COURSE of nature to cause death (objective test); (4) CLAUSE FOURTHLY: Act done with knowledge that it is SO IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS that it MUST IN ALL PROBABILITY cause death or grievous hurt likely to cause death. The distinction between murder (Section 100) and culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 101) turns on the degree of mens rea. Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465) established the test for clause Thirdly: the prosecution must prove (a) the injury was actually inflicted; (b) it was intentionally inflicted; (c) it was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 100 / Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC)

Correct answer: B. The prosecution must prove: (1) the nature of the injury was objectively 'sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death'; (2) the injury was intentionally inflicted (not accidental); (3) the accused intended to inflict that specific injury (not some other injury); (4) whether the injury was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature is an objective question for medical expert evidence; the accused's own knowledge or intention about whether the injury would cause death is irrelevant

Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465) is the most important case on Section 300 IPC Clause Thirdly (Section 100 BNS Clause 3). Justice Vivian Bose's test: (1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a particular wound is 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death'; this is a question of MEDICAL EVIDENCE, not of what the accused believed; (2) The injury must have been INTENTIONALLY INFLICTED, not accidental; (3) The accused must have intended to inflict THAT particular injury (not just some injury); (4) The fact that the injury IS sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature establishes the offence, regardless of whether the accused KNEW it was so sufficient. The word 'sufficient' means 'enough in ordinary course of events to cause death'; highly probable, not necessarily certain. This test has been applied in hundreds of subsequent cases and remains the leading authority.

Source note: Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465)

Correct answer: B. The provocation must be grave (severe enough to cause loss of self-control) and sudden (not time for cooling off); the accused must act in the heat of passion.

Section 100 BNS 2023 Exception 1 (corresponding to Section 300 IPC Exception 1): 'Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.' Key conditions: (1) GRAVE: the provocation must be serious, not trivial; a mere insult is insufficient; (2) SUDDEN: there must be no time for passion to cool; if there is a time gap, the killing is premeditated, not provoked; (3) DEPRIVED OF SELF-CONTROL: the accused must actually have lost self-control; a calculating killer who uses provocation as a pretext cannot rely on this exception; (4) Proviso: the exception does not apply where (a) the provocation is self-induced; (b) it is given by a public servant acting in good faith; (c) death is caused by the offender using the excuse of provocation. KM Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 605) is the most famous case on provocation.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 100 Exception 1 / KM Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC)

Correct answer: B. The provocation exception did not apply because there was a significant time gap between the provocation (wife's confession) and the killing; after confronting his wife, Nanavati had gone to his ship, returned home, taken his revolver, gone to Ahuja's flat, and then shot him; this time gap showed the cooling-off period and that the act was premeditated rather than impulsive; the accused was convicted of murder

KM Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 605) is India's most famous criminal trial. The Navy officer Nanavati found out his wife was having an affair with Prem Ahuja. After his wife confessed, Nanavati went to his ship, returned home, took his revolver (obtaining it on a pretext), drove to Ahuja's flat, and shot him three times. The jury initially acquitted him but the High Court reversed the verdict. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding: (1) Provocation (wife's confession) was NOT sudden at the time of the killing because there was a significant time gap during which Nanavati had time to cool down; (2) The premeditated nature of obtaining the revolver, driving to the flat, and confronting Ahuja negated the spontaneity required for the exception; (3) Adultery of wife, even if true, does not automatically provide provocation to kill the lover. This case also led to the abolition of the jury system in India.

Source note: KM Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 605)

Correct answer: B. The distinction lies in the degree of culpability: murder is culpable homicide at the highest rung of mental culpability; culpable homicide not amounting to murder occupies a lower rung.

State of Andhra Pradesh v. R. Punnayya (AIR 1977 SC 45) provided a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Sections 299 and 300 IPC (Sections 101 and 100 BNS). The Supreme Court held: (1) Culpable homicide is the genus; murder is the species; every murder is culpable homicide but not every culpable homicide is murder; (2) The distinction lies in the DEGREE OF CULPABILITY with which the killing is effected; (3) The area of culpable homicide NOT amounting to murder is a residual area between murder and accidental or negligent killing; (4) Moving from Section 299 to Section 300: the crucial difference is the level of certainty/probability of death intended or foreseen. This case is the foundation for understanding the often-confusing provisions on culpable homicide and murder. It confirmed that 'knowledge that the act is likely to cause death' (Section 299) is a weaker mental state than 'knowledge that the act is imminently dangerous and must in all probability cause death' (Section 300 Fourthly/Section 100 BNS Fourthly).

