Criminal Law (BNS 2023) MCQs for Judiciary, Page 7

Correct answer: B. Pending IPC investigations, trials, appeals, and revisions continue under the saving clause.

Section 358 BNS 2023 (repeal and savings): The IPC is repealed by the BNS. However, the savings clause provides: (1) All proceedings for offences COMMITTED BEFORE the BNS came into force (1st July 2024) continue to be governed by the IPC; (2) Pending trials, appeals, revisions: continue under IPC; (3) New investigations for offences committed before 1st July 2024: proceed under IPC; (4) New offences committed after 1st July 2024: governed by BNS. This bifurcation means Indian courts will be applying BOTH the BNS and the IPC simultaneously for many years until all pre-July 2024 cases are disposed of. The principle is that the law applicable at the time of the offence governs the accused's liability (against retrospective criminalisation under Article 20(1) of the Constitution). If the BNS provides a lesser punishment for the same act, the principle of lex mitior (lighter law applies) under Article 20 may require applying the BNS even to pre-1st July 2024 offences.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 358

Correct answer: B. The Explanation to Section 23 BNS provides that 'intoxication' includes intoxication caused by any intoxicating substance whether it is alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicant; the defence applies regardless of the type of intoxicant consumed

Section 23 BNS 2023 (corresponding to Section 85-86 IPC) deals with intoxication as a defence. The BNS provision clarifies: 'intoxication' covers any intoxicating substance, not just alcohol. This is important for cases involving: (1) Drug-induced states (heroin, cocaine, cannabis, prescription sedatives); (2) Involuntary drugging (someone's drink being spiked). The distinction between voluntary (Section 23) and involuntary (Section 24) intoxication is crucial. Under Section 23 BNS (voluntary intoxication): limited defence, only negating specific intent. Under Section 24 BNS (involuntary intoxication): complete defence if the person was incapable of understanding the act or knowing it was wrong. Basdev v. State of PEPSU (AIR 1956 SC 488) is the leading case on voluntary intoxication, holding that voluntary drunkenness does not excuse criminal acts; but where the offence requires specific intent, voluntary intoxication may prevent formation of that specific intent.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 23

Correct answer: B. Yes; the acquittal of B does not automatically preclude A's conviction under Section 3(5) BNS.

The general principle: under Section 34 IPC (now Section 3(5) BNS), when multiple accused are tried, the acquittal of one co-accused does not necessarily require the acquittal of others. The Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab (1963 SC) held that Section 34 IPC requires proof that each accused shared the common intention with the other(s); but the conviction of one accused under Section 34 IPC is possible even if the co-accused with whom common intention is alleged has been acquitted, PROVIDED the prosecution establishes that the convicted accused DID share common intention with AT LEAST ONE OTHER PERSON (identified or unidentified). The acquittal of a specific person for insufficient evidence does not mean the common intention did not exist. However, where the acquittal is on the merits (finding that no crime occurred), Section 34 IPC/BNS cannot be applied to the other accused.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 3(5)

Correct answer: B. Under Section 29 BNS, a judge is protected for acts done judicially or quasi-judicially in good faith; the protection does not extend to acts done outside judicial capacity, acts done with malice or in bad faith, or acts amounting to offences that are not protected by any judicial immunity (like demanding bribes)

Section 29 BNS 2023 (Section 77 IPC): 'Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.' The key word: JUDICIALLY. Protection applies to: (1) Adjudicatory acts (deciding cases, issuing judgments, orders, warrants); (2) Acts done in good faith believing there is legal power. Protection does NOT apply to: (1) Ministerial acts (administrative/clerical acts not involving judicial discretion); (2) Acts done in bad faith (corrupt judicial orders); (3) Acts completely outside jurisdiction without even a good faith belief of jurisdiction. In K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655, the Supreme Court held that judges of superior courts can be prosecuted for corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act with prior sanction from the Chief Justice of India. Section 218 BNSS requires prior sanction for prosecution of judges.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 29

