Family Law MCQs for Judiciary, Page 9

Correct answer: B. Any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms including Virashaiva, Lingayat, Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj, or by birth to Hindu parents, or who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew; Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs are also included

Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 applies to: (a) any person who is Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments including Virashaiva, Lingayat, Brahmo, Prarthana, and Arya Samaj; (b) any person who is Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh by religion; (c) any person domiciled in India who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew. The residuary definition (not Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew) is important: it brings within the Act anyone of uncertain religion who cannot be identified as a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew. The Supreme Court in Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah (AIR 2001 SC 938) held that an tribal woman who did not profess any specific religion was not a Hindu under Section 2 as she could not be brought within the residuary clause.

Source note: Section 2, Hindu Marriage Act 1955; Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah AIR 2001 SC 938

Correct answer: C. The parties must belong to the same gotra

Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 prescribes conditions for a valid Hindu marriage: (a) no living spouse; (b) neither party is unsound mind; (c) bridegroom must be 21 and bride 18 years; (d) parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless custom permits; (e) parties are not sapindas unless custom permits. There is NO requirement that parties must belong to the same gotra. The HMA 1955 specifically abolished the gotra restriction: same gotra marriages are valid. The requirement of same gotra would be antithetical to the progressive intent of the codified Hindu law.

Source note: Section 5, Hindu Marriage Act 1955

Correct answer: B. The customary rites and ceremonies of either party; where these include the Saptapadi the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken

Section 7 HMA 1955 provides that a Hindu marriage may be solemnised in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party to the marriage. Where such rites include the Saptapadi (the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and bride jointly before the sacred fire) the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken. This recognises the enormous diversity of Hindu marriage ceremonies across regions and communities while identifying the Saptapadi as the pivotal moment for marriages where it is performed. The Supreme Court has held that ceremonies required by Section 7 must actually be performed; a mere registration is not solemnisation.

Source note: Section 7, Hindu Marriage Act 1955

Correct answer: B. Bigamy (living spouse at time of marriage), prohibited degrees of relationship, and sapinda relationship; a void marriage is a nullity and neither party acquires any matrimonial rights from it

Section 11 HMA declares a marriage void if it contravenes Section 5 clauses: (i) bigamy (living spouse at time of marriage, Section 5(i)); (iv) prohibited degrees of relationship (Section 5(iv)); (v) sapinda relationship (Section 5(v)). A void marriage is a complete nullity from the very beginning; no decree is needed to declare it void (though parties may seek a declaratory decree for convenience). In Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 SC 1564) the Supreme Court held that a bigamous marriage performed without the essential ceremonies of Section 7 was void from inception.

Source note: Sections 5 and 11, Hindu Marriage Act 1955

Correct answer: B. Impotency of the respondent; mental disorder (not soundness of mind).

Section 12 HMA 1955 makes a marriage voidable (not void) on specific grounds: (a) impotency of the respondent at the time of marriage and continuing at the time of filing the petition; (b) mental disorder of a specified kind; (c) consent of petitioner obtained by force or fraud; (d) respondent was pregnant by another person at the time of marriage (without petitioner's knowledge). A voidable marriage is valid until a decree of nullity is obtained. The petitioner can also ratify the marriage by continuing to cohabit. This distinction from void marriage is crucial.

Source note: Section 12, Hindu Marriage Act 1955

Correct answer: B. Either the husband or wife withdraws from the society of the other without reasonable excuse; the court may decree restitution directing the defaulting party to resume cohabitation.

Section 9 HMA 1955 provides that where either the husband or wife has withdrawn from the society of the other without reasonable excuse, the aggrieved party may apply for restitution of conjugal rights. The court shall decree restitution if satisfied that there is no legal ground for refusal. In Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar (AIR 1984 SC 1562) the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 9 and held it was not violative of Article 21. The earlier Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah which had struck it down was overruled. The respondent's reasonable excuse for withdrawal is a complete defence.

Source note: Section 9, Hindu Marriage Act 1955; Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar AIR 1984 SC 1562

Correct answer: B. Any conduct (physical or mental) by the respondent that makes it impossible for the petitioner to reasonably be expected to live with the respondent; it includes persistent verbal abuse, mental cruelty, false allegations, and oppressive conduct affecting the petitioner's health or mental well-being

The Supreme Court in N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (AIR 1975 SC 1534) held that cruelty need not be of a degree to create reasonable apprehension of physical danger; it includes conduct that causes reasonable apprehension in the petitioner's mind that cohabitation will be harmful or injurious to him/her. Mental cruelty includes false allegations, persistent humiliation, and behaviour making it impossible to reasonably live together. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) the Supreme Court laid down comprehensive categories of mental cruelty. Physical violence is only one form of cruelty; the concept encompasses all conduct that makes conjugal life insupportable.