Source note: State of AP v. R. Punnayya (AIR 1977 SC 45)

Correct answer: B. It addresses rash or negligent driving causing death followed by escape or non-reporting.

Section 106 BNS 2023 (Section 304A IPC) deals with causing death by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide. Section 106(1) BNS (the general provision corresponding to Section 304A IPC): causing death by rashness or negligence, punishment up to 5 years and fine. Section 106(2) BNS is NEWLY INTRODUCED: 'Whoever causes death of any person by rash and negligent driving of vehicle not amounting to culpable homicide, and escapes without reporting it to a police officer or a Magistrate soon after the incident, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.' This was introduced in response to the growing problem of hit-and-run driving cases in India. The enhanced punishment recognises that fleeing without reporting is an aggravating factor demonstrating callous disregard for human life. Cherubin Gregory v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 205) remains the leading case on Section 304A IPC.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 106(2) (New Provision)

Correct answer: B. She was not guilty of murder or culpable homicide; her act of jumping into the well was done in a state of panic to escape the danger she apprehended.

Emperor v. Dhirajia (AIR 1940 Allahabad 486) is a nuanced case on causation and mens rea in culpable homicide. The woman was being beaten by her husband and in a state of panic jumped into a well holding her infant. The infant died. The Allahabad High Court held that she was not guilty of culpable homicide because: (1) She did not intend to kill the child; (2) She jumped in a state of terror and panic, not with any criminal intention; (3) The chain of causation required by Section 299 IPC (now Section 101 BNS) was broken by the absence of requisite mens rea; (4) The act was done in a state of fright without intention to harm. This case illustrates the importance of proving BOTH actus reus AND mens rea for culpable homicide. Compare with Gyarsibai v. The State (AIR 1953 M.B. 61) where a similar fact pattern led to a different finding based on different evidence of intent.

Source note: Emperor v. Dhirajia (AIR 1940 All 486)

Correct answer: B. The accused was guilty of murder under Clause Fourthly of Section 300 IPC: setting fire to a hut knowing a person was inside constituted an act so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death; the accused knew the act was imminently dangerous to life

Rawalpenta Venkalu v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1956 SC 171) is the classic Clause Fourthly case. The Supreme Court held: The accused set fire to a hut at night knowing his victim was inside and asleep. This clearly fell under Section 300 Clause Fourthly IPC (now Section 100 BNS Clause 4): the act was 'done with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury.' The accused knew that setting fire to a closed hut with a sleeping person inside was virtually certain to cause death. He had no justification or excuse for creating this mortal danger. Therefore he was convicted of murder, not merely culpable homicide. This case demonstrates that Clause Fourthly can apply even without direct evidence of specific intent to kill, provided the circumstances make death virtually certain.

Source note: Rawalpenta Venkalu v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1956 SC 171)

Correct answer: B. The case illustrated the 'transfer of malice' principle; the accused was not convicted of murder because he did not intend to cause death when he struck the blow (he believed she was already dead when he hanged her); he was convicted of a lesser offence for the blow and an offence for interfering with the corpse; subsequently this led to debate about multiple and severable acts

Palani Goundan v. Emperor (1919) ILR Mad 547 is a complex and famous case on causation and mens rea in homicide. The accused struck his wife on the head rendering her apparently dead. To simulate suicide, he hanged her from a tree. The wife actually died from the hanging, not the blow. The Madras High Court held: (1) When the blow was struck, the accused did not intend to kill (he intended grievous hurt, not death); (2) When he hanged her, he believed she was already dead (no intent to kill a living person); (3) Therefore there was NO meeting of actus reus and mens rea at any single moment sufficient to constitute murder or culpable homicide as to the CAUSE OF DEATH (hanging); (4) He was convicted for the lesser offence of grievous hurt and for interfering with a corpse. This case raises profound questions about causation: the accused caused death by hanging, but his mental state at that moment was about disposing of what he thought was a corpse. Later cases like In Re Thavamani (AIR 1943 Mad 571) tried to reconcile and extend this principle.