Correct answer: B. Section 101 BNS (corresponding to Section 304 IPC): culpable homicide not amounting to murder is divided based on mental element: if death is caused with intention of causing death or grievous hurt, punishment is imprisonment up to life; if death is caused with knowledge that the act is likely to cause death (but without intention of causing death or grievous hurt), punishment is imprisonment up to 10 years

Section 101 BNS 2023 (Section 304 IPC) on culpable homicide not amounting to murder: Paragraph 1 (corresponding to Section 304 Part I IPC): 'If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death' + the act falls under one of the five exceptions to Section 100 BNS (murder): punishment is IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE or imprisonment up to 10 years plus fine. Paragraph 2 (corresponding to Section 304 Part II IPC): 'If the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death': punishment is imprisonment up to 10 years plus fine. The gradation: Section 100 BNS (murder) > Section 101 Para 1 BNS (culpable homicide with intention) > Section 101 Para 2 BNS (culpable homicide with knowledge only) > Section 106 BNS (death by negligence).

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 101

Correct answer: B. Yes; the BNS and UAPA can both apply to the same act of terrorism.

The relationship between BNS Section 113 and UAPA 1967: (1) BNS Section 113 creates a SUBSTANTIVE OFFENCE of terrorist act that is triable by ordinary criminal courts (Sessions Court); (2) UAPA creates both substantive offences (Sections 13, 15-18 UAPA) and SPECIAL PROCEDURE: special courts (NIA courts or designated courts), stricter bail conditions (Section 43D UAPA: no bail unless court finds reasonable grounds that accusations are prima facie untrue), longer investigation/remand period (180 days), and DEEMING provision. The same act can attract both BNS Section 113 (ordinary court trial) and UAPA (NIA/special court trial). In practice, for serious terrorism cases, the government typically invokes the UAPA for its procedural advantages. BNS Section 113 provides an alternative for smaller-scale terrorism cases or where UAPA procedures are inappropriate. In Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. State (NIA) (2019 SC), the Supreme Court discussed the strict bail standards under Section 43D UAPA.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 113 / UAPA 1967

Correct answer: B. Article 105(2) of the Constitution provides that no member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament; this immunity from prosecution for parliamentary speech is also reflected in Section 356 BNS Exception 6

Section 356 BNS 2023 Exception 6 (Section 499 IPC Exception 6): 'It is not defamation to make in good faith any report of the proceedings of a court of justice, or of the result of any such proceedings.' (This is the court proceedings exception). The immunity for parliamentary speech comes from: Article 105(2) Constitution: 'No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof.' This is an absolute privilege: even statements made maliciously or knowing them to be false attract immunity if made in Parliament. Section 194 and 361A-C of the Representation of People Act also protect reports of legislative proceedings. The privilege exists to ensure complete freedom of speech in Parliament without fear of legal consequences, enabling frank and fearless debate. In P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) (1998 SC), the Supreme Court held that Article 105(2) immunity extends to voting by MPs but was controversially held not to cover bribery to vote.

Source note: Constitution Article 105(2) / BNS 2023 Section 356

Correct answer: B. Dacoity is robbery committed by five or more persons conjointly; when five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit robbery, all persons are guilty of dacoity, including those who merely assisted or were part of the group even if they did not directly commit the robbery

Section 311 BNS 2023 (Section 391 IPC): 'When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding is said to commit dacoity.' Key elements: (1) FIVE OR MORE PERSONS: the minimum threshold distinguishes dacoity from robbery; (2) CONJOINTLY: acting together with a common purpose; (3) Includes persons present and AIDING even if they are not directly committing the robbery. Punishment for dacoity (Section 312 BNS, Section 395 IPC): imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment up to 10 years plus fine. Section 314 BNS (Section 396 IPC): dacoity with murder: death or imprisonment for life, with fine. Section 315 BNS (Section 397 IPC): robbery or dacoity with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt: minimum 7 years rigorous imprisonment.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 311, 312

Correct answer: B. Whoever at any time after the passing of this Act shall belong to any gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment up to 7 years, and shall also be liable to fine; membership of the gang is sufficient even without proof of participation in any specific dacoity