Source note: Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act 1955; N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane AIR 1975 SC 1534; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007)

Correct answer: B. Actual breaking off of cohabitation combined with the animus deserendi (intention to desert permanently) for a continuous period of not less than 2 years immediately before presentation of the petition; constructive desertion (forcing the other out) is also recognised

Desertion as a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ib) HMA requires two essential elements: (1) actual factum of separation; (2) animus deserendi (intention to desert permanently). Both must coexist throughout the period of 2 years. In Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati (AIR 1957 SC 176) the Supreme Court held that desertion is the abandonment of one party by the other without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other. Constructive desertion, where one spouse's conduct compels the other to leave, was also recognised. Desertion period is counted immediately before the petition is filed.

Source note: Section 13(1)(ib), Hindu Marriage Act 1955; Bipinchandra v. Prabhavati AIR 1957 SC 176

Correct answer: B. A joint petition after living separately for 1 year or more; a minimum waiting period of 6 months after the first motion before the second motion (waivable by the Supreme Court under Article 142 in exceptional cases); parties must agree on all ancillary matters

Section 13B HMA 1955 provides for divorce by mutual consent: both parties must have been living separately for at least 1 year. The first motion is jointly presented; thereafter a minimum of 6 months but not more than 18 months must elapse before the second motion for the divorce decree. In Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) the Supreme Court held that the 6-month cooling-off period is not mandatory in all cases and can be waived by the court under Article 142 where the marriage has irretrievably broken down. In Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1991) the Supreme Court held that the consent for mutual consent divorce must subsist until the second motion.

Source note: Section 13B, Hindu Marriage Act 1955; Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017); Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1991)

Correct answer: B. Either the wife or the husband if they have no independent income sufficient for their support and the necessary expenses of the proceedings; the court must look at the income of both parties to fix a reasonable amount

Section 24 HMA 1955 is gender-neutral: it allows either the wife or the husband who has no independent income sufficient for support and the expenses of the proceedings to claim maintenance pendente lite from the other. The court considers: income of the claimant, income of the other party, and the standard of living. In Amar Kanta Sen v. Sovana Sen (AIR 1960 Cal 438) the Calcutta High Court held that the wife's income must be insufficient; if she has sufficient income, Section 24 maintenance will not be awarded. Section 24 applies in all proceedings under the HMA - divorce, nullity, restitution, and judicial separation.

Source note: Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act 1955

Correct answer: B. By birth, as a coparcener in the same manner as a son; the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v.

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 amended Section 6 to give daughters equal coparcenary rights by birth. In the landmark decision of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) 9 SCC 1, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court resolved conflicting precedents and held: (1) the daughter becomes a coparcener by birth irrespective of whether she was born before or after the 2005 amendment; (2) the father coparcener must have been alive on 9 September 2005 (the date the amendment came into force) for the daughter to get coparcenary rights if the father had already died. This resolved the controversy created by Prakash v. Phulavati (2015) and Danamma v. Amar (2018).

Source note: Section 6, Hindu Succession Act 1956 (as amended 2005); Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) 9 SCC 1

Correct answer: B. Class I heirs simultaneously (widow, sons, daughters, mother, children of predeceased sons and daughters); if there are no Class I heirs then on Class II heirs.

Section 8 HSA 1956 establishes the order of succession for a Hindu male dying intestate: first, Class I heirs listed in the Schedule all take simultaneously; if no Class I heir then Class II heirs in prescribed order; if no Class II heir then agnates; if no agnates then cognates. Class I heirs include: widow, son, daughter, mother, son of predeceased son, daughter of predeceased son, son of predeceased daughter, daughter of predeceased daughter, widow of predeceased son, son of predeceased son of predeceased son, daughter of predeceased son of predeceased son, widow of predeceased son of predeceased son. All Class I heirs take simultaneously and simultaneously to the exclusion of all other heirs.

Source note: Section 8 and Schedule, Hindu Succession Act 1956

Correct answer: B. Sons and daughters (including children of predeceased children) first; then husband.