Source note: Palani Goundan v. Emperor (1919 ILR Mad 547)

Correct answer: B. Section 117(3) BNS addresses voluntarily causing grievous hurt which puts the victim in a permanent vegetative state or causes permanent disability; this is newly added in BNS and was not in the IPC

Section 117 BNS 2023 deals with grievous hurt. Section 117(1) and 117(2) correspond to Sections 326A and 326B IPC (acid attacks). Section 117(3) BNS is NEWLY INTRODUCED: it addresses the situation where an act of voluntarily causing grievous hurt results in the victim being in a PERMANENT VEGETATIVE STATE or causes PERMANENT DISABILITY. This provision fills a gap in the IPC which did not specifically address such severe outcomes of grievous hurt below the level of culpable homicide. The punishment under Section 117(3) is rigorous imprisonment not less than 10 years which may extend to life imprisonment. Section 117(4) BNS is also NEW: it addresses voluntarily causing grievous hurt on the basis of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief, or any other ground. This reflects the awareness of hate-crime motivated violence beyond identity-based mob lynching.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 117(3) and 117(4) (New Provisions)

Correct answer: B. Section 303 BNS: (1) Dishonest intention to take property; (2) Taking movable property.

Section 303 BNS 2023 (Section 378 IPC): 'Whoever intending to take dishonestly any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft.' Five essential elements: (1) DISHONEST INTENTION: intent to cause wrongful loss to the owner or wrongful gain to himself (Section 2(6) BNS); (2) MOVABLE PROPERTY: including intangible property under BNS (unlike IPC's more limited definition); (3) OUT OF ANOTHER'S POSSESSION: the property must be in someone else's possession (not necessarily ownership); (4) WITHOUT CONSENT: taking without the possessor's consent (or with consent obtained by deception); (5) MOVING THE PROPERTY: the physical act of moving is required to complete the offence. The offence is complete the moment the property is moved dishonestly. Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1963 SC 1094) held that temporary removal with dishonest intent constitutes theft; permanent deprivation is not required.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 303 / Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1963 SC)

Correct answer: B. Snatching under Section 304 BNS specifically refers to committing theft by suddenly grabbing or snatching any movable property carried or worn by a person; it is a specific sub-type of theft attracting a higher punishment than ordinary theft

Section 304 BNS 2023 is a NEW PROVISION: 'Whoever commits theft of any movable property by suddenly grabbing or snatching or forcibly taking the same from any person, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.' This was introduced to specifically address mobile phone snatching, chain snatching, and similar street crimes that have become prevalent. Under the IPC, such acts would be prosecuted as ordinary theft (Section 378 IPC) or potentially robbery (Section 390 IPC) if force was used. The BNS creates an intermediate category: snatching (without necessarily using force sufficient for robbery) attracts a higher punishment than simple theft (Section 303 BNS up to 3 years) but less than robbery (Section 309 BNS up to 10 years). The key element: the property must be 'suddenly grabbed, snatched, or forcibly taken' from a person.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 304 (New Provision)

Correct answer: B. In theft, the property is taken without the consent of the possessor; in extortion, the accused induces consent by putting a person in fear of injury.

Section 308 BNS 2023 (Section 383 IPC): 'Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits extortion.' Key elements: (1) Putting the person in FEAR OF INJURY (broadly defined to include threats to body, mind, reputation, property); (2) Fear must be INTENTIONALLY caused by the accused; (3) The fear INDUCES the person to DELIVER property; (4) DELIVERY: the victim actively delivers the property, unlike theft where the accused takes it. The critical distinction: in theft the property is taken without and against the will of the owner; in extortion the owner 'consents' (though under fear) and delivers. Section 309 BNS (robbery) involves extortion or theft with use of or threat of death or grievous hurt at the time.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 308

Correct answer: B. The essential difference is entrustment: in criminal breach of trust, the accused is initially entrusted with the property; he later dishonestly misappropriates, converts, uses, or disposes of the property in violation of that trust; in theft, the accused takes the property without initial authorised possession

Section 316 BNS 2023 (Section 405 IPC): 'Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits criminal breach of trust.' Key: (1) ENTRUSTMENT: the accused must be entrusted with property in some capacity (bailee, agent, employee, partner, director); (2) DISHONEST MISAPPROPRIATION OR CONVERSION in violation of the trust; (3) The entrustment can be for any purpose (custody, use, return) and need not be of specific property. In Jaikrishandas Manohardas Desai v. State of Bombay (AIR 1960 SC 889), the Supreme Court held that mere retention of property without accounting for it can constitute criminal breach of trust.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 316 / Jaikrishandas Manohardas Desai v. State of Bombay (AIR 1960 SC)

Correct answer: B. The accused must have made a false or misleading representation which induced the complainant to deliver property or do something he would not otherwise have done; there must be a causal connection between the deception and the delivery