Section 316 BNS 2023 (Section 401 IPC): 'Whoever, at any time after the passing of this Act, shall belong to any gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.' This is a membership offence: the prosecution need NOT prove the accused participated in any specific dacoity. Proof of membership in the gang is sufficient for conviction. This is analogous to anti-organised crime provisions like the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA) and the Gujarat Control of Organised Crime Act. The provision serves as a preventive/deterrent measure against organised robber gangs. In State of Rajasthan v. Ram Shrink Meena (1981), the Supreme Court discussed the elements of Section 401 IPC and held that 'belonging to a gang' can be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 316

Correct answer: B. Criminal trespass requires either: (1) entry with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult, or annoy the occupant; or (2) lawful entry followed by staying with the intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult, or annoy the occupant; the criminal intent distinguishes it from civil trespass which is mere entry without permission

Section 329 BNS 2023 (Section 441 IPC): 'Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains therein with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit criminal trespass.' Essential: (1) Entry (or remaining) on property in another's possession; (2) WITHOUT PERMISSION; (3) WITH CRIMINAL INTENT: intent to commit an offence OR to intimidate, insult, or annoy the occupant. Civil trespass: mere entry without permission (no criminal intent required). The 'intimidate, insult or annoy' limb is broad: even an ex-boyfriend repeatedly entering an ex-girlfriend's property to 'annoy' her could be criminal trespass. Section 330 BNS (Section 442 IPC): house trespass = criminal trespass in a building used as a human dwelling, for worship, or as a place for custody of property.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 329

Correct answer: B. Section 331 BNS specifies six ways in which a person commits house-breaking: entering through means of breaking into or through any wall or building; through a passage made by the trespasser; by opening any lock; by using a false key or counterfeit key; by gaining entry through any passage not intended for human entry; and by entry from one part of a building to another not meant as a passage, by breaking down any wall

Section 331 BNS 2023 (Section 445 IPC) specifies 6 ways to commit house-breaking: 'A person is said to commit house-breaking who commits house-trespass if he effects his entrance into the house or any part of it in any of the six ways hereinafter described; or if, being in the house or any part of it for the purpose of committing an offence, or having committed an offence therein, he quits the house in any of such six ways, that is to say: First - If he enters or quits through a passage made by himself or by any abettor; Secondly - If he enters or quits through any passage not intended by any person...to be used as a human passage, or through a natural opening not intended to be used; Thirdly - If he enters or quits through any passage which he opens; Fourthly - If he enters or quits through any passage by opening a lock; Fifthly - If he effects his entrance or departure by scaling or climbing over any wall or building; Sixthly - If he enters or quits through any passage by breaking open any outer or inner door or window of a building.' Section 331 BNS: punishment for house-breaking up to 2 years or fine or both.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 331

Correct answer: B. 7 years rigorous imprisonment; this mandatory minimum represents one of the few cases in the original IPC (and now BNS) where a specific minimum was fixed

Section 313 BNS 2023 (Section 397 IPC): 'If, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years.' This provision fixes a MANDATORY MINIMUM of 7 years rigorous imprisonment when deadly weapons are used or grievous hurt is caused during robbery or dacoity. Section 315 BNS (Section 399 IPC): preparation for dacoity: imprisonment up to 10 years plus fine. The mandatory minimum under Section 313 BNS ensures that armed robbery and dacoity with violence are dealt with severely by courts, preventing disproportionately lenient sentences. Courts cannot impose a sentence below 7 years for this offence, though they retain discretion to impose up to 10 years (for robbery) or life (for dacoity with murder).