Section 15 HSA 1956 prescribes a special order of succession for property of a Hindu female dying intestate: (a) sons, daughters, and children of predeceased children; (b) husband; (c) heirs of the husband; (d) mother and father; (e) heirs of the father. Section 16 provides rules of distribution within each class. Section 15(2) creates an important exception: property inherited from the female's father or mother devolves on the father's heirs (not the husband's family), and property inherited from husband or father-in-law devolves on husband's heirs, preventing property from passing to a family that did not originally own it.

Source note: Section 15, Hindu Succession Act 1956

Correct answer: B. The Act overrides any text, rule, or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of Hindu law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act; in cases of intestate succession among Hindus governed by the Act the rules in the Act apply exclusively

Section 4 HSA 1956 gives the Act an overriding effect over previous Hindu law (both textual and customary) in matters of intestate succession. This was a significant codification: the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools had different succession rules, and customary practices varied enormously across communities. Section 4 abolished these differences for matters covered by the Act. However, Section 5 contains exceptions where the Act does not apply, including property governed by special laws. The overriding effect ensures uniform succession rules for all Hindus within the Act's scope.

Source note: Section 4, Hindu Succession Act 1956

Correct answer: B. He is of sound mind and not a minor; if he has a wife living, he cannot adopt except with her consent (unless wife is of unsound mind, has renounced the world, or has ceased to be a Hindu); where there are more than one wife all wives must consent

Section 7 HAMA 1956 provides that a Hindu male of sound mind and not a minor has the capacity to take a child in adoption. However if he has a wife living his capacity to adopt is subject to her consent. The consent of every wife is necessary. The proviso allows adoption without wife's consent if the wife: (a) is of unsound mind; (b) has completely and finally renounced the world; or (c) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion. In Manju Sharma v. Vipin (2019) the Delhi High Court held that failure to obtain wife's consent makes the adoption voidable not void.

Source note: Section 7, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956

Correct answer: B. The adopter must not have a living Hindu son, son's son, or son's son's son (whether by natural birth or by adoption); this applies symmetrically for adoption of a daughter

Section 11(i) HAMA 1956 provides that a male child shall not be adopted if the adopter already has a Hindu son (including adopted son), son's son, or son's son's son living at the time of adoption. Section 11(ii) similarly prohibits adoption of a female child if the adopter has a Hindu daughter living. These conditions prevent multiple adoptions of the same gender in one family. Section 11(iii) prohibits adoption by a man of a female child and by a woman of a male child unless the difference in age between the adopter and the adopted is at least 21 years.

Source note: Section 11, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956

Correct answer: B. She has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion, or is unchaste, or living in adultery; she also loses the right if she lives separately from the husband without reasonable cause but this right can be restored on resumption of cohabitation

Section 18 HAMA 1956 provides that a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime. Section 18(3) provides that she forfeits the right to maintenance if she: (a) is unchaste; or (b) ceases to be a Hindu by voluntarily converting to another religion. She is also not entitled to separate maintenance if she lives apart from the husband without sufficient cause or against his will except where the husband has another wife living, keeps a concubine, or is guilty of cruelty. The loss is not permanent: restoration of conjugal rights restores the maintenance right.

Source note: Section 18, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956

Correct answer: B. For a boy or unmarried girl: the father, and after the father, the mother; for an illegitimate boy or girl: the mother, and after the mother, the father.

Section 6 HMGA 1956 provides: (a) for a legitimate boy or unmarried girl, father is the first natural guardian, then the mother; (b) for an illegitimate boy or girl, the mother is the first natural guardian, then the father; (c) for a married girl, the husband. However, Section 6 proviso provides that the custody of a minor below 5 years shall ordinarily be with the mother. In Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228, the Supreme Court read Section 6(a) harmoniously with Article 21 and held that 'after the father' in Section 6(a) does not mean only after the father's death; the mother can act as guardian in his absence or incapacity.