Section 318 BNS 2023 (Section 415 IPC): 'Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat.' Elements: (1) DECEPTION of any person; (2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing them; (3) To deliver property OR to do something harmful; (4) The act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage. Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1954 SC 724) held: the deception must be the CAUSE of the delivery; mere false representation without inducing delivery is not cheating. The victim must actually have been deceived and the deception must have induced the act.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 318 / Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1954 SC)

Correct answer: B. Theft becomes robbery when the offender voluntarily causes or attempts to cause death, hurt, or wrongful restraint, or fear thereof, in order to commit theft, or in carrying away stolen property, or to effect his escape; extortion becomes robbery when it is committed in the presence of the person extorted with immediate fear of death, grievous hurt, or restraint

Section 310 BNS 2023 (Section 390 IPC): 'In all robbery there is either theft or extortion.' Theft becomes robbery when: (1) the offender, in order to commit theft, or after committing theft, or in carrying away property obtained by theft, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause death, hurt, wrongful restraint, or fear of death, hurt, or wrongful restraint to any person. Extortion becomes robbery when: (2) it is committed in the presence of the person extorted; and (3) the offender puts the person in fear of death, grievous hurt, or wrongful restraint, at the time of the extortion. Section 311 BNS: dacoity is when five or more persons conjointly commit robbery (robbery + the requirement of five or more persons). Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1963 SC 1094) confirmed that robbery requires a nexus between the theft/extortion and the violence: if violence is not connected to the theft, it remains a separate offence.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 310

Correct answer: B. Temporary removal of property with dishonest intention constitutes theft; the word 'dishonestly' in the definition includes temporary taking that causes wrongful loss to the owner.

Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1963 SC 1094) arose from a case where an employee temporarily removed a government file from the office to show it to someone and then returned it. The Supreme Court held: (1) The word 'dishonestly' in the definition of theft (Section 378 IPC, now Section 303 BNS) covers temporary as well as permanent taking; (2) Dishonesty requires intent to cause wrongful loss or gain; temporary removal that causes wrongful loss (even temporarily) to the owner suffices; (3) The duration of the taking is irrelevant to guilt; (4) The accused was convicted of theft. This case established the important principle that even brief, temporary removal with dishonest intent constitutes theft. It is frequently contrasted with State of Karnataka v. Basavegowda (1997) CrLJ 4386 (Kant.) which also dealt with temporary removal of property in the context of criminal misappropriation.

Source note: Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1963 SC 1094)

Correct answer: B. In criminal misappropriation (Section 314 BNS), the accused comes into lawful possession of property (without it being entrusted to him) and then dishonestly misappropriates it; in criminal breach of trust (Section 316 BNS), the property is specifically entrusted to the accused in a fiduciary or trust capacity; the key distinction is whether there was a specific relationship of trust/entrustment

Section 314 BNS 2023 (Section 403 IPC): 'Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any movable property, shall be punished...' The key distinction: Criminal MISAPPROPRIATION (Section 314) applies where: (1) property comes into the accused's hands WITHOUT a specific trust relationship (e.g., property of a deceased, mistakenly received property, found property); and (2) the accused then dishonestly converts it. Criminal BREACH OF TRUST (Section 316) applies where: (1) the property was specifically ENTRUSTED to the accused; (2) In a capacity that creates a fiduciary duty (agent, employee, director, trustee, bailee). Illustration: A finds money belonging to B. A keeps it for himself dishonestly = criminal misappropriation (Section 314). An employee given money by his employer to pay suppliers keeps it = criminal breach of trust (Section 316). In Akhil Kishore Ram v. Emperor (AIR 1938 Pat. 185), the Patna High Court elaborated this distinction.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 314, 316

Correct answer: B. Mischief requires intention to cause wrongful loss or damage to the public or any person or knowledge that the act is likely to cause such wrongful loss or damage; mere accidental damage is not mischief

Section 323 BNS 2023 (Section 425 IPC): 'Whoever with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person, causes the destruction of any property, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits mischief.' Key elements: (1) INTENT or KNOWLEDGE: (a) intention to cause wrongful loss or damage, OR (b) knowledge that the act is likely to cause wrongful loss or damage; (2) CAUSING: destruction of property OR change in property or its situation; (3) RESULT: destroying or diminishing value/utility or injuriously affecting the property. Mischief can be committed against one's OWN property: if a person destroys his own property to defraud insurers or creditors, it may constitute mischief under this section because the intent is to cause wrongful loss to the insurer/creditors. Section 324(3) BNS: mischief causing loss to government or local authority property is a newly aggravated form.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 323