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 313

Correct answer: B. Imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment up to 10 years and fine; the punishment for the aggravated trespass is less than for the underlying offence but is still very severe

Section 333 BNS 2023 (Section 449 IPC): 'Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any offence punishable with death, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.' The graduated punishment scale for house-trespass under BNS: (1) Simple house-trespass to commit an offence: Section 330 BNS, up to 2 years; (2) House-trespass to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment: Section 332 BNS, same as the punishment for the offence; (3) House-trespass to commit an offence punishable with death: Section 333 BNS, up to life imprisonment; (4) House-breaking at night: Section 334 BNS (Section 456 IPC), up to 3 years; (5) House-breaking at night after previous conviction: Section 335 BNS (Section 457 IPC), up to 14 years. This gradation ensures that the severity of punishment is proportionate to the seriousness of the intended offence.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 333

Correct answer: B. Section 195 BNS punishes private persons who obstruct public servants; Section 199 BNS punishes the public servant himself who knowingly disobeys a direction of law with the intent to cause injury to any person

Section 199 BNS 2023 (Section 166 IPC): 'Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will by such disobedience cause injury to any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.' Key: (1) ACCUSED IS A PUBLIC SERVANT; (2) KNOWINGLY DISOBEYING a direction of law regarding his conduct as public servant; (3) WITH INTENT or KNOWLEDGE of likely injury to a person. This is specifically directed at public servants who abuse or misuse their position. Example: a police officer who knowingly detains someone beyond the permissible 24-hour period without producing before a magistrate is guilty under Section 199 BNS. This intersects with D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997 SC) which laid down guidelines against illegal detention and police brutality.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 199

Correct answer: B. Both sections punish non-cooperation with public servants engaged in lawful investigation or other official duties; Section 213 BNS punishes deliberate omission to produce documents when legally required; Section 217 BNS punishes refusal to answer lawful questions by public servants with authority to require the information

Section 213 BNS 2023 (Section 175 IPC): 'Whoever, being legally bound to produce or deliver up any document or electronic record to any public servant, as such, intentionally omits so to produce or deliver up the same, shall be punished...' Section 217 BNS (Section 179 IPC): 'Whoever, being legally bound to state the truth on any subject to any public servant, refuses to answer any question demanded of him touching that subject by such public servant in the exercise of the legal powers of such public servant, shall be punished...' The common thread: both punish deliberate obstruction of lawful official functions by non-cooperation rather than by active physical obstruction. The right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution (no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself) limits the operation of Section 217 BNS: a person who has been accused of an offence cannot be penalised for refusing to answer questions that would tend to incriminate him.

Source note: BNS 2023 Sections 213, 217

Correct answer: B. Section 218 BNS was specifically targeted at protecting victims of sexual offences, acid attacks, and related offences against women; it penalises public servants who knowingly disobey provisions of law regulating investigation of such offences or fail to record an FIR in cognizable cases

Section 218 BNS 2023 (Section 166A IPC): 'Whoever, being a public servant: (a) fails to record any information given to him under sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in relation to cognizable offences punishable under Section 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 124 of this Sanhita shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.' This provision was introduced post the Nirbhaya case to ensure police record FIRs for sexual offences. Punishment (minimum 6 months rigorous imprisonment) serves as a deterrent against police reluctance to register rape and other sexual offence complaints. The Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of UP (2014 SC) judgment also mandated mandatory FIR registration for cognizable offences.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 218

Correct answer: B. The accused must have given information to a public servant: (1) which is false and which the accused knew or believed to be false or didn't believe to be true; (2) with intent to cause the public servant to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person; or (3) with intent to cause a public servant to do an act which the public servant ought not to do if the true state of facts was known to him

Section 224 BNS 2023 (Section 182 IPC): 'Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant: (a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known to him; or (b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.' Section 224 BNS is commonly used for: false police complaints against rivals; false complaints to tax authorities; false information to regulatory bodies. It is related to but distinct from Section 243 BNS (false charge of an offence with intent to injure) which specifically targets false criminal accusations.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 224

Correct answer: B. Section 204 BNS (corresponding to Section 169 IPC) specifically prohibits public servants from purchasing or bidding for property that they are legally prohibited from purchasing; this applies to judges at court auctions, government valuers acquiring the property they valued, and other public servants with official interest in the property

Section 204 BNS 2023 (Section 169 IPC): 'Whoever, being a public servant, and being legally bound as such public servant not to purchase or bid for certain property, purchases or bids for that property, either in his own name or in the name of another, or jointly, or in shares with others, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and the property, if purchased, shall be confiscated.' Read together: Section 202 BNS (public servant engaging in trade when prohibited): community service, as discussed; Section 204 BNS (public servant bidding at auctions when prohibited): imprisonment up to 2 years OR fine, PLUS confiscation of property if purchased. The confiscation provision ensures the illegal purchase cannot be retained. This prevents conflicts of interest where a public servant uses official position to acquire property at advantageous prices.