Source note: Section 6, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956; Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228

Correct answer: B. Under Mitakshara, a coparcener acquires interest in coparcenary property by birth (jus accrescendi); under Dayabhaga, no interest vests by birth and property passes only on death of the ancestor (no survivorship, only inheritance)

The fundamental distinction between Mitakshara and Dayabhaga coparcenary is the basis of coparcenary interest. Under Mitakshara (applicable in all of India except Bengal and Assam), a coparcener acquires an interest in joint property by birth (jus accrescendi - right of survivorship); the interest fluctuates with births and deaths. Under Dayabhaga (applicable in Bengal and Assam), there is no interest by birth; the son acquires interest only on the death of the father. Under Dayabhaga there is no right of survivorship; shares are fixed and descendants only inherit, not survive. These differences significantly affect partition rights and the nature of the coparcener's interest.

Source note: Classical Hindu Law; Moro Vishwanath v. Ganesh Vithal (1873)

Correct answer: B. Three purposes only: (1) legal necessity (apatkale); (2) benefit of the estate (kutumbarthe).

The Karta of a Hindu joint family has restricted alienation powers. The Privy Council in Hunoomanprasad Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856) laid down that the Karta can alienate joint family property only for: (1) legal necessity (apatkale) - debt, illness, education, marriage; (2) benefit of the estate (kutumbarthe) - improvement of property, paying off pressing debts; (3) acts of religious duty that the family is bound to perform. Any alienation beyond these purposes is voidable (not void) and can be set aside by a coparcener except against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

Source note: Hunoomanprasad Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856) 6 Moore IA 393

Correct answer: B. The joint status is severed; each coparcener gets a defined share and ceases to hold property as a co-owner.

Partition under Hindu law can take two forms: (1) partition by metes and bounds - actual physical division of property; (2) partition by separation of share - a coparcener can declare that he is separating without demanding physical division, which converts his undivided interest into a definite share. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen (AIR 1986 SC 1753) held that a son can validly partition his share. Post-2005 amendment daughters can also demand partition as coparceners. A partial partition (of some property or between some members) is also valid under Section 30 of the HSA 1956.

Source note: Hindu Law on Partition; Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen AIR 1986 SC 1753

Correct answer: B. When a coparcener voluntarily throws his separate property into the common stock of the joint family with the intention of abandoning his separate ownership, the property loses its separate character and becomes joint family property

The doctrine of blending in Hindu law operates when a coparcener voluntarily and with the intention of abandoning separate ownership throws his separate property into the joint family stock. Once thrown in, the property loses its separate character and becomes joint family (coparcenary) property subject to the rights of all coparceners. The intention to blend must be established; a mere deposit or temporary use of separate funds for family purposes does not constitute blending. The doctrine is distinct from accretion (property acquired with the aid of joint family property) and detriment (property acquired at the expense of joint family property).

Source note: Classical Hindu Law; Singhal Family Law II

Correct answer: B. Her property was a 'limited estate' or 'widow's estate' (stridhan) - she could use it but could not alienate without legal necessity; at her death it passed to the last full owner's heirs, not her own heirs; Section 14 converted this limited estate into absolute ownership

Before the HSA 1956, a Hindu female's property was typically a 'limited estate': she could use it but not alienate except for legal necessity; at her death it passed to the reversioners (heirs of the last male full owner), not her own heirs. Section 14 HSA 1956 converted this limited estate into absolute ownership. In Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva (AIR 1959 SC 577) the Supreme Court gave Section 14 a wide interpretation: any property possessed by a Hindu female by inheritance, gift, before her own labour, or purchase is covered.

Source note: Section 14, Hindu Succession Act 1956

Correct answer: B. The couple must hold themselves out to society as husband and wife; they must be of legal age to marry.

In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469 the Supreme Court defined the conditions for a 'relationship in the nature of marriage' under the DV Act: (1) the couple must hold themselves out as husband and wife to the public; (2) both must be of legal age to marry; (3) they must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage (including not being already married to a third person); (4) they must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period. A keep or concubine relationship does not qualify.

Source note: D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469

Correct answer: B. Optional as prescribed by the State Government; non-registration does not affect the validity of the marriage.

Section 8 HMA 1955 makes registration optional, not mandatory; non-registration does not invalidate a marriage. However, in Seema v. Ashwani Kumar (2006) 2 SCC 578 the Supreme Court recognised the serious consequences of non-registration (particularly for women) and directed all state governments to make registration compulsory by amending their rules under Section 8. The Court held that until such registration, certificates or evidence of marriage must be maintained. This directions was to prevent child marriages and protect women's rights. Despite the direction, implementation has been uneven across states.

Source note: Section 8, Hindu Marriage Act 1955; Seema v. Ashwani Kumar (2006) 2 SCC 578