Source note: BNS 2023 Section 204

Correct answer: B. The Supreme Court held that the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 is not a formal technicality; courts have a constitutional obligation to ensure that the enforcement of penal law does not become an instrument of oppression and denial of personal liberty; bail should not be denied as a matter of course in cases where it is warranted

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra (2020) 14 SCC 12 involved the arrest of journalist Arnab Goswami for alleged abetment of suicide. The Supreme Court, while granting bail, made important observations: (1) The guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 is 'a living ideal' not to be treated as a 'dead letter'; (2) Courts should exercise their powers to grant bail with awareness that the accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence until proved guilty; (3) Bail should not be refused as a tool of punishment before conviction; (4) While the gravity of the offence is relevant, the court must balance it against the right to personal liberty; (5) High Courts should not be reluctant to grant bail where the grounds for denial do not meet the required standard. This judgment builds on the foundation laid in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979 SC) which held that undertrial imprisonment violates Article 21 when it exceeds what would be the sentence if convicted.

Source note: Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra (2020 SC)

Correct answer: B. The court held that Section 377 IPC violated the constitutional guarantees of dignity, privacy (Article 21), equality (Article 14), non-discrimination (Article 15), and freedom of expression (Article 19); the nine-judge bench decision in K.S.

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 overruled Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014 SC) which had reinstated Section 377 IPC. The five-judge Constitutional Bench held: (1) Section 377 IPC as applied to consensual same-sex adults violates Article 21 (right to dignity and privacy per Puttaswamy, 2017); (2) It violates Article 14 (arbitrary, no intelligible differentia between consensual and non-consensual acts); (3) It violates Article 15 (discrimination on the basis of sex which includes sexual orientation per NALSA v. UOI, 2014); (4) It violates Article 19 (expression of one's identity). As a result, Section 377 IPC was read down to apply only to non-consensual acts (which are already covered by other BNS provisions). The BNS 2023 then deleted Section 377 IPC entirely. Consensual same-sex acts between adults are now legal; non-consensual acts are covered by Section 63 BNS (rape, limited to women) and other relevant provisions.

Source note: Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1

Correct answer: B. The exception violated Article 21 (right to dignity and bodily autonomy of a minor girl), Article 14 (discriminatory and unreasonable classification between minor girls who are married and those who are not), and Article 15 (discrimination on the ground of sex); it also conflicted with POCSO Act 2012 which treats any sexual act with a child below 18 as an offence regardless of marital status

Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 800 had two judges writing concurrent opinions. Justice Madan B. Lokur: (1) The exception violates Article 21 as it strips the minor wife of the right to say 'no' to sexual intercourse with her husband; (2) It violates Article 14 as there is no reasonable basis to distinguish between married and unmarried minor girls for the purposes of rape law; (3) It violates Article 15 as it discriminates on the basis of sex; (4) It conflicts with POCSO Act 2012 which contains no marital exception for children. The court held that Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC (as applicable to girls aged 15-17) was unconstitutional and read it as 18 years. The BNS 2023 incorporated this holding in Section 63 Exception 2 which now reads 'wife not being under eighteen years of age.' The issue of adult marital rape remains unresolved constitutionally, with a Special Bench of the Delhi High Court having given split opinions in RIT Foundation v. Union of India (2022 HC).

Source note: Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 800

Correct answer: B. Section 497 IPC violated Articles 14, 15, and 21: it was a remnant of Victorian morality that treated women as the property of their husbands; it denied women agency and dignity.

Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 was decided by a five-judge Constitutional Bench overruling three earlier decisions that had upheld Section 497 IPC. The court held: (1) Section 497 IPC violated Article 14 as it treated women differently (only the man could be prosecuted, not the woman who had the affair); (2) It violated Article 15 as it discriminated on the basis of sex; (3) It violated Article 21 as it denied married women autonomy and treated them as their husband's property ('chattels'); (4) Sexual autonomy is part of the right to privacy under Article 21 per Puttaswamy (2017); (5) A consensual intimate relationship between adults, even extramarital, cannot be criminalised. The Court held that adultery may be a ground for divorce (civil wrong) but cannot be a criminal offence. Section 497 IPC was deleted in BNS 2023. The broader principle from this judgment (sexual autonomy as a fundamental right) has implications for other criminal law provisions and ongoing challenges.

Source note: Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39

Correct answer: B. The Supreme Court held that registration of FIR under Section 154 CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS) is mandatory if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence; no preliminary inquiry is permissible before registration when a cognizable offence is clearly made out; failure to register the FIR would make the police officer liable under Section 166A IPC (now Section 218 BNS)

Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1 (Five-judge Constitution Bench) settled a long-standing controversy: (1) Registration of FIR is MANDATORY when information discloses a cognizable offence; police cannot conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR in such cases; (2) If the information does not clearly disclose a cognizable offence, a preliminary inquiry is permissible to determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed; (3) The scope of preliminary inquiry is LIMITED to determining if a cognizable offence is disclosed, NOT to verify the truthfulness of the complaint; (4) Preliminary inquiry may be conducted in specific categories: matrimonial disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence, corruption cases; (5) Non-registration renders the police officer liable under Section 166A IPC. Under Section 173 BNSS 2023, the duty to register is maintained and even expanded (e-FIR, zero FIR). Failure to register attracts Section 218 BNS (rigorous imprisonment 6 months to 2 years).

Source note: Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP (2014) 2 SCC 1

Correct answer: B. The arresting officer must prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest, attested by a family member or a witness; the arrestee must be informed of his right to have someone informed of his arrest; the arrestee must be produced before the magistrate within 24 hours; a custody form must be maintained in the police station

D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1997 SC 610) is the foundational case on police accountability during arrest and detention. The Supreme Court laid down 11 guidelines (later incorporated into Section 41B CrPC and now Section 47 BNSS 2023): (1) Arrest memo at time of arrest, attested by witness; (2) Arrestee's right to inform a friend/relative of arrest; (3) Arrestee to be produced before magistrate within 24 hours; (4) Right of the arrested person to consult a lawyer of his choice; (5) Medical examination of the arrested person; (6) Custody form maintained in police station; (7) Identification of all arresting officers through name plates; (8) No arrest without reasonable cause. Violation of these guidelines entitles the arrested person to compensation from the state. The guidelines are now part of BNSS provisions and the failure of police to follow them is actionable under Section 199 BNS (public servant disobeying law). Article 22 of the Constitution provides constitutional backing for rights during arrest and detention.

Source note: D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1997 SC 610)

Correct answer: B. The right to speedy trial as a fundamental right under Article 21 was articulated for the first time; prolonged detention of undertrial prisoners beyond what would be the sentence if convicted is a violation of Article 21; the right to legal aid for accused persons who cannot afford lawyers was also recognised as part of the right to fair trial under Article 21

Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) 3 SCC 1 is a landmark public interest litigation about the conditions of undertrial prisoners in Bihar jails. Justice P.N. Bhagwati held: (1) RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL is a fundamental right under Article 21; it is part of the right to life and personal liberty; (2) Undertrial prisoners who have been in jail for periods longer than what they would have been sentenced to if convicted must be released; (3) RIGHT TO LEGAL AID: Article 39A mandates free legal aid for those who cannot afford it; this flows from Article 21 as a right to fair hearing; (4) The state must provide free legal services to accused persons; (5) The government has a duty to expedite criminal justice proceedings. Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 implements these directions. Under BNSS 2023, the importance of speedy trial is reflected in provisions for time-bound investigation, trial, and disposal of cases.

Source note: Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) 3 SCC